This paper studies the problem of functional inequalities for analytic functions in classical geometric function theory.Using the di erential subordination principle and(p,q)-derivative operator,it introduces(p,q)-ana...This paper studies the problem of functional inequalities for analytic functions in classical geometric function theory.Using the di erential subordination principle and(p,q)-derivative operator,it introduces(p,q)-analog of a class of multivalently Bazilevic functions as-sociated with a limacon function,and obtains the corresponding coefficient estimates and the Fekete-Szego inequality,which extend and improve the related results for starlike functions,even q-starlike functions.展开更多
Self-serving,rational agents sometimes cooperate to their mutual benefit.The two-player iterated prisoner′s dilemma game is a model for including the emergence of cooperation.It is generally believed that there is no...Self-serving,rational agents sometimes cooperate to their mutual benefit.The two-player iterated prisoner′s dilemma game is a model for including the emergence of cooperation.It is generally believed that there is no simple ultimatum strategy which a player can control the return of the other participants.The zero-determinant strategy in the iterated prisoner′s dilemma dramatically expands our understanding of the classic game by uncovering strategies that provide a unilateral advantage to sentient players pitted against unwitting opponents.However,strategies in the prisoner′s dilemma game are only two strategies.Are there these results for general multi-strategy games?To address this question,the paper develops a theory for zero-determinant strategies for multi-strategy games,with any number of strategies.The analytical results exhibit a similar yet different scenario to the case of two-strategy games.The results are also applied to the Snowdrift game,the Hawk-Dove game and the Chicken game.展开更多
基金Supported by Natural Science Foundation of Ningxia(2023AAC 03001)Natural Science Foundation of China(12261068)
文摘This paper studies the problem of functional inequalities for analytic functions in classical geometric function theory.Using the di erential subordination principle and(p,q)-derivative operator,it introduces(p,q)-analog of a class of multivalently Bazilevic functions as-sociated with a limacon function,and obtains the corresponding coefficient estimates and the Fekete-Szego inequality,which extend and improve the related results for starlike functions,even q-starlike functions.
文摘Self-serving,rational agents sometimes cooperate to their mutual benefit.The two-player iterated prisoner′s dilemma game is a model for including the emergence of cooperation.It is generally believed that there is no simple ultimatum strategy which a player can control the return of the other participants.The zero-determinant strategy in the iterated prisoner′s dilemma dramatically expands our understanding of the classic game by uncovering strategies that provide a unilateral advantage to sentient players pitted against unwitting opponents.However,strategies in the prisoner′s dilemma game are only two strategies.Are there these results for general multi-strategy games?To address this question,the paper develops a theory for zero-determinant strategies for multi-strategy games,with any number of strategies.The analytical results exhibit a similar yet different scenario to the case of two-strategy games.The results are also applied to the Snowdrift game,the Hawk-Dove game and the Chicken game.
