This paper is mainly to discuss cooperative games on convex geometries with a coalition structure, which can be seen as an extension of cooperative games with a coalition structure. For this kind of games, the coopera...This paper is mainly to discuss cooperative games on convex geometries with a coalition structure, which can be seen as an extension of cooperative games with a coalition structure. For this kind of games, the cooperation among unions and within each union will be the convex sets, i.e., the feasible subsets of the coalition structure and that of each union belong to a convex geometry, respectively. The explicit form of the generalized Owen value for this kind of games is given, which can be seen as an extension of the Owen value. Eklrthermore, two special cases of this kind of games are researched. The corresponding Davoff indices are also stHdied. Fin~.llv ~n ilhl^r~＇i, ~r^l~ to ~展开更多
The nation can be broken down into two categories： ＂ancient nations＂ and ＂modern nations.＂ The ancient Huaxia nation went through two phases in the course of its formation： the self-existent nation and the self-...The nation can be broken down into two categories： ＂ancient nations＂ and ＂modern nations.＂ The ancient Huaxia nation went through two phases in the course of its formation： the self-existent nation and the self-aware nation. The reason the self-existent Huaxia nation1 arose in the Xia and Shang period lies in its unified yet diverse composite state structure that could encompass a variety of buzu within the framework of a dynastic state. The pre-Xia Five Emperors period saw the genesis of the Huaxia nation. During this period, different buzu states were cemented into a diverse yet unified nation-state through a confederation of chiefdoms.展开更多
The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the d...The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.71201089, 71271217,and 71071018the Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province,China,under Grant No. ZR2012GQ005
文摘This paper is mainly to discuss cooperative games on convex geometries with a coalition structure, which can be seen as an extension of cooperative games with a coalition structure. For this kind of games, the cooperation among unions and within each union will be the convex sets, i.e., the feasible subsets of the coalition structure and that of each union belong to a convex geometry, respectively. The explicit form of the generalized Owen value for this kind of games is given, which can be seen as an extension of the Owen value. Eklrthermore, two special cases of this kind of games are researched. The corresponding Davoff indices are also stHdied. Fin~.llv ~n ilhl^r~＇i, ~r^l~ to ~
基金part of the fruits of the National Key Program for Social Sciences on"Theories and Methodologies in Research on the Origins of China"(Grant No.:12&ZD133) in 2012funded by Shanghai Higher Education’s Connotation Construction Project("085 Project") of Sociology
文摘The nation can be broken down into two categories： ＂ancient nations＂ and ＂modern nations.＂ The ancient Huaxia nation went through two phases in the course of its formation： the self-existent nation and the self-aware nation. The reason the self-existent Huaxia nation1 arose in the Xia and Shang period lies in its unified yet diverse composite state structure that could encompass a variety of buzu within the framework of a dynastic state. The pre-Xia Five Emperors period saw the genesis of the Huaxia nation. During this period, different buzu states were cemented into a diverse yet unified nation-state through a confederation of chiefdoms.
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.7117112071373262 and 71571108)+3 种基金Projects of International(Regional)Cooperation and Exchanges of National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.71411130215)Specialized Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education of China(Grant No.20133706110002)Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province of China(Grant No.ZR2015GZ007)Saint Petersburg State University(Grant No.9.38.245.2014)
文摘The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.
