论作为评价性权力的话语权

近年,话语权成了我们耳熟能详的一个词语。话语权的概念意味着话语本身可以构成一种权力,但并非所有话语都能构成权力,相反,只有通过评价性的话语,我们才能对他人行使权力。因此,话语权是评价性权力中的一个特殊类型。在理论上,我们可以把评价性权力分为作为制衡权的评价权与作为支配权的评价权,以及政治的评价权与知识的评价权。话语权属于知识的评价权,且它既是一种制衡权,也是一种支配权。知识的评价权的最重要特征在于这种权力的行使者同时也是这种权力的立法者,所以,对话语权的争夺实际上是对知识立法权的争夺。只要获得了通过知识来对一切事务进行立法的权力,权力主体也就获得了评价一切并通过评价来支配一切的权力。这就是当今围绕话语权所展开的权力斗争的本质。

在三维社会关系网络中理解评价性权力

近年来,评价成为社会生活中一种日益常见的现象,也构成了一种新的权力形式。评价可以对被评价者产生两方面的改变:一是通过塑造其自我认同改变其所欲实现的目标;二是通过改变特定分配规则对于被评价者的可适用性来影响其分配结果,进而改变其实现各种目标的手段。要达到这种结果,评价必须得到被评价者或分配决策者的承认。评价性权力的兴起是竞争普遍化的结果,在理论上,评价可以被视为对竞争的一种确认,但在实践中,评价性权力造就了赢家与输家的意识形态对立,使得所有人都寻求成为赢家,并因此臣服在了评价性权力之下。

平台经济下消费者评价定价的权力逻辑及监管进路

在今天日益平台化的市场中,每一进入平台且产生消费行为的个体都有对产品和服务做出评价的机会;而当消费者的评价影响并改变了被评价者的行为时,评价就具备了成为权力的可能。消费者通过评价性权力的集体行使形成评价“价格”,平台提供榜单为生产者的评价“价格”排序,生产者则为竞争更高排名而不断根据评价规则来纠正自己的行为,这构成了评价性权力的作用过程。在为消费者利益服务的名义下,平台—消费者的联盟得以建立,借助消费者的评价之手,平台对生产者和劳动者的控制权力得到巩固与合理化。在此基础上,平台通过构建并货币化消费者的互动评价而颠倒了评价权力,使消费者成为全天候为平台生产数据的产消者,进而导致消费者的主权被剥夺。在由此形成的“赢者通吃”的局面下,颠倒“被颠倒”的评价性权力,进而实现平台经济的良好治理,就成为平台企业监管的重要议题。

The Adoption and Maintenance of Executive Stock Option Plan （ESOP）＂ Company Characteristics Evaluation in Indonesia

This paper investigates company characteristics associated with the adoption and maintenance of executive stock option plan （ESOP） proxied with the proportion of stock options. In order to develop and inform public policies of executive stock options, it is important to understand some of the factors that will drive a company＇s decision in order to adopt an ESOP. First, an analysis evaluates what kind of company＇s characteristics is associated with these plans. Second, an analysis examines the company characteristics that predict the adoption of such plans. This paper contributes to that stream of accounting research by identifying several factors to the adoption of ESOP. The study finds that intellectual capital （consisting of human capital efficiency （HCE）, structural capital efficiency （SCE）, and capital employed efficiency （CEE））, risk, and financial constraints （FC） affect the adoption and maintenance of stock option plans, these conditions will be increasingly supported in companies that experience relatively rapid growth. HCE, risk, and FC are significant predictors of the adoption and maintenance of ESOP. The companies who have some difficulties in observing human capital＇s behavior are more likely to adopt executive stock options, and based on our theoretical review, this is a rational course of action. Firms with higher levels of business risks are less likely to shift some of the risks to employees through stock-based compensation, whereas firms with higher variability in total shareholder returns are more likely to adopt executive stock options. Overall, our results suggest that higher monitoring costs prompt firms to adopt and maintain ESOP.