Kuquradi （1994）, in a paper entitled ＂The concept of Justice,＂ makes a determination in terms of the situation of injustice by comparing individual situations. In her opinion, when we consider the injustice in ind...Kuquradi （1994）, in a paper entitled ＂The concept of Justice,＂ makes a determination in terms of the situation of injustice by comparing individual situations. In her opinion, when we consider the injustice in individual situations, we consider two different things and compare them through a third （middle） term. In other words, we consider： （1） some things that a person possesses at a certain moment, （2） the things that another person possesses at a certain moment, and （3） we compare human beings as a species, in respect of the actualisation of the human potentialities at this historical moment. From the Ku^uradi＇s point of view, conceptualization of the idea of justice, that is, giving an answer that can be established by knowledge to the question of ＂what is justice？＂ is the inevitable condition for surpassing this situation （1994）. But, here we may claim that the situation of injustice can be surpassed by the feeling of respect for human being in the Kantian sense without the conceptualizing the idea of justice as a precondition. If certain persons who actualize the human potentialities in a higher degree than others at the same historical moment and act with a will determined by the law of moral, shall inevitably be respected by other persons who have not yet actualized such potentialities in themselves. It seems that the appearance of this feeling is possible only through a moral education in the Kantian sense, through which persons who have actualized human potentialities in a higher degree will possess a will determined by the moral law.展开更多
Through a semantic analysis of such common words as ＂good,＂ ＂right,＂ and ＂rights,＂ this article tries to argue that ＂justice＂ as a value-term basically means ＂no unacceptable harm to the human＂ or ＂respecti...Through a semantic analysis of such common words as ＂good,＂ ＂right,＂ and ＂rights,＂ this article tries to argue that ＂justice＂ as a value-term basically means ＂no unacceptable harm to the human＂ or ＂respecting the deserved rights of the human＂ in the meta-ethical sense. In real life, then, the becoming of universal justice as an authentic moral virtue depends first and foremost upon the concrete and dynamic cultivation of such a universalistic ethical attitude： regarding neither merely oneself nor some persons specially related to oneself, but everyone as the ＂human,＂ and valuing all of them morally important and dignified so as not to do morally unacceptable harm to them, but to respect their deserved rights.展开更多
文摘Kuquradi （1994）, in a paper entitled ＂The concept of Justice,＂ makes a determination in terms of the situation of injustice by comparing individual situations. In her opinion, when we consider the injustice in individual situations, we consider two different things and compare them through a third （middle） term. In other words, we consider： （1） some things that a person possesses at a certain moment, （2） the things that another person possesses at a certain moment, and （3） we compare human beings as a species, in respect of the actualisation of the human potentialities at this historical moment. From the Ku^uradi＇s point of view, conceptualization of the idea of justice, that is, giving an answer that can be established by knowledge to the question of ＂what is justice？＂ is the inevitable condition for surpassing this situation （1994）. But, here we may claim that the situation of injustice can be surpassed by the feeling of respect for human being in the Kantian sense without the conceptualizing the idea of justice as a precondition. If certain persons who actualize the human potentialities in a higher degree than others at the same historical moment and act with a will determined by the law of moral, shall inevitably be respected by other persons who have not yet actualized such potentialities in themselves. It seems that the appearance of this feeling is possible only through a moral education in the Kantian sense, through which persons who have actualized human potentialities in a higher degree will possess a will determined by the moral law.
文摘Through a semantic analysis of such common words as ＂good,＂ ＂right,＂ and ＂rights,＂ this article tries to argue that ＂justice＂ as a value-term basically means ＂no unacceptable harm to the human＂ or ＂respecting the deserved rights of the human＂ in the meta-ethical sense. In real life, then, the becoming of universal justice as an authentic moral virtue depends first and foremost upon the concrete and dynamic cultivation of such a universalistic ethical attitude： regarding neither merely oneself nor some persons specially related to oneself, but everyone as the ＂human,＂ and valuing all of them morally important and dignified so as not to do morally unacceptable harm to them, but to respect their deserved rights.
