This paper first gives an explanation of moral hazard in the insurance field,and then offers a game theory model about insurance pricing according to the non zero sum game analysis between the insurer and the insured...This paper first gives an explanation of moral hazard in the insurance field,and then offers a game theory model about insurance pricing according to the non zero sum game analysis between the insurer and the insured when moral hazard exists.On the basis of the game analysis,this paper also presents a lowest pricing formula and studies the cost of moral hazard simultaneously.展开更多
The double moral hazard of ＂company ＋ farmer＂ and the time preference cost of company and farmer was analyzed. According to static game model, it re-vealed that the reason for low compliance rate of ＂company ＋ fa...The double moral hazard of ＂company ＋ farmer＂ and the time preference cost of company and farmer was analyzed. According to static game model, it re-vealed that the reason for low compliance rate of ＂company ＋ farmer＂ model was the existence of market risk, namely, the fluctuation of market price, and the stable market price in contracts was actualy a kind of interval, instead of a specific value. Furthermore, the effect of default penalty, market transaction cost and time prefer-ence cost on the stability of contract was studied. The results showed that default penalty, market transaction cost and time preference cost had positive influence on the price interval range of a contract.展开更多
The mortgage loan has evolved from a local lending instrument into a major global security and its role is unparallel to other financial instruments in the process of financial globalization. This paper explains how t...The mortgage loan has evolved from a local lending instrument into a major global security and its role is unparallel to other financial instruments in the process of financial globalization. This paper explains how technology and financial innovation transformed the mortgage loan from a local security into a premier global security traded worldwide. It examines the fundamental flaws of this process and why it does not work in regards to mortgage lending and the re-securitization products that were created through financial innovation. The findings show that regulation was unable to keep pace with financial innovation, which created an environment where actors in the financial service sector were able to behave geographically irresponsibly by using information asymmetries to their advantage by par- ticipating in moral hazard activities and engaging in other immoral and unethical business practices that were centered around localized geography, which ultimately contributed to the global financial crisis. It also examines the roll of financial innovation in regard to the Lehman Brothers Mini-Bond in Hung and its role as a driving force behind China＇s newly emerging shadow banking sector. It concludes with a policy recommendation and its implication for China＇s continued economic development.展开更多
Business ethics is considered critical for the reputation and competitive power of banks, especially in China after WTO Entry. This study applied the theory and research on ethical practices of successful managers and...Business ethics is considered critical for the reputation and competitive power of banks, especially in China after WTO Entry. This study applied the theory and research on ethical practices of successful managers and ethics control mechanisms to identify the ethical climates that result in ethical behaviors in the banking. 141 employees from different banks in Shanghai, China, completed measures of all scales in the survey. The results support the theorizing of the value of well-formed business ethics in the banking in China. The correlation and structural equation analysis suggests that ethical practices of successful managers and ethics control mechanisms of banks reinforce three ethical climates of ‘service’, ‘law and rules’ and ‘caring’ that promote the ethical level of employees, and the independence and instrumental climate on the contrary. This study also found that there are three ethics control mechanisms most commonly used in the banking and ethics-focused reward system is believed to be a mostly effective one by the employees of banking in China.展开更多
The present paper offers an opportunity to explore Keynes＇ contribution to our understanding of crisis by returning to him seminal contribution in the theory of the effective demand. The analysis contrasts this appro...The present paper offers an opportunity to explore Keynes＇ contribution to our understanding of crisis by returning to him seminal contribution in the theory of the effective demand. The analysis contrasts this approach with the neoclassical orthodoxy regarding the theory of the interest rate and the relation between saving and investment. The author poses the fundamental question： Can a policy of stimulating saving promote investment？ By using the ＂Saving Paradox＂ presented in chapter sixteen, as a framework for interpreting Bernanke＇s description of the saving glut and the current account deficit of the U.S. economy, the author offers an answer that is useful for understanding the current situation. The author also shows how moral hazard plays a significant role in the current crisis.展开更多
Trade credit,as an effective tool for integrating and coordinating material,information,and financial flows in supply chain management,is becoming increasingly widespread.We explore how a manufacturer can design optim...Trade credit,as an effective tool for integrating and coordinating material,information,and financial flows in supply chain management,is becoming increasingly widespread.We explore how a manufacturer can design optimal trade credit contracts when a risk-averse retailer hides its sales cost information(adverse selection)and selling effort level(moral hazard).We develop incentive models for a risk-averse supply chain when adverse selection and moral hazard coexist,which are then compared with the results under single information asymmetry(moral hazard).Moreover,we analyze the effects of private information and risk-aversion coefficient on contract parameters,selling effort level and the profit or utility of the supply chain.The study shows that when the degree of retailer’s risk aversion is within a certain range,reasonable trade credit contracts designed by the manufacturer can effectively induce the retailer to report its real sales cost and encourage it to exert appropriate effort.Furthermore,we find that the optimal trade credit period,optimal transfer payment,and retailer’s optimal sales effort level under dual information asymmetry are less than those under single information asymmetry.Numerical analysis are conducted to demonstrate the effects of the parameters on decisions and profits.展开更多
This paper develops a kind of generalized double-sided moral hazard model of contract choice with Cobb-Douglas technology in a frame of principal-agent theory. The two parties, the principal and the agent, generally h...This paper develops a kind of generalized double-sided moral hazard model of contract choice with Cobb-Douglas technology in a frame of principal-agent theory. The two parties, the principal and the agent, generally have different levels of production efficiency, relative importance factor and are risk-averse or risk-neutral. Using this model, we formally prove that the optimal contract maximizes the output net of the disutility of both the parties and carry out some simulations exercise under two special cases which help explain the double-sided moral hazard issues. By focusing on production efficiency, relative importance factor and risk attitude respectively, this paper analyzes the properties of optimal contracts under three cases.展开更多
文摘This paper first gives an explanation of moral hazard in the insurance field,and then offers a game theory model about insurance pricing according to the non zero sum game analysis between the insurer and the insured when moral hazard exists.On the basis of the game analysis,this paper also presents a lowest pricing formula and studies the cost of moral hazard simultaneously.
基金Supported by Humanities and Social Sciences of Ministry of Education(12YJC630050)Soft Science Bidding Project of Ministry of Agriculture(20140203)+1 种基金Jiangxi Soft Science Fund(20141BBA10065)Jiangxi’s Jiangxi Provincial Education Department(GJJ13727)~~
文摘The double moral hazard of ＂company ＋ farmer＂ and the time preference cost of company and farmer was analyzed. According to static game model, it re-vealed that the reason for low compliance rate of ＂company ＋ farmer＂ model was the existence of market risk, namely, the fluctuation of market price, and the stable market price in contracts was actualy a kind of interval, instead of a specific value. Furthermore, the effect of default penalty, market transaction cost and time prefer-ence cost on the stability of contract was studied. The results showed that default penalty, market transaction cost and time preference cost had positive influence on the price interval range of a contract.
基金Under the auspices of International Centre for China Development Studies,the University of Hong Kong
文摘The mortgage loan has evolved from a local lending instrument into a major global security and its role is unparallel to other financial instruments in the process of financial globalization. This paper explains how technology and financial innovation transformed the mortgage loan from a local security into a premier global security traded worldwide. It examines the fundamental flaws of this process and why it does not work in regards to mortgage lending and the re-securitization products that were created through financial innovation. The findings show that regulation was unable to keep pace with financial innovation, which created an environment where actors in the financial service sector were able to behave geographically irresponsibly by using information asymmetries to their advantage by par- ticipating in moral hazard activities and engaging in other immoral and unethical business practices that were centered around localized geography, which ultimately contributed to the global financial crisis. It also examines the roll of financial innovation in regard to the Lehman Brothers Mini-Bond in Hung and its role as a driving force behind China＇s newly emerging shadow banking sector. It concludes with a policy recommendation and its implication for China＇s continued economic development.
文摘Business ethics is considered critical for the reputation and competitive power of banks, especially in China after WTO Entry. This study applied the theory and research on ethical practices of successful managers and ethics control mechanisms to identify the ethical climates that result in ethical behaviors in the banking. 141 employees from different banks in Shanghai, China, completed measures of all scales in the survey. The results support the theorizing of the value of well-formed business ethics in the banking in China. The correlation and structural equation analysis suggests that ethical practices of successful managers and ethics control mechanisms of banks reinforce three ethical climates of ‘service’, ‘law and rules’ and ‘caring’ that promote the ethical level of employees, and the independence and instrumental climate on the contrary. This study also found that there are three ethics control mechanisms most commonly used in the banking and ethics-focused reward system is believed to be a mostly effective one by the employees of banking in China.
文摘The present paper offers an opportunity to explore Keynes＇ contribution to our understanding of crisis by returning to him seminal contribution in the theory of the effective demand. The analysis contrasts this approach with the neoclassical orthodoxy regarding the theory of the interest rate and the relation between saving and investment. The author poses the fundamental question： Can a policy of stimulating saving promote investment？ By using the ＂Saving Paradox＂ presented in chapter sixteen, as a framework for interpreting Bernanke＇s description of the saving glut and the current account deficit of the U.S. economy, the author offers an answer that is useful for understanding the current situation. The author also shows how moral hazard plays a significant role in the current crisis.
基金supported by the Plan Project of Shanghai Philosophy and Social Science(2017BGL014)the National Natural Science Foundation of China(71832001)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(2232020B-04,2232018H-07).
文摘Trade credit,as an effective tool for integrating and coordinating material,information,and financial flows in supply chain management,is becoming increasingly widespread.We explore how a manufacturer can design optimal trade credit contracts when a risk-averse retailer hides its sales cost information(adverse selection)and selling effort level(moral hazard).We develop incentive models for a risk-averse supply chain when adverse selection and moral hazard coexist,which are then compared with the results under single information asymmetry(moral hazard).Moreover,we analyze the effects of private information and risk-aversion coefficient on contract parameters,selling effort level and the profit or utility of the supply chain.The study shows that when the degree of retailer’s risk aversion is within a certain range,reasonable trade credit contracts designed by the manufacturer can effectively induce the retailer to report its real sales cost and encourage it to exert appropriate effort.Furthermore,we find that the optimal trade credit period,optimal transfer payment,and retailer’s optimal sales effort level under dual information asymmetry are less than those under single information asymmetry.Numerical analysis are conducted to demonstrate the effects of the parameters on decisions and profits.
文摘This paper develops a kind of generalized double-sided moral hazard model of contract choice with Cobb-Douglas technology in a frame of principal-agent theory. The two parties, the principal and the agent, generally have different levels of production efficiency, relative importance factor and are risk-averse or risk-neutral. Using this model, we formally prove that the optimal contract maximizes the output net of the disutility of both the parties and carry out some simulations exercise under two special cases which help explain the double-sided moral hazard issues. By focusing on production efficiency, relative importance factor and risk attitude respectively, this paper analyzes the properties of optimal contracts under three cases.
