This paper investigates the incentives of invest in improving quality （as opposed to investments in new activities） in the telecommunications industry, based on the example of wireless markets. What is the impact of...This paper investigates the incentives of invest in improving quality （as opposed to investments in new activities） in the telecommunications industry, based on the example of wireless markets. What is the impact of competition on incentives to invest, and on capacities to invest？ What is the role of the rate of penetration and technical progress？ This paper highlights the fact that investment incentives are positively related to potential for technical progress. Investment incentives also depend on market structure, competition intensity, and penetration rate, but not monotonically. This paper consists of a theoretical part which, under assumptions of full market coverage and market share symmetry, shows that for each national market, there is a target level of investment which companies strive to achieve but had not exceeded, and an empirical part that confirms the findings of the theoretical part and explains the differences with the theoretical part by relaxing the assumptions of full coverage and market share symmetry. This target level on the one hand depends on the potential for technical progress and on the other hand, depends on the rate of penetration. From a social perspective, this target level is the best amount that companies are encouraged to invest. Non-achievement of the target level entails underinvestment and a decrease in consumer surplus and welfare and may slow down technical progress. A data set covering 30 countries over a period of eight years is used to empirically prove the existence of a change in investment behavior depending on whether or not the target level is achieved. A low margin per user may hamper achievement of the target level. As a result, maximum consumer surplus and welfare occur under imperfect competition but not under perfect competition.展开更多
As an incentive to innovation, intellectual property （IP） should be protected by law. However, as it is a key factor in market competition, it should also be subject to competition law. In most jurisdictions, restri...As an incentive to innovation, intellectual property （IP） should be protected by law. However, as it is a key factor in market competition, it should also be subject to competition law. In most jurisdictions, restriction of competition related to IP rights is not a black and white question, and such rights are challenged only when the IP owners hold market power and when protection of their fights has a serious and unreasonable effect on competition. In assessing IP-related restriction of competition, we need to analyze several elements： we have to define the relevant markets, identify the parties concerned, determine their market share, assess the anti-competitive effects of the controls, etc.. China＇s existing legislation is not adequate to solve problems arising from IP-related restriction of competition. Nevertheless, the process of China＇s legislation on this issue shows clearly that the misuse of IP rights for the purpose of excluding or significantly restricting competition is not justifiable under competition law.展开更多
文摘This paper investigates the incentives of invest in improving quality （as opposed to investments in new activities） in the telecommunications industry, based on the example of wireless markets. What is the impact of competition on incentives to invest, and on capacities to invest？ What is the role of the rate of penetration and technical progress？ This paper highlights the fact that investment incentives are positively related to potential for technical progress. Investment incentives also depend on market structure, competition intensity, and penetration rate, but not monotonically. This paper consists of a theoretical part which, under assumptions of full market coverage and market share symmetry, shows that for each national market, there is a target level of investment which companies strive to achieve but had not exceeded, and an empirical part that confirms the findings of the theoretical part and explains the differences with the theoretical part by relaxing the assumptions of full coverage and market share symmetry. This target level on the one hand depends on the potential for technical progress and on the other hand, depends on the rate of penetration. From a social perspective, this target level is the best amount that companies are encouraged to invest. Non-achievement of the target level entails underinvestment and a decrease in consumer surplus and welfare and may slow down technical progress. A data set covering 30 countries over a period of eight years is used to empirically prove the existence of a change in investment behavior depending on whether or not the target level is achieved. A low margin per user may hamper achievement of the target level. As a result, maximum consumer surplus and welfare occur under imperfect competition but not under perfect competition.
基金This article forms part of the 2006 national major project of the Ministry of Justice on the rule of law and judicial theory,"Market Economy and Anti-monopoly Law:From the Perspective of Intellectual Property"(06SFB 1015).
文摘As an incentive to innovation, intellectual property （IP） should be protected by law. However, as it is a key factor in market competition, it should also be subject to competition law. In most jurisdictions, restriction of competition related to IP rights is not a black and white question, and such rights are challenged only when the IP owners hold market power and when protection of their fights has a serious and unreasonable effect on competition. In assessing IP-related restriction of competition, we need to analyze several elements： we have to define the relevant markets, identify the parties concerned, determine their market share, assess the anti-competitive effects of the controls, etc.. China＇s existing legislation is not adequate to solve problems arising from IP-related restriction of competition. Nevertheless, the process of China＇s legislation on this issue shows clearly that the misuse of IP rights for the purpose of excluding or significantly restricting competition is not justifiable under competition law.
