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Comparison Research on Anti-dumping Duty Rates between Administrative Review and Welfare Maximization under Dynamic Game of Perfect Information
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作者 许源 朱海洋 钟根元 《Journal of Donghua University(English Edition)》 EI CAS 2006年第3期127-130,共4页
Using economics and game theory, two kinds of models have been proposed in this paper under the assumption that foreign and domestic firms behave under the condition of dynamic game of perfect information. One model i... Using economics and game theory, two kinds of models have been proposed in this paper under the assumption that foreign and domestic firms behave under the condition of dynamic game of perfect information. One model is for calculating Anti-dumping rate which is obtained according to current regulations of Anti-dumping, but it is not optimal. The other is an optimal model of Anti-dumping which is obtained according to the maximum principle of domestic social welfare. Then, through the comparison of this two models in detail, several shortages have been revealed about Anti-dumping rate model based on current regulations of Anti-dumping. Finally, a suggestion is indicated that WTO and China should use the optimal model to calculate Anti-dumping rate. 展开更多
关键词 administrative review Anti-dumping rate dynamic game perfect information.
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权威治理与转型时期中国的政治稳定 被引量:1
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作者 许开轶 《当代世界与社会主义》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第6期75-80,共6页
当代中国的国家治理具有典型的权威主义特征,表现在执政党主导国家的治理活动、国家对社会的强力控制、上下分治的治理体制等方面。权威治理对转型时期中国的政治稳定是把双刃剑:一方面,它构建了完整而相对严密的"社会控制之网&quo... 当代中国的国家治理具有典型的权威主义特征,表现在执政党主导国家的治理活动、国家对社会的强力控制、上下分治的治理体制等方面。权威治理对转型时期中国的政治稳定是把双刃剑:一方面,它构建了完整而相对严密的"社会控制之网",有效地化解了日益多样化的社会对政治稳定的冲击,蕴含着分散执政风险和自发调节中央与地方关系的功能,在国家与民众之间、中央权威与地方权力之间的关系等向度上发挥了维护当代中国政治稳定的关键性作用。另一方面,它主要依托组织而不是制度作为其核心媒介,维稳的制度化设计缺失,导致压力型维稳常态化;它抑制了社会的成长,维稳的主体过于单一,基层政府的负荷过大,加剧了社会矛盾向政府的集中;它没有使中央与地方之间形成稳定的、制度化的关联机制,导致政府间行政博弈泛滥,地方政府的"变通"行为时常成为群体性事件的重要诱因。 展开更多
关键词 权威治理 政治稳定 组织化调控 上下分治 行政博弈
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From administering administrative divisions to regional public administration: a game analysis of evolution in the pattern of governance by the government
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作者 Jin Taijun 《Social Sciences in China》 2008年第4期48-62,共15页
Regional public administration represents in essence an institutional change in the pattern of governance by the government, in that it breaks down the original institutional arrangements of the administration of admi... Regional public administration represents in essence an institutional change in the pattern of governance by the government, in that it breaks down the original institutional arrangements of the administration of administrative divisions and embarks on a new process of institutional evolution of the patterns of interest distribution in society. Present throughout this process is a game between different interests, leading to the final emergence of a new system - a new contractual setup resulting from the playing out of the relevant factors. These games take place mainly between the central and the local authorities and among the latter. Setting up a cooperative approach of "repeated gaming" when the game runs into possible difficulties, developing mechanisms conducive to better information exchange and to bilateral or multilateral consultation, further reshaping government functions by cutting the interest ties that link local authorities with socioeconomic entities, and strengthening the central authorities' macro-control functions are efficient guidance measures for setting up a system of regional public administration and realizing change in governance patterns. 展开更多
关键词 administering administrative divisions regional public administration GAME institutional transition
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