反驳认知现象学的载体代理论证——基于胡塞尔的内时间意识现象学

认知现象学的核心议题是,认知状态是否需要还原为感觉状态。其中还原论的支持者提出“载体代理”时间论证,通过引入进程性的时间结构,说明非进程性的认知状态同进程性的意识流间存在矛盾,故认知状态须由进程性的感觉表象代理,才能具有现象特质,但是由于进程性的时间结构奠基于绝对时间观,因而载体代理论证最终陷入了无法解释同一对象、非实存对象的窘境。将进程性的时间结构与胡塞尔的内时间结构比较后发现,基于主体现下并总关涉对象整体的内时间结构可消解以上难题,故后者的解释力更强。因此,可用内时间结构替换进程性结构,结果表明:认知状态无需还原为感觉状态便可持存于意识流中,从而佐证了认知现象学的不可还原性。

思维与“感受性质”——认知现象学的“发现”与探索

认知现象学是专门探讨思维等命题态度有无现象学特征的心灵哲学分支,在"发现"心理现象有情感性和认知性两种感受性质的基础上,对思维等有没有这两种感受性质、感情等现象有没有认知性感受性质等作了新的深入的探讨,进而沿着思维等命题态度的两个构成,即态度和命题内容,作掘进性分析。这无疑值得我们在研究思维等现象时借鉴。它对思想与感受性质及其关系的研究尽管属于心灵哲学的研究,与对感性认识、理性认识的研究有较大差别,但所用的方法、所取得的成果无疑有借鉴价值。

感受性质发微

感受性质是心灵哲学发现和开辟的一个全新的研究领域。最新的工作在强调过去视作同义词的相关概念存在着差异的基础上,对它们分别展开深度剖析,进而认识到了它们各自更多的细节、构成和结构。在探讨思维与感受性质的关系问题上,强调感受性质不局限于知觉之类的现象,而可以由思维等命题态度表现出来,甚至思维还有专门的认知性现象学特征。自主体在施动过程中也表现出了可称作"施动性"的现象特征。对此尚存许多未知因素,有待于我们去发现。

Wittgenstein, Phenomenology and Cognitive Linguistics

Although the literature devoted to the naturalization of mainstream phenomenology has been blooming recently, not so many efforts have been made to make the intellectual legacy from Wittgenstein, who could also be viewed as a ＂linguistic phenomenologist,＂ accessible to cognitive science. The reluctance of making Wittgenstein naturalized is sometimes backed by the worry that Wittgen- stein＇s criticism of the notion of ＂thinking＂ as some ＂internal process＂ is also potentially threatening the computational theory of cognition. But this worry itself is based on some serious misunderstandings of the internal/external dichotomies, the clarifications of which would greatly relieve the tension between Wittgenstein and cognitive science. Moreover, cognitive linguistics could also be viewed as the intermediate theory between Wittgenstein and cognitive science due to the affinities it bears with both Wittgenstein＇s later philosophy and cognitive science.