Can choosing to sale one＇s kidney be morally permissible？ ＂No＂, Kant would answer. Humanity, whether in one＇s own person or that of any other, must never be treated merely as a means, but always at the same time ...Can choosing to sale one＇s kidney be morally permissible？ ＂No＂, Kant would answer. Humanity, whether in one＇s own person or that of any other, must never be treated merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end, is Kant＇s instruction （Groundwork 4：429）. He thought that organ sale violates this imperative. Lectures on Ethics （27：346） shows that ＂... a man is not entitled to sell his limbs for money If a man does that, he turns himself into a thing, and then anyone may treat him as they please, because he has thrown his person away....＂ This paper explains Kant＇s reasons against commerce in organs, drawing on his views on prostitution, and the moral impermissibility of sexual use within this context, a case which he himself compares to the selling of one＇s body part（s）. Can choosing to donate one＇s kidney be morally permissible？ If we take Kant＇s views at face value, it would follow that organ donation is on a par with morality only if it takes place in a context where people have gained rights over each other＇s persons （for example, in a marital context）. In this context, however, a person has a right to her partner＇s kidney should she happen to need it, which can open the path to bodily violation. Moreover, this view severely restricts the permissibility of organ donation. In this paper, I argue that a closer examination of Kant＇s views on what is involved in the idea of respecting humanity could reveal that organ donation does not violate the categorical imperative. In fact, it could be said to follow from such an imperative that we actually have a duty to organ donation.展开更多
文摘Can choosing to sale one＇s kidney be morally permissible？ ＂No＂, Kant would answer. Humanity, whether in one＇s own person or that of any other, must never be treated merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end, is Kant＇s instruction （Groundwork 4：429）. He thought that organ sale violates this imperative. Lectures on Ethics （27：346） shows that ＂... a man is not entitled to sell his limbs for money If a man does that, he turns himself into a thing, and then anyone may treat him as they please, because he has thrown his person away....＂ This paper explains Kant＇s reasons against commerce in organs, drawing on his views on prostitution, and the moral impermissibility of sexual use within this context, a case which he himself compares to the selling of one＇s body part（s）. Can choosing to donate one＇s kidney be morally permissible？ If we take Kant＇s views at face value, it would follow that organ donation is on a par with morality only if it takes place in a context where people have gained rights over each other＇s persons （for example, in a marital context）. In this context, however, a person has a right to her partner＇s kidney should she happen to need it, which can open the path to bodily violation. Moreover, this view severely restricts the permissibility of organ donation. In this paper, I argue that a closer examination of Kant＇s views on what is involved in the idea of respecting humanity could reveal that organ donation does not violate the categorical imperative. In fact, it could be said to follow from such an imperative that we actually have a duty to organ donation.
