By inserting the variable of the exactness of corporate valuation into the classic model of Contract Theory, this paper, on the bases of the interaction of the variables of the veraciousness of corporate valuation, ma...By inserting the variable of the exactness of corporate valuation into the classic model of Contract Theory, this paper, on the bases of the interaction of the variables of the veraciousness of corporate valuation, managerial incentives and operational risks, explores the deep-seated reasons for changes in corporate structures, and draws the conclusion that the divestment of the subsidiary is beneficial to shareholders when the parent corporate is undervalued and that the relation between the parent and the subsidiary is disordered, or vice versa. This conclusion is consistent with the motives of many divestiture cases in reality.展开更多
The mode of arrangement and innovation of governance for corporate rights of control should be in accordance with the global resource disposition opportunities and efficiency competition. Based on rights formulated by...The mode of arrangement and innovation of governance for corporate rights of control should be in accordance with the global resource disposition opportunities and efficiency competition. Based on rights formulated by acts and regulations, this paper establishes models of arrangement for corporate rights of control, and then analyses the composite basic features derived from the models. To conclude, a main frame for the arrangement and innovation of corporate rights of control is put forward based on the real practice of listed companies in China.展开更多
文摘By inserting the variable of the exactness of corporate valuation into the classic model of Contract Theory, this paper, on the bases of the interaction of the variables of the veraciousness of corporate valuation, managerial incentives and operational risks, explores the deep-seated reasons for changes in corporate structures, and draws the conclusion that the divestment of the subsidiary is beneficial to shareholders when the parent corporate is undervalued and that the relation between the parent and the subsidiary is disordered, or vice versa. This conclusion is consistent with the motives of many divestiture cases in reality.
文摘The mode of arrangement and innovation of governance for corporate rights of control should be in accordance with the global resource disposition opportunities and efficiency competition. Based on rights formulated by acts and regulations, this paper establishes models of arrangement for corporate rights of control, and then analyses the composite basic features derived from the models. To conclude, a main frame for the arrangement and innovation of corporate rights of control is put forward based on the real practice of listed companies in China.