This paper will add to an evolving new paradigm for financial decision-making by exploring the important roles that intuition, heuristics, and impulses play as a bridge between how the conscious and unconscious can wo...This paper will add to an evolving new paradigm for financial decision-making by exploring the important roles that intuition, heuristics, and impulses play as a bridge between how the conscious and unconscious can work together more effectively in making better decisions. Historically, the roles of financial/accounting theory and cognitive psychology have been extensively studied and documented in attempting to explain individual financial decision-making. More recently, neuroscience has made substantial contributions to learning how prospective financial decisions and outcomes affect brain activity and observed decision-making behavior. The evidence from neuroscience indicates that up to 90% of our decisions are initiated at the unconscious level, which is only beginning to be investigated in a systematic manner. Integrating these findings from multiple disciplines, including recent contributions from neuroscience, has many implications, not only with respect to personal and corporate financial decisions and how markets work, but also as an essential component in the tool box of the general decision maker.展开更多
A revival of empiricist theories in cognitive psychology, neuropsychology, and philosophy has been led by figures such as Antonio Damasio （1994）, Lawrence Barsalou （1999）, George Lakoff （1987）, and Jesse Prinz ...A revival of empiricist theories in cognitive psychology, neuropsychology, and philosophy has been led by figures such as Antonio Damasio （1994）, Lawrence Barsalou （1999）, George Lakoff （1987）, and Jesse Prinz （2002; 2004）. Their work has served to connect familiar empiricist approaches to thought and reason with contemporary cognitive psychology and neuroscience. The work of Prinz is of special philosophical significance since it aims to bring together the work of neo-empirically minded theorists in the cognitive and neuro-sciences with main themes found in contemporary philosophical theories of intentionality and reference. In this paper, I examine Prinz＇s efforts to synthesize a neo-empiricist theory of concepts with contemporary semantic theories of reference and intentionality. In part one, I analyze Prinz＇s approach in some depth. In part two, I raise a question concerning the origins of intentionality. Specifically, I am interested in examining the minimum cognitive prerequisites for intentionality within Prinz＇s theory of perception-based representation. In part three, I raise a problem case for Prinz＇s account of the requirements for intentionality, and propose an adjustment in Prinz＇s account to meet the challenge of the objection.展开更多
文摘This paper will add to an evolving new paradigm for financial decision-making by exploring the important roles that intuition, heuristics, and impulses play as a bridge between how the conscious and unconscious can work together more effectively in making better decisions. Historically, the roles of financial/accounting theory and cognitive psychology have been extensively studied and documented in attempting to explain individual financial decision-making. More recently, neuroscience has made substantial contributions to learning how prospective financial decisions and outcomes affect brain activity and observed decision-making behavior. The evidence from neuroscience indicates that up to 90% of our decisions are initiated at the unconscious level, which is only beginning to be investigated in a systematic manner. Integrating these findings from multiple disciplines, including recent contributions from neuroscience, has many implications, not only with respect to personal and corporate financial decisions and how markets work, but also as an essential component in the tool box of the general decision maker.
文摘A revival of empiricist theories in cognitive psychology, neuropsychology, and philosophy has been led by figures such as Antonio Damasio （1994）, Lawrence Barsalou （1999）, George Lakoff （1987）, and Jesse Prinz （2002; 2004）. Their work has served to connect familiar empiricist approaches to thought and reason with contemporary cognitive psychology and neuroscience. The work of Prinz is of special philosophical significance since it aims to bring together the work of neo-empirically minded theorists in the cognitive and neuro-sciences with main themes found in contemporary philosophical theories of intentionality and reference. In this paper, I examine Prinz＇s efforts to synthesize a neo-empiricist theory of concepts with contemporary semantic theories of reference and intentionality. In part one, I analyze Prinz＇s approach in some depth. In part two, I raise a question concerning the origins of intentionality. Specifically, I am interested in examining the minimum cognitive prerequisites for intentionality within Prinz＇s theory of perception-based representation. In part three, I raise a problem case for Prinz＇s account of the requirements for intentionality, and propose an adjustment in Prinz＇s account to meet the challenge of the objection.
