The distortion of corporate financing in China stock markets is not only reflected as the significant increase of leverage after rights offering, but also the large amount of post-issuance related party transactions b...The distortion of corporate financing in China stock markets is not only reflected as the significant increase of leverage after rights offering, but also the large amount of post-issuance related party transactions between the parent SOEs and their subsidiaries. This paper examines the three channels, including accounts receivables, direct loan and loan guarantee. Empirical findings suggest that high frequency of these transactions after rights offering, and the amount of transactions increase as ownership concentration increases, which support the argument of tunneling.展开更多
文摘The distortion of corporate financing in China stock markets is not only reflected as the significant increase of leverage after rights offering, but also the large amount of post-issuance related party transactions between the parent SOEs and their subsidiaries. This paper examines the three channels, including accounts receivables, direct loan and loan guarantee. Empirical findings suggest that high frequency of these transactions after rights offering, and the amount of transactions increase as ownership concentration increases, which support the argument of tunneling.
