Accounting supervision is a management activity to monitor and supervise the production, business operation, and budget implementation in enterprises, and a good accounting supervision plays an extremely important rol...Accounting supervision is a management activity to monitor and supervise the production, business operation, and budget implementation in enterprises, and a good accounting supervision plays an extremely important role in the social and economic development. In China, there are many accounting supervision problems in accounting practice at present, and a lot of the problems have exerted a negative impact on the social and economic life. Therefore, the causes for these problems are discussed and analyzed, so that the corresponding methods and measures are proposed for solving the existing problems and promoting the accounting supervision to play a better and greater role in the financial management of enterprises.展开更多
Accounting supervision is a management activity to monitor and supervise the production, business operation, and budget implementation in enterprises, and a good accounting supervision plays an extremely important rol...Accounting supervision is a management activity to monitor and supervise the production, business operation, and budget implementation in enterprises, and a good accounting supervision plays an extremely important role in the social and economic development. In China, there are many accounting supervision problems in accounting practice at present, and a lot of the problems have exerted a negative impact on the social and economic life. Therefore, the causes for these problems are discussed and analyzed, so that the corresponding methods and measures are proposed for solving the existing problems and promoting the accounting supervision to play a better and greater role in the financial management of enterprises.展开更多
This paper takes Principal-agent Theory as the basic analysis flame to analyze the modern corporate principal and agent in a state of the two sides in asymmetric information on the basis of self-interest maximization,...This paper takes Principal-agent Theory as the basic analysis flame to analyze the modern corporate principal and agent in a state of the two sides in asymmetric information on the basis of self-interest maximization, and the game strategy which revolves the information disclosure and hideaway to launch, and therefore can get the game way which causes the auditing institution. The equilibrium in game of the information disclosure causes the auditing institution, the expense and cost which the audit profession consumes is the company governs reduces the information not asymmetrical diligently center essential agency costs.展开更多
Corporate accounting frauds over the last two decades have caused massive erosion of investor wealth and shattered public confidence in regulators and capital markets. Deliberate manipulation of financial numbers by a...Corporate accounting frauds over the last two decades have caused massive erosion of investor wealth and shattered public confidence in regulators and capital markets. Deliberate manipulation of financial numbers by a company is rarely a one-off event; it is more a culture of widespread earnings management that permeates an organization and eventually leads to a full-blown accounting fraud. This paper looks at earnings management practices in Indian companies and examines the extent of earnings management prevalent across firms of varying market capitalization. The present study examines 130 listed Indian companies during the period of 2013-2015. The findings of this study provide a measure of the quality of financial reporting in India. Modified Jones model （1995） is used to estimate discretionary accruals （DA）, which is considered as a proxy for earnings management. The average DA is estimated at 5.6% of the total assets of the firms, which is comparable to the estimates in other parts of the world （about 1%-5% of total assets）. A sector-specific analysis reveals presence of higher earnings manipulation in the consumer durable and energy sectors. Large cap companies are found to show a lower level of eamings management as compared to the small-cap firms. The study also finds a dip in the magnitude of DA in 2015, which is the first year of application of the new Companies Act 2013. Subsequent years will reveal the true success of the new Act in enforcing a stricter regime of corporate governance and greater accountability of corporate boards and audit committees. International studies point towards a high degree of correlation between effective audit committees and lower levels of earnings management in companies. Further work in this field from an Indian context will help identify factors that have a constraining effect on earnings management, and ultimately help preserve the sanctity of reported financial numbers.展开更多
文摘Accounting supervision is a management activity to monitor and supervise the production, business operation, and budget implementation in enterprises, and a good accounting supervision plays an extremely important role in the social and economic development. In China, there are many accounting supervision problems in accounting practice at present, and a lot of the problems have exerted a negative impact on the social and economic life. Therefore, the causes for these problems are discussed and analyzed, so that the corresponding methods and measures are proposed for solving the existing problems and promoting the accounting supervision to play a better and greater role in the financial management of enterprises.
文摘Accounting supervision is a management activity to monitor and supervise the production, business operation, and budget implementation in enterprises, and a good accounting supervision plays an extremely important role in the social and economic development. In China, there are many accounting supervision problems in accounting practice at present, and a lot of the problems have exerted a negative impact on the social and economic life. Therefore, the causes for these problems are discussed and analyzed, so that the corresponding methods and measures are proposed for solving the existing problems and promoting the accounting supervision to play a better and greater role in the financial management of enterprises.
文摘This paper takes Principal-agent Theory as the basic analysis flame to analyze the modern corporate principal and agent in a state of the two sides in asymmetric information on the basis of self-interest maximization, and the game strategy which revolves the information disclosure and hideaway to launch, and therefore can get the game way which causes the auditing institution. The equilibrium in game of the information disclosure causes the auditing institution, the expense and cost which the audit profession consumes is the company governs reduces the information not asymmetrical diligently center essential agency costs.
文摘Corporate accounting frauds over the last two decades have caused massive erosion of investor wealth and shattered public confidence in regulators and capital markets. Deliberate manipulation of financial numbers by a company is rarely a one-off event; it is more a culture of widespread earnings management that permeates an organization and eventually leads to a full-blown accounting fraud. This paper looks at earnings management practices in Indian companies and examines the extent of earnings management prevalent across firms of varying market capitalization. The present study examines 130 listed Indian companies during the period of 2013-2015. The findings of this study provide a measure of the quality of financial reporting in India. Modified Jones model （1995） is used to estimate discretionary accruals （DA）, which is considered as a proxy for earnings management. The average DA is estimated at 5.6% of the total assets of the firms, which is comparable to the estimates in other parts of the world （about 1%-5% of total assets）. A sector-specific analysis reveals presence of higher earnings manipulation in the consumer durable and energy sectors. Large cap companies are found to show a lower level of eamings management as compared to the small-cap firms. The study also finds a dip in the magnitude of DA in 2015, which is the first year of application of the new Companies Act 2013. Subsequent years will reveal the true success of the new Act in enforcing a stricter regime of corporate governance and greater accountability of corporate boards and audit committees. International studies point towards a high degree of correlation between effective audit committees and lower levels of earnings management in companies. Further work in this field from an Indian context will help identify factors that have a constraining effect on earnings management, and ultimately help preserve the sanctity of reported financial numbers.
