This paper investigates a risk-averse inventory model by balancing the expected profit and conditional value-at-risk （CVaR） in a newsvendor model setting. We find out that： i） The optimal order quantity is increas...This paper investigates a risk-averse inventory model by balancing the expected profit and conditional value-at-risk （CVaR） in a newsvendor model setting. We find out that： i） The optimal order quantity is increasing in the shortage cost for both the CVaR only criterion and the tradeoff objective, ii） For the case of zero shortage cost, the optimal order quantity to the CVaR criterion or tradeoff objective is increasing in the selling price, respectively. However, it may not be monotonic in the selling price when incorporating a substantial shortage cost. Moreover, it may be larger or less than the risk-neutral solution, iii） Under the tradeoff objective function, although the optimal order quantity for the model without shortage cost is increasing in the weight put on the expected profit, this property may not be true in general for the model with a substantial shortage cost. Some numerical examples are conducted to verify our results and observations.展开更多
This paper develops a kind of generalized double-sided moral hazard model of contract choice with Cobb-Douglas technology in a frame of principal-agent theory. The two parties, the principal and the agent, generally h...This paper develops a kind of generalized double-sided moral hazard model of contract choice with Cobb-Douglas technology in a frame of principal-agent theory. The two parties, the principal and the agent, generally have different levels of production efficiency, relative importance factor and are risk-averse or risk-neutral. Using this model, we formally prove that the optimal contract maximizes the output net of the disutility of both the parties and carry out some simulations exercise under two special cases which help explain the double-sided moral hazard issues. By focusing on production efficiency, relative importance factor and risk attitude respectively, this paper analyzes the properties of optimal contracts under three cases.展开更多
基金This research was supported by the Social Science Foundation of the Ministry of Education of China under Grant No. 07JA630015, the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 70901059 and 70901029, and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities under Grant No. 105-275171.
文摘This paper investigates a risk-averse inventory model by balancing the expected profit and conditional value-at-risk （CVaR） in a newsvendor model setting. We find out that： i） The optimal order quantity is increasing in the shortage cost for both the CVaR only criterion and the tradeoff objective, ii） For the case of zero shortage cost, the optimal order quantity to the CVaR criterion or tradeoff objective is increasing in the selling price, respectively. However, it may not be monotonic in the selling price when incorporating a substantial shortage cost. Moreover, it may be larger or less than the risk-neutral solution, iii） Under the tradeoff objective function, although the optimal order quantity for the model without shortage cost is increasing in the weight put on the expected profit, this property may not be true in general for the model with a substantial shortage cost. Some numerical examples are conducted to verify our results and observations.
文摘This paper develops a kind of generalized double-sided moral hazard model of contract choice with Cobb-Douglas technology in a frame of principal-agent theory. The two parties, the principal and the agent, generally have different levels of production efficiency, relative importance factor and are risk-averse or risk-neutral. Using this model, we formally prove that the optimal contract maximizes the output net of the disutility of both the parties and carry out some simulations exercise under two special cases which help explain the double-sided moral hazard issues. By focusing on production efficiency, relative importance factor and risk attitude respectively, this paper analyzes the properties of optimal contracts under three cases.
