The negative externalities of businesses brought serious social and environmental problems. Based on externality theory and game theory, the author in-depth analyzes intrinsic motivation of corporate social responsibi...The negative externalities of businesses brought serious social and environmental problems. Based on externality theory and game theory, the author in-depth analyzes intrinsic motivation of corporate social responsibility, and points out that corporate social responsibility will increase production costs, so companies will not take the initiative to raise the level of social responsibility. Through the analysis of corporate social responsibility profits, the paper reveals that if the government lack reasonable system to regulate corporate behavior, then the In＇m, pursuiting maximizing profit, will choose the Nash equilibrium ofconsumpting public resources, and not take the initiative to fulfill their social responsibility to seek the Pareto equilibrium of the whole regional optimal, which results in high output and low returns. The research finds that the government should strengthen the publicity of corporate social responsibility, privatization of corporate social responsibility benefits and establishment of corporate social responsibility system and other means to guide and standardize the corporate social responsihility.展开更多
The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the d...The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.展开更多
Mean field theory has raised a lot of interest in the recent years (see in particular the results of Lasry-Lions in 2006 and 2007,of Gueant-Lasry-Lions in 2011,of HuangCaines-Malham in 2007 and many others).There are ...Mean field theory has raised a lot of interest in the recent years (see in particular the results of Lasry-Lions in 2006 and 2007,of Gueant-Lasry-Lions in 2011,of HuangCaines-Malham in 2007 and many others).There are a lot of applications.In general,the applications concern approximating an infinite number of players with common behavior by a representative agent.This agent has to solve a control problem perturbed by a field equation,representing in some way the behavior of the average infinite number of agents.This approach does not lead easily to the problems of Nash equilibrium for a finite number of players,perturbed by field equations,unless one considers averaging within different groups,which has not been done in the literature,and seems quite challenging.In this paper,the authors approach similar problems with a different motivation which makes sense for control and also for differential games.Thus the systems of nonlinear partial differential equations with mean field terms,which have not been addressed in the literature so far,are considered here.展开更多
文摘The negative externalities of businesses brought serious social and environmental problems. Based on externality theory and game theory, the author in-depth analyzes intrinsic motivation of corporate social responsibility, and points out that corporate social responsibility will increase production costs, so companies will not take the initiative to raise the level of social responsibility. Through the analysis of corporate social responsibility profits, the paper reveals that if the government lack reasonable system to regulate corporate behavior, then the In＇m, pursuiting maximizing profit, will choose the Nash equilibrium ofconsumpting public resources, and not take the initiative to fulfill their social responsibility to seek the Pareto equilibrium of the whole regional optimal, which results in high output and low returns. The research finds that the government should strengthen the publicity of corporate social responsibility, privatization of corporate social responsibility benefits and establishment of corporate social responsibility system and other means to guide and standardize the corporate social responsihility.
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.7117112071373262 and 71571108)+3 种基金Projects of International(Regional)Cooperation and Exchanges of National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.71411130215)Specialized Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education of China(Grant No.20133706110002)Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province of China(Grant No.ZR2015GZ007)Saint Petersburg State University(Grant No.9.38.245.2014)
文摘The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.
基金Project supported by the WCU World Class University program through the National Research Foundation of Korea funded by the Ministry of Education,Science and Technology (No. R31-20007)the Research Grants Council of HKSAR (No. PolyU 5001/11P)
文摘Mean field theory has raised a lot of interest in the recent years (see in particular the results of Lasry-Lions in 2006 and 2007,of Gueant-Lasry-Lions in 2011,of HuangCaines-Malham in 2007 and many others).There are a lot of applications.In general,the applications concern approximating an infinite number of players with common behavior by a representative agent.This agent has to solve a control problem perturbed by a field equation,representing in some way the behavior of the average infinite number of agents.This approach does not lead easily to the problems of Nash equilibrium for a finite number of players,perturbed by field equations,unless one considers averaging within different groups,which has not been done in the literature,and seems quite challenging.In this paper,the authors approach similar problems with a different motivation which makes sense for control and also for differential games.Thus the systems of nonlinear partial differential equations with mean field terms,which have not been addressed in the literature so far,are considered here.
