This study empirically investigates the impact of managerial entrenchment on firm financial performance of Chinese firms initial public offerings （IPOs）. Using 142 firms listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange （SZSE...This study empirically investigates the impact of managerial entrenchment on firm financial performance of Chinese firms initial public offerings （IPOs）. Using 142 firms listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange （SZSE）, which was collected from the Guotaian Research Service Center （GTA-RSC） databases, this study uses two proxies to measure firm performance and three proxies to measure managerial entrenchment. The two proxies for firm performance are Tobins＇ Q and return on assets （ROA）, and the three proxies for managerial entrenchment are entrenchment 1, entrenchment 2, and entrenchment 3. These three entrenchment proxies are derived from the principal component analysis （PCA）. Though previous studies of managerial entrenchment and firm performance variables suffer from endogeneity, with respect to the corporate governance it is unclear as to which variables are endogenous and which are exogenous. This study confirms that the data are linear and no endogeneity issue should be address in this study, but only heteroskedasticity, non-normality for Tobins＇ Q are a problem, therefore, the regression method employed for Tobins＇ Q is the generalised least square （GLS） and the ordinary least square （OLS） between estimators for ROA. The regression result for Tobins＇ Q reveals that managerial entrenchment is negatively impact on firm performance. The results are in contradiction to the stewardship theory for new firms whereas the managerial entrenchment for new firms is positive. Furthermore, only one entrenchment proxy yields a significant coefficient. In conclusion, the negative results of entrenchment proxies were caused by the different institutional structures and legal systems which are the Chinese corporations that are still largely owned and controlled by a state and hence the centralised state controlled was responsible for all managerial actions.展开更多
The purpose of this article is to analyze the impact of corporate governance and disclosure policy on corporate financial performance by examining the combined effect of board characteristics and disclosure level on f...The purpose of this article is to analyze the impact of corporate governance and disclosure policy on corporate financial performance by examining the combined effect of board characteristics and disclosure level on financing costs. The empirical analysis, conducted on a sample of 192 Canadian companies, generally shows the importance of board characteristics in determining the level of disclosure and firms＇ costs of financing. In particular, the results found indicate that boards whose characteristics meet the governance requirements that are associated with greater transparency in disclosure on governance attributes reduce the costs of financing of their companies by debt as well as by equity capital.展开更多
To be successful in global markets, companies from the emerging countries need the approval of foreign investors and other stakeholders. In this regard, Brazil, Russia, India, and China （BRIC） have progressively str...To be successful in global markets, companies from the emerging countries need the approval of foreign investors and other stakeholders. In this regard, Brazil, Russia, India, and China （BRIC） have progressively strengthened their corporate governance rules to help their companies overcome the competitors from the old industrialized countries. Directors＇ non-executive qualification, independence, and professional expertise represent basic requirements for effective corporate governance, so they should be carefully considered to guarantee a proper board composition and an adequate establishment of internal committees in listed companies. The paper intends to compare the legislative and regulatory frameworks adopted by the four countries; then it aims at answering to the following research questions by means of an empirical investigation： Have BRIC companies appointed non-executive and independent board members？ What do BRIC companies do in order to assure an effective participation of non-executive and independent board members to corporate governance activities？ Have BRIC companies established internal committees？ The research examines the appointment of non-executive directors and independent directors to the boards of 100 BRIC leading firms, as well as their involvement in internal committees focused on matters requiring motivated and impartial opinions. Although the laws and recommendations seem to favor a general convergence of corporate governance principles among the four BRIC and towards the international best practices, some differences and peculiarities emerge from a firm-level perspective. Indeed, the Indian and the Chinese companies analyzed appear more inclined than the Brazilian and the Russian ones to reassure their international stakeholders about board independence and effective committees.展开更多
The operating processes of boards of directors are delicate and complex, so corporate legislation cannot simply equate board structure law with board governance law. It is therefore necessary to start from China＇s ac...The operating processes of boards of directors are delicate and complex, so corporate legislation cannot simply equate board structure law with board governance law. It is therefore necessary to start from China＇s actual conditions and grasp the operating processes of Chinese boards with a sober appreciation of the irrational elements in their operating mechanisms. Board governance has entered a new stage of institutionalization, and the law should shift from its emphasis on structure to give equal attention to structure and process in optimizing institutional structure. In the construction of board operating mechanisms, we should treat differently such ＂living laws＂ as customs, experiences and traditions, give full play to the functionality of boards＇ strategic choices, and provide legal regulation of irrational elements, so as to distinguish between different roles, develop consensus, select strong points and improve efficiency. We should build control over board operational procedures, improve the system of functional allocation, correct assessment mechanisms, develop a mechanism for judicial scrutiny of the affective relationships in society and curb such behavioral tendencies as relational identity, structural bias and group polarization, with a view to controlling such ＂living laws＂ within the framework of the basic values and principles of board governance.展开更多
文摘This study empirically investigates the impact of managerial entrenchment on firm financial performance of Chinese firms initial public offerings （IPOs）. Using 142 firms listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange （SZSE）, which was collected from the Guotaian Research Service Center （GTA-RSC） databases, this study uses two proxies to measure firm performance and three proxies to measure managerial entrenchment. The two proxies for firm performance are Tobins＇ Q and return on assets （ROA）, and the three proxies for managerial entrenchment are entrenchment 1, entrenchment 2, and entrenchment 3. These three entrenchment proxies are derived from the principal component analysis （PCA）. Though previous studies of managerial entrenchment and firm performance variables suffer from endogeneity, with respect to the corporate governance it is unclear as to which variables are endogenous and which are exogenous. This study confirms that the data are linear and no endogeneity issue should be address in this study, but only heteroskedasticity, non-normality for Tobins＇ Q are a problem, therefore, the regression method employed for Tobins＇ Q is the generalised least square （GLS） and the ordinary least square （OLS） between estimators for ROA. The regression result for Tobins＇ Q reveals that managerial entrenchment is negatively impact on firm performance. The results are in contradiction to the stewardship theory for new firms whereas the managerial entrenchment for new firms is positive. Furthermore, only one entrenchment proxy yields a significant coefficient. In conclusion, the negative results of entrenchment proxies were caused by the different institutional structures and legal systems which are the Chinese corporations that are still largely owned and controlled by a state and hence the centralised state controlled was responsible for all managerial actions.
文摘The purpose of this article is to analyze the impact of corporate governance and disclosure policy on corporate financial performance by examining the combined effect of board characteristics and disclosure level on financing costs. The empirical analysis, conducted on a sample of 192 Canadian companies, generally shows the importance of board characteristics in determining the level of disclosure and firms＇ costs of financing. In particular, the results found indicate that boards whose characteristics meet the governance requirements that are associated with greater transparency in disclosure on governance attributes reduce the costs of financing of their companies by debt as well as by equity capital.
文摘To be successful in global markets, companies from the emerging countries need the approval of foreign investors and other stakeholders. In this regard, Brazil, Russia, India, and China （BRIC） have progressively strengthened their corporate governance rules to help their companies overcome the competitors from the old industrialized countries. Directors＇ non-executive qualification, independence, and professional expertise represent basic requirements for effective corporate governance, so they should be carefully considered to guarantee a proper board composition and an adequate establishment of internal committees in listed companies. The paper intends to compare the legislative and regulatory frameworks adopted by the four countries; then it aims at answering to the following research questions by means of an empirical investigation： Have BRIC companies appointed non-executive and independent board members？ What do BRIC companies do in order to assure an effective participation of non-executive and independent board members to corporate governance activities？ Have BRIC companies established internal committees？ The research examines the appointment of non-executive directors and independent directors to the boards of 100 BRIC leading firms, as well as their involvement in internal committees focused on matters requiring motivated and impartial opinions. Although the laws and recommendations seem to favor a general convergence of corporate governance principles among the four BRIC and towards the international best practices, some differences and peculiarities emerge from a firm-level perspective. Indeed, the Indian and the Chinese companies analyzed appear more inclined than the Brazilian and the Russian ones to reassure their international stakeholders about board independence and effective committees.
文摘The operating processes of boards of directors are delicate and complex, so corporate legislation cannot simply equate board structure law with board governance law. It is therefore necessary to start from China＇s actual conditions and grasp the operating processes of Chinese boards with a sober appreciation of the irrational elements in their operating mechanisms. Board governance has entered a new stage of institutionalization, and the law should shift from its emphasis on structure to give equal attention to structure and process in optimizing institutional structure. In the construction of board operating mechanisms, we should treat differently such ＂living laws＂ as customs, experiences and traditions, give full play to the functionality of boards＇ strategic choices, and provide legal regulation of irrational elements, so as to distinguish between different roles, develop consensus, select strong points and improve efficiency. We should build control over board operational procedures, improve the system of functional allocation, correct assessment mechanisms, develop a mechanism for judicial scrutiny of the affective relationships in society and curb such behavioral tendencies as relational identity, structural bias and group polarization, with a view to controlling such ＂living laws＂ within the framework of the basic values and principles of board governance.
