In this essay I will explicate the gaze （le regard） and the ways in which it exceeds or transcends what we know as vision, the objectifying or representational power of the eyes. Building critically on Sartre, the g...In this essay I will explicate the gaze （le regard） and the ways in which it exceeds or transcends what we know as vision, the objectifying or representational power of the eyes. Building critically on Sartre, the gaze in Lacan and Merleau-Ponty is part of the technical apparatus used to describe the foundation, production, and reproduction of the subject. I will begin by discussing the role of visual perception in subject-formation in their respective work, differentiating between the Merleau-Pontian notion of the ＂gaze of the world,＂ i.e., the ways in which things cast their gaze upon us, and the Lacanian gaze as a manifestation of the scopic drive. Through an analysis of anamorphosis I will show （1） how the gaze evades the spectator, （2） what the relationship of the gaze is to the object petit a as the object of the scopic drive, and （3） how both Merleau-Ponty and Lacan require a movement that precedes and destabilizes the subject of intentional consciousness.展开更多
文摘In this essay I will explicate the gaze （le regard） and the ways in which it exceeds or transcends what we know as vision, the objectifying or representational power of the eyes. Building critically on Sartre, the gaze in Lacan and Merleau-Ponty is part of the technical apparatus used to describe the foundation, production, and reproduction of the subject. I will begin by discussing the role of visual perception in subject-formation in their respective work, differentiating between the Merleau-Pontian notion of the ＂gaze of the world,＂ i.e., the ways in which things cast their gaze upon us, and the Lacanian gaze as a manifestation of the scopic drive. Through an analysis of anamorphosis I will show （1） how the gaze evades the spectator, （2） what the relationship of the gaze is to the object petit a as the object of the scopic drive, and （3） how both Merleau-Ponty and Lacan require a movement that precedes and destabilizes the subject of intentional consciousness.
