To put the ongoing debate in the philosophy of emotions in a wider context, access to medieval philosophy could turn out to be useful. Huxley＇s ＂Brave New World＂ is a world without history and without strong emotio...To put the ongoing debate in the philosophy of emotions in a wider context, access to medieval philosophy could turn out to be useful. Huxley＇s ＂Brave New World＂ is a world without history and without strong emotions--so let＇s plea for both. The medieval complementarity of intellectus and affectus is an example of the central role of the emotive powers in medieval anthropology. It could be worth discussing even today, as well as the notion ofscientia affectiva. By the way, a Franciscan thinker of the 13th century, Olivi, seems to explain better than Descartes the depths of subjectivity： I think, therefore I am--but I feel, therefore I am I.展开更多
The intellectual heritage of modernity needs rethinking. It is marked by radical humanism and implied by the ideas of Descartes and Kant above all, which introduces an unbridgeable gap between animals and human perso...The intellectual heritage of modernity needs rethinking. It is marked by radical humanism and implied by the ideas of Descartes and Kant above all, which introduces an unbridgeable gap between animals and human persons （nonhuman and human animals）. Intuitive sensibility to the question of the welfare of nonhuman animals meets a theoretical ally in the rapidly growing knowledge on their subjectivity and makes us pose a questions about their ontological status. This context arouses a possibility of a turn to personalist ethics, yet not to its anthropocentric version implied by Kant, but to personalism conceived of as an instance of value ethics as exemplified by Antonio Rosmini and Karol Wojtyta （John Paul II）.展开更多
文摘To put the ongoing debate in the philosophy of emotions in a wider context, access to medieval philosophy could turn out to be useful. Huxley＇s ＂Brave New World＂ is a world without history and without strong emotions--so let＇s plea for both. The medieval complementarity of intellectus and affectus is an example of the central role of the emotive powers in medieval anthropology. It could be worth discussing even today, as well as the notion ofscientia affectiva. By the way, a Franciscan thinker of the 13th century, Olivi, seems to explain better than Descartes the depths of subjectivity： I think, therefore I am--but I feel, therefore I am I.
文摘The intellectual heritage of modernity needs rethinking. It is marked by radical humanism and implied by the ideas of Descartes and Kant above all, which introduces an unbridgeable gap between animals and human persons （nonhuman and human animals）. Intuitive sensibility to the question of the welfare of nonhuman animals meets a theoretical ally in the rapidly growing knowledge on their subjectivity and makes us pose a questions about their ontological status. This context arouses a possibility of a turn to personalist ethics, yet not to its anthropocentric version implied by Kant, but to personalism conceived of as an instance of value ethics as exemplified by Antonio Rosmini and Karol Wojtyta （John Paul II）.
