2023年修订的《公司法》延续了此前的股份回购规定,较为宽松的回购条件旨在激活上市公司的股份回购功能,但实践中“忽悠式”股份回购频发,回购计划仅仅停留在“纸面功夫”,不仅损害了投资者、中小股东等多方主体的利益,还降低了股份回...2023年修订的《公司法》延续了此前的股份回购规定,较为宽松的回购条件旨在激活上市公司的股份回购功能,但实践中“忽悠式”股份回购频发,回购计划仅仅停留在“纸面功夫”,不仅损害了投资者、中小股东等多方主体的利益,还降低了股份回购方案的可信度,导致市场反应下降。股份回购决议程序不严格、信息披露机制落实不到位以及“忽悠式”股份回购的责任与救济不明,三者共同构成这一问题的法律成因。基于此,建议弥补上市公司股份回购决议中的疏漏,并通过细化回购信息披露的阶段性内容和发挥第三方在信息披露中的作用来规范相关义务主体的信息披露义务,并完善“忽悠式”股份回购的责任追究机制。The Company Law amended in 2023 continues the previous share repurchase provisions, and the relatively loose repurchase conditions aim to activate the share repurchase function of listed companies. However, in practice, “flickering” share repurchases are frequent, and repurchase plans only stay on paper. This not only harms the interests of investors and small- and medium-sized shareholders, but also reduces the credibility of share repurchase plans, leading to a decrease in market reaction. The share repurchase resolution procedure is not strict, the information disclosure mechanism is not in place, and the responsibility and relief of "fraudulent" share repurchase are unclear, which all constitute the legal cause of this problem. Based on this, it is recommended to make up for the omissions in the resolution on share repurchase of listed companies, and standardize the information disclosure obligations of relevant obligation subjects by refining the phased content of repurchase information disclosure and leveraging the role of third parties in information disclosure, and improve the accountability mechanism for "fraudulent" share repurchase.展开更多
文摘2023年修订的《公司法》延续了此前的股份回购规定,较为宽松的回购条件旨在激活上市公司的股份回购功能,但实践中“忽悠式”股份回购频发,回购计划仅仅停留在“纸面功夫”,不仅损害了投资者、中小股东等多方主体的利益,还降低了股份回购方案的可信度,导致市场反应下降。股份回购决议程序不严格、信息披露机制落实不到位以及“忽悠式”股份回购的责任与救济不明,三者共同构成这一问题的法律成因。基于此,建议弥补上市公司股份回购决议中的疏漏,并通过细化回购信息披露的阶段性内容和发挥第三方在信息披露中的作用来规范相关义务主体的信息披露义务,并完善“忽悠式”股份回购的责任追究机制。The Company Law amended in 2023 continues the previous share repurchase provisions, and the relatively loose repurchase conditions aim to activate the share repurchase function of listed companies. However, in practice, “flickering” share repurchases are frequent, and repurchase plans only stay on paper. This not only harms the interests of investors and small- and medium-sized shareholders, but also reduces the credibility of share repurchase plans, leading to a decrease in market reaction. The share repurchase resolution procedure is not strict, the information disclosure mechanism is not in place, and the responsibility and relief of "fraudulent" share repurchase are unclear, which all constitute the legal cause of this problem. Based on this, it is recommended to make up for the omissions in the resolution on share repurchase of listed companies, and standardize the information disclosure obligations of relevant obligation subjects by refining the phased content of repurchase information disclosure and leveraging the role of third parties in information disclosure, and improve the accountability mechanism for "fraudulent" share repurchase.
