计及电解铝负荷需求侧响应的风电并网调峰研究

风电的反调峰特性和电网中调峰资源的不足,导致系统对风电的消纳能力偏低,弃风现象严重。相较于安装储能设备等措施,引导负荷侧参与需求响应是一项经济且高效的手段。考虑到西部地区丰富的可再生能源和众多电解铝企业,本文提出一种引导电解铝负荷参与风电调峰的方法。首先,建立了电解铝负荷的数学模型;以此为基础,借鉴鲁棒优化的思想,引入功率松弛变量,设计了电网-多电解铝负荷的协同调度模型,在电网侧采用模糊机会约束刻画风电出力的不确定性;同时通过交互松弛变量的值,在保证电解铝负荷生产隐私的前提下,实现双方的有效调度;然后,采用纳什合作博弈模型,进行多方利益分配;最后,通过改进的IEEE-30节点测试系统,验证了本文所提方法的可行性。

排序博弈:合作博弈的新发展

本文指出人类社会发展模式的巨变决定合作博弈理论研究和应用研究的必要性和紧迫性;简要综述以合作联盟内的任务分配不是决策变量为特征的合作博弈模型的研究成果;系统介绍由Nash(纳什)创立的把联盟内的任务分配作为决策变量的另一类两人合作Nash Bargaining Model(NBM,纳什博弈模型)及其Nash Bargaining Solution(NBS,纳什博弈解);强调排序博弈是NBM在管理学中的离散化发展;完整介绍此离散化方面开创性论文中全新的定义、改进的博弈模型、创新的博弈机制、求解博弈解(集)的精确算法;最后指出NBM的改进和离散化这两方面后续研究的几个重要方向。

A game-theory approach against Byzantine attack in cooperative spectrum sensing

In order to solve the Byzantine attack problem in cooperative spectrum sensing,a non-cooperative game-theory approach is proposed to realize an effective Byzantine defense.First,under the framework of the proposed non-cooperative game theory,the pure Byzantine attack strategy and defense strategy in cooperative spectrum sensing are analyzed from the perspective of the Byzantine attacker and network administrator.The cost and benefit of the pure strategy on both sides are defined. Secondly,the mixed attack and defense strategy are also derived. The closed form Nash equilibrium is obtained by the Lemke-Howson algorithm. Furthermore,the impact of the benefit ratio and penalty rate on the dynamic process of the noncooperative game is analyzed. Numerical simulation results show that the proposed game-theory approach can effectively defend against the Byzantine attack and save the defensive cost.

A projected gradient based game theoretic approach for multi-user power control in cognitive radio network

The fifth generation （5G） networks have been envisioned to support the explosive growth of data demand caused by the increasing traditional high-rate mobile users and the expected rise of interconnections between human and things. To accommodate the ever-growing data traffic with scarce spectrum resources, cognitive radio （CR） is considered a promising technology to improve spectrum utilization. We study the power control problem for secondary users in an underlay CR network. Unlike most existing studies which simplify the problem by considering only a single primary user or channel, we investigate a more realistic scenario where multiple primary users share multiple channels with secondary users. We formulate the power control problem as a non-cooperative game with coupled constraints, where the Pareto optimality and achievable total throughput can be obtained by a Nash equilibrium （NE） solution. To achieve NE of the game, we first propose a projected gradient based dynamic model whose equilibrium points are equivalent to the NE of the original game, and then derive a centralized algorithm to solve the problem. Simulation results show that the convergence and effectiveness of our proposed solution, emphasizing the proposed algorithm, are competitive. Moreover, we demonstrate the robustness of our proposed solution as the network size increases.

A survey of static and dynamic potential games

Potential games are noncooperative games for which there exist auxiliary functions, called potentials,such that the maximizers of the potential are also Nash equilibria of the corresponding game. Some properties of Nash equilibria, such as existence or stability, can be derived from the potential, whenever it exists. We survey different classes of potential games in the static and dynamic cases, with a finite number of players, as well as in population games where a continuum of players is allowed. Likewise, theoretical concepts and applications are discussed by means of illustrative examples.

Strategically supported cooperation in dynamic games with coalition structures

The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.