Thomas S. Kuhn＇s theory of normal science （NS）, aside from being a provocative philosophical reconstruction of the relatively conservative phase of scientific research, contains useful ideas for systematic analysis...Thomas S. Kuhn＇s theory of normal science （NS）, aside from being a provocative philosophical reconstruction of the relatively conservative phase of scientific research, contains useful ideas for systematic analysis of specific episodes in the history of science. Therefore, although the theory has been looked at from different angles since the first edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions （TSSR） was published in 1962, its detailed exploration of the cumulative phase of research in mature science is of abiding relevance in the philosophy of science. This is because NS provides a compelling account of how and why members of scientific communities succeed, largely, to produce reliable knowledge about an incompletely known phenomenal world. Again, the theory elucidates special features of scientific research that differentiate it from other creative enterprises. In that regard, this paper reconstructs Arthur Compton＇s research into x-ray scattering as a good instantiation of NS. Discussion of Compton＇s convincing demonstration of the particulate properties of electromagnetic radiation within the framework of NS showcases the elucidatory power of Kuhn＇s theory with respect to selected episodes in science, and corroborates the notion that the bulk of scientific work is a conservative puzzle-solving activity with the potential for precipitating scientific revolutions. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time that Compton＇s groundbreaking work on x-ray scattering has been analysed within the framework of Kuhn＇s philosophy of science.展开更多
Thomas S. Kuhn is one of the leading philosophers and historians of science that investigated in-depth cases of simultaneous discoveries in science. Although his analysis of the discovery of energy conservation and ox...Thomas S. Kuhn is one of the leading philosophers and historians of science that investigated in-depth cases of simultaneous discoveries in science. Although his analysis of the discovery of energy conservation and oxygen did not focus sharply on the priority disputes involved, it is within such contexts that controversy about which scientist was the first to make a discovery takes place. Evidently, Kuhn＇s recourse to historical case studies is a clear departure from the standpoint of traditional mainstream philosophies of science （namely, logical positivism and falsificationism）, which cavalierly dismissed such concerns as irrelevant to philosophical reconstructions of science Challenges to orthodox logistic approaches were prompted by the realisation that the two dominant traditions mentioned above, in their excessive preoccupation with ＂the logical skeleton of science＂, have lost contact with real science. As a contribution to what Michael Polanyi referred to as post-critical philosophy, the present study reanalyses the tension-generating potentials of bipolar values shared by members of scientific communities. It traces the origins of the rebellion against logic-dominated philosophies of science, and identifies different post-positivist approaches that have eme^rged over the years which legitimise broadening the frontiers of the philosophy of science. Consequent upon that, some conflicting values or norms shared by members of scientific communities and how they affect the quest for scientific knowledge are underscored. Using as a case study the acrimonious priority dispute between Isaac Newton and Gottfried Leibniz concerning the discovery of calculus, the paper demonstrates that excessive concern for recognition which sometimes leads to protracted priority disputes tends to bring out the worst kind of behaviours towards colleagues even from the greatest scientists. We submit, by way of conclusion, that despite the heroic （almost god-like） reputation of such scientists, they are human and, therefore, subject to the vicissitudes of emotional turbulence just like everyone else.展开更多
文摘Thomas S. Kuhn＇s theory of normal science （NS）, aside from being a provocative philosophical reconstruction of the relatively conservative phase of scientific research, contains useful ideas for systematic analysis of specific episodes in the history of science. Therefore, although the theory has been looked at from different angles since the first edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions （TSSR） was published in 1962, its detailed exploration of the cumulative phase of research in mature science is of abiding relevance in the philosophy of science. This is because NS provides a compelling account of how and why members of scientific communities succeed, largely, to produce reliable knowledge about an incompletely known phenomenal world. Again, the theory elucidates special features of scientific research that differentiate it from other creative enterprises. In that regard, this paper reconstructs Arthur Compton＇s research into x-ray scattering as a good instantiation of NS. Discussion of Compton＇s convincing demonstration of the particulate properties of electromagnetic radiation within the framework of NS showcases the elucidatory power of Kuhn＇s theory with respect to selected episodes in science, and corroborates the notion that the bulk of scientific work is a conservative puzzle-solving activity with the potential for precipitating scientific revolutions. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time that Compton＇s groundbreaking work on x-ray scattering has been analysed within the framework of Kuhn＇s philosophy of science.
文摘Thomas S. Kuhn is one of the leading philosophers and historians of science that investigated in-depth cases of simultaneous discoveries in science. Although his analysis of the discovery of energy conservation and oxygen did not focus sharply on the priority disputes involved, it is within such contexts that controversy about which scientist was the first to make a discovery takes place. Evidently, Kuhn＇s recourse to historical case studies is a clear departure from the standpoint of traditional mainstream philosophies of science （namely, logical positivism and falsificationism）, which cavalierly dismissed such concerns as irrelevant to philosophical reconstructions of science Challenges to orthodox logistic approaches were prompted by the realisation that the two dominant traditions mentioned above, in their excessive preoccupation with ＂the logical skeleton of science＂, have lost contact with real science. As a contribution to what Michael Polanyi referred to as post-critical philosophy, the present study reanalyses the tension-generating potentials of bipolar values shared by members of scientific communities. It traces the origins of the rebellion against logic-dominated philosophies of science, and identifies different post-positivist approaches that have eme^rged over the years which legitimise broadening the frontiers of the philosophy of science. Consequent upon that, some conflicting values or norms shared by members of scientific communities and how they affect the quest for scientific knowledge are underscored. Using as a case study the acrimonious priority dispute between Isaac Newton and Gottfried Leibniz concerning the discovery of calculus, the paper demonstrates that excessive concern for recognition which sometimes leads to protracted priority disputes tends to bring out the worst kind of behaviours towards colleagues even from the greatest scientists. We submit, by way of conclusion, that despite the heroic （almost god-like） reputation of such scientists, they are human and, therefore, subject to the vicissitudes of emotional turbulence just like everyone else.
