A revival of empiricist theories in cognitive psychology, neuropsychology, and philosophy has been led by figures such as Antonio Damasio （1994）, Lawrence Barsalou （1999）, George Lakoff （1987）, and Jesse Prinz ...A revival of empiricist theories in cognitive psychology, neuropsychology, and philosophy has been led by figures such as Antonio Damasio （1994）, Lawrence Barsalou （1999）, George Lakoff （1987）, and Jesse Prinz （2002; 2004）. Their work has served to connect familiar empiricist approaches to thought and reason with contemporary cognitive psychology and neuroscience. The work of Prinz is of special philosophical significance since it aims to bring together the work of neo-empirically minded theorists in the cognitive and neuro-sciences with main themes found in contemporary philosophical theories of intentionality and reference. In this paper, I examine Prinz＇s efforts to synthesize a neo-empiricist theory of concepts with contemporary semantic theories of reference and intentionality. In part one, I analyze Prinz＇s approach in some depth. In part two, I raise a question concerning the origins of intentionality. Specifically, I am interested in examining the minimum cognitive prerequisites for intentionality within Prinz＇s theory of perception-based representation. In part three, I raise a problem case for Prinz＇s account of the requirements for intentionality, and propose an adjustment in Prinz＇s account to meet the challenge of the objection.展开更多
Bildung, a western cultural ideal, which fundamentally can be traced back to biblical connotations, but is also rich in Platonic elements from the history of hermeneutics, reached its culmination point by the 19th cen...Bildung, a western cultural ideal, which fundamentally can be traced back to biblical connotations, but is also rich in Platonic elements from the history of hermeneutics, reached its culmination point by the 19th century. As the vast superstructure of western erudition, it has acquired the rank of the sole discursive and epistemic normativity, which has defined not only its own system, i.e., education in its narrow sense, but also the criteria of scientific assertions. Since the basis of Bildung was formed by the variations of classical erudition changing by every era, so in the Age of Bildung the defining epistemological and methodological pattern, which determined it from a discursive, and at the same time, an epistemological point of view, was meant by classical philology. As a classical philologist Friedrich Nietzsche was among the first to point out the inseparable connection between rhetoric, interpretation, and epistemology. Nietzsche, as against the monolithic tradition of Bildung, developed a set of aspects of subversive criticism of science, so his surpassing of the nineteenth century academic philology and renewal of it as a kind of cultural hermeneutics walk hand in hand. Nietzschean philology, first and foremost, has to be adapted for revaluing its scientific statements from the aspect of art, i.e., aesthetical sensitivity, which has to be reassessed from viewpoint of effects on life as active potential. The claims of Nietzsche are so comprehensive that the notion of morality defined by Bildung, as well as the ethical system of Bildung, the sole sense of morality is questioned, and his issues are extended over the methodological basis of Bildung considered as normative. However, he does not use such a method of interpretation that, to a certain extent, would not have been known and used by the philology of the Bildung＇s scientific ideal. With the difference that the Nietzschean critical practice does not have respect for the borders defining homologous structures but, by implementing transgressive tactics, it claims the authority of these borders. In my article, I show how the Nietzschean propositions for the methodological reform of classical philology did set the stage for Nietzsche＇s later critical comments, now purely on the philosophy of science, and I analyse the multifold consequences of the concept of the Nietzschean philology as an ＂existential science,＂ which was aimed to de（con）struct the concept of Bildung.展开更多
文摘A revival of empiricist theories in cognitive psychology, neuropsychology, and philosophy has been led by figures such as Antonio Damasio （1994）, Lawrence Barsalou （1999）, George Lakoff （1987）, and Jesse Prinz （2002; 2004）. Their work has served to connect familiar empiricist approaches to thought and reason with contemporary cognitive psychology and neuroscience. The work of Prinz is of special philosophical significance since it aims to bring together the work of neo-empirically minded theorists in the cognitive and neuro-sciences with main themes found in contemporary philosophical theories of intentionality and reference. In this paper, I examine Prinz＇s efforts to synthesize a neo-empiricist theory of concepts with contemporary semantic theories of reference and intentionality. In part one, I analyze Prinz＇s approach in some depth. In part two, I raise a question concerning the origins of intentionality. Specifically, I am interested in examining the minimum cognitive prerequisites for intentionality within Prinz＇s theory of perception-based representation. In part three, I raise a problem case for Prinz＇s account of the requirements for intentionality, and propose an adjustment in Prinz＇s account to meet the challenge of the objection.
文摘Bildung, a western cultural ideal, which fundamentally can be traced back to biblical connotations, but is also rich in Platonic elements from the history of hermeneutics, reached its culmination point by the 19th century. As the vast superstructure of western erudition, it has acquired the rank of the sole discursive and epistemic normativity, which has defined not only its own system, i.e., education in its narrow sense, but also the criteria of scientific assertions. Since the basis of Bildung was formed by the variations of classical erudition changing by every era, so in the Age of Bildung the defining epistemological and methodological pattern, which determined it from a discursive, and at the same time, an epistemological point of view, was meant by classical philology. As a classical philologist Friedrich Nietzsche was among the first to point out the inseparable connection between rhetoric, interpretation, and epistemology. Nietzsche, as against the monolithic tradition of Bildung, developed a set of aspects of subversive criticism of science, so his surpassing of the nineteenth century academic philology and renewal of it as a kind of cultural hermeneutics walk hand in hand. Nietzschean philology, first and foremost, has to be adapted for revaluing its scientific statements from the aspect of art, i.e., aesthetical sensitivity, which has to be reassessed from viewpoint of effects on life as active potential. The claims of Nietzsche are so comprehensive that the notion of morality defined by Bildung, as well as the ethical system of Bildung, the sole sense of morality is questioned, and his issues are extended over the methodological basis of Bildung considered as normative. However, he does not use such a method of interpretation that, to a certain extent, would not have been known and used by the philology of the Bildung＇s scientific ideal. With the difference that the Nietzschean critical practice does not have respect for the borders defining homologous structures but, by implementing transgressive tactics, it claims the authority of these borders. In my article, I show how the Nietzschean propositions for the methodological reform of classical philology did set the stage for Nietzsche＇s later critical comments, now purely on the philosophy of science, and I analyse the multifold consequences of the concept of the Nietzschean philology as an ＂existential science,＂ which was aimed to de（con）struct the concept of Bildung.
