This paper addresses the relationship between ontology and ethics, as outlined in Charles Taylor＇s essay ＂Ethics and Ontology,＂ problematizing it from a narrative ethics viewpoint. It attempts to overcome the ＂bin...This paper addresses the relationship between ontology and ethics, as outlined in Charles Taylor＇s essay ＂Ethics and Ontology,＂ problematizing it from a narrative ethics viewpoint. It attempts to overcome the ＂binary＂ dichotomy presented in Taylor＇s essay, insisting instead in favour of an approach that distances itself from both reductionist naturalism and ancient and medieval ontological models. The move towards narrative ethics is positioned in relation to an implicit ontology. Taylor recognizes that man＇s way of life ＂consists of ways of sense making;＂ this human trait thus being an ontological presupposition, or precomprehension. Here, I suggest that this pre-narrative quality is in fact an ex ante projection of the work of meaning-making, arising ex post and, crucially, not universally attainable. If it were, it would be an unwarranted ontologization of features of human moral experience. Organizing the relationship between ontology and ethics within the perspective of narrative ethics does not mean doing away with the ontological dimension. Indeed, as this paper seeks to demonstrate, the ontological background of narrative ethics may be traced from a phenomenology of fragility, exposure, and interdependence. The definition of man as a self-interpreting animal should therefore be delineated in the sense of an endeavour; in this way, the individual can build up his own mediated relation with meaning, and, as a result, the practice of self-narrative becomes available to all.展开更多
The environment in the sense of all the ecosystems on Earth, has been polluted, harmed, and put at risk of degradation to some extent. Nevertheless, the mainstream ethical philosophies have found it difficult to assig...The environment in the sense of all the ecosystems on Earth, has been polluted, harmed, and put at risk of degradation to some extent. Nevertheless, the mainstream ethical philosophies have found it difficult to assign an intrinsic value to the environment itself, and most environmental ethics is based on an ＂enlightened＂ anthropocentrism which values environmental protection for the sake of other humans including the future generations. Philosophically speaking, the concept of moral obligations towards generations, who have not been born yet, can be challenged. This vicious circle is a fundamental issue for ＂environmental ethics.＂ The current paper is an attempt to help correct this broken cycle of arguments using three lines of argument： （1） The harmful impact of human activity on the environment does not benefit all humans; the question is not over the selfishness and short-sightedness of humankind regarding the environment as much as it is regarding ＂environmental＂ justice among humans. The pursuit of self-interest and wealth by some humans, but not all, should not lead philosophers to ignore the insufficiencies of our economic and capitalist systems in the delineation of morally correct human-environment interaction. The right to a livable environment is a universal human right and morality has to support it. （2） The moral obligation of humankind toward the environment is similar to any situation where a party, such as a child, does not have the ability to protect itself or defend its rights; this is the principle of ＂due care.＂ Humans have the knowledge to understand the complexity of ecosystem interrelationships and the harm which industrial activity has caused. Therefore they have a moral obligation to exercise due care to prevent it from being harmed irreversibly. （3） The third argument is concerned with human morality and the spirituality of the environment. It can be argued that the natural instinct of the love of the environment, biophilia, is not a cause but a symptom of the grand spiritual value in the environment, even though this spiritual value may not be confined to humans, but be accrued to all life forms that have and/or show a genuine interest in the environment.展开更多
Over the last 30 years, environmental philosophers and ecological researchers have turned their attention to the possibilities of narratives： the stories people tell about their lives in conjunction with the human an...Over the last 30 years, environmental philosophers and ecological researchers have turned their attention to the possibilities of narratives： the stories people tell about their lives in conjunction with the human and non-human agents they live with. An interest in narrative environmental ethics reflects a re-evaluation of canonical ecophilosophical texts. Works such as Paul W. Taylor＇s Respect for Nature suggest an essentialist view of environmental ethics in which predetermined principles are imposed on places and situations. On the other hand, Aldo Leopold＇s A Sand County Almanac combines first-person prose with science-based explanations of the ＂biotic pyramid＂ towards the development of a land ethic. Examples, such as Leopold＇s, of narrative ethics are thought to offer relational, place-based, non-authoritative, and non-anthropocentric models. This article examines three critical components of environmental narratives： self, context, and tradition. In order for environmental narratives to advance ecological ethics, they must be accompanied by the tradition of natural science （geology, ecology, and evolution） to provide the ＂sponsoring ground＂ for ethical concern and action. The role of natural science as a tradition--and indeed one of many--in narrative ethics provides the basis for ecological selfhood in the context of place. These assertions will be supported by an analysis of the environmental narratives of Karen Warren and Jim Cheney. However, in the temporally expansive and ecologically conscious poetic narratives of John Kinsella we find an environmental ethics deeply rooted in the material realities of place.展开更多
The newly proposed entropic gravity suggests gravity as an emergent force rather than a fundamental one. In this approach,the Newtonian constant G does not play a fundamental role any more, and a new fundamental const...The newly proposed entropic gravity suggests gravity as an emergent force rather than a fundamental one. In this approach,the Newtonian constant G does not play a fundamental role any more, and a new fundamental constant is required to replace itsposition. This request also arises from some philosophical considerations to contemplate the physical foundations for the unificationof theories. We here consider the suggestion to derive G from more fundamental quantities in the presence of a new fundamentallength scale l, which is suspected to originate from the structure of quantum space-time, and can be measured directly from Lorentz-violating observations. Our results are relevant to the fundamental understanding of physics, and more practically, of natural units,as well as explanations of experimental constraints in searching for Lorentz violation.展开更多
文摘This paper addresses the relationship between ontology and ethics, as outlined in Charles Taylor＇s essay ＂Ethics and Ontology,＂ problematizing it from a narrative ethics viewpoint. It attempts to overcome the ＂binary＂ dichotomy presented in Taylor＇s essay, insisting instead in favour of an approach that distances itself from both reductionist naturalism and ancient and medieval ontological models. The move towards narrative ethics is positioned in relation to an implicit ontology. Taylor recognizes that man＇s way of life ＂consists of ways of sense making;＂ this human trait thus being an ontological presupposition, or precomprehension. Here, I suggest that this pre-narrative quality is in fact an ex ante projection of the work of meaning-making, arising ex post and, crucially, not universally attainable. If it were, it would be an unwarranted ontologization of features of human moral experience. Organizing the relationship between ontology and ethics within the perspective of narrative ethics does not mean doing away with the ontological dimension. Indeed, as this paper seeks to demonstrate, the ontological background of narrative ethics may be traced from a phenomenology of fragility, exposure, and interdependence. The definition of man as a self-interpreting animal should therefore be delineated in the sense of an endeavour; in this way, the individual can build up his own mediated relation with meaning, and, as a result, the practice of self-narrative becomes available to all.
文摘The environment in the sense of all the ecosystems on Earth, has been polluted, harmed, and put at risk of degradation to some extent. Nevertheless, the mainstream ethical philosophies have found it difficult to assign an intrinsic value to the environment itself, and most environmental ethics is based on an ＂enlightened＂ anthropocentrism which values environmental protection for the sake of other humans including the future generations. Philosophically speaking, the concept of moral obligations towards generations, who have not been born yet, can be challenged. This vicious circle is a fundamental issue for ＂environmental ethics.＂ The current paper is an attempt to help correct this broken cycle of arguments using three lines of argument： （1） The harmful impact of human activity on the environment does not benefit all humans; the question is not over the selfishness and short-sightedness of humankind regarding the environment as much as it is regarding ＂environmental＂ justice among humans. The pursuit of self-interest and wealth by some humans, but not all, should not lead philosophers to ignore the insufficiencies of our economic and capitalist systems in the delineation of morally correct human-environment interaction. The right to a livable environment is a universal human right and morality has to support it. （2） The moral obligation of humankind toward the environment is similar to any situation where a party, such as a child, does not have the ability to protect itself or defend its rights; this is the principle of ＂due care.＂ Humans have the knowledge to understand the complexity of ecosystem interrelationships and the harm which industrial activity has caused. Therefore they have a moral obligation to exercise due care to prevent it from being harmed irreversibly. （3） The third argument is concerned with human morality and the spirituality of the environment. It can be argued that the natural instinct of the love of the environment, biophilia, is not a cause but a symptom of the grand spiritual value in the environment, even though this spiritual value may not be confined to humans, but be accrued to all life forms that have and/or show a genuine interest in the environment.
文摘Over the last 30 years, environmental philosophers and ecological researchers have turned their attention to the possibilities of narratives： the stories people tell about their lives in conjunction with the human and non-human agents they live with. An interest in narrative environmental ethics reflects a re-evaluation of canonical ecophilosophical texts. Works such as Paul W. Taylor＇s Respect for Nature suggest an essentialist view of environmental ethics in which predetermined principles are imposed on places and situations. On the other hand, Aldo Leopold＇s A Sand County Almanac combines first-person prose with science-based explanations of the ＂biotic pyramid＂ towards the development of a land ethic. Examples, such as Leopold＇s, of narrative ethics are thought to offer relational, place-based, non-authoritative, and non-anthropocentric models. This article examines three critical components of environmental narratives： self, context, and tradition. In order for environmental narratives to advance ecological ethics, they must be accompanied by the tradition of natural science （geology, ecology, and evolution） to provide the ＂sponsoring ground＂ for ethical concern and action. The role of natural science as a tradition--and indeed one of many--in narrative ethics provides the basis for ecological selfhood in the context of place. These assertions will be supported by an analysis of the environmental narratives of Karen Warren and Jim Cheney. However, in the temporally expansive and ecologically conscious poetic narratives of John Kinsella we find an environmental ethics deeply rooted in the material realities of place.
基金partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 11005018, 11021092, 10975003 and 11035003)
文摘The newly proposed entropic gravity suggests gravity as an emergent force rather than a fundamental one. In this approach,the Newtonian constant G does not play a fundamental role any more, and a new fundamental constant is required to replace itsposition. This request also arises from some philosophical considerations to contemplate the physical foundations for the unificationof theories. We here consider the suggestion to derive G from more fundamental quantities in the presence of a new fundamentallength scale l, which is suspected to originate from the structure of quantum space-time, and can be measured directly from Lorentz-violating observations. Our results are relevant to the fundamental understanding of physics, and more practically, of natural units,as well as explanations of experimental constraints in searching for Lorentz violation.
