The aim of this paper is to reveal the mechanism of compromise and change in coordination where players agree in general but disagree on coordination methods. When players agree on the need to collaborate but are in c...The aim of this paper is to reveal the mechanism of compromise and change in coordination where players agree in general but disagree on coordination methods. When players agree on the need to collaborate but are in conflict regarding the specific method, one player must always compromise. This situation is known as the Battle of the Sexes in game theory. It has ever been believed that if an agreement is reached under such circumstances, the players do not have the incentive to withdraw from the agreement. However, this study shows that this belief is not always true if the players were able to revise the outcome of their negotiations later. The wide-ranging fields use game theories for their analysis frameworks to analyze the success or failure of coordination. However, comparing with the possibility of betrayal illustrated as a well-known Prisoner Dilemma, it has been rare to discuss conflict regarding the specific method of coordination, although such situations are often observed in today's interdependent real world. The repeated Battle of the Sexes games presented in this study would be a useful framework to analyze conflict regarding the specific method of coordination.展开更多
文摘The aim of this paper is to reveal the mechanism of compromise and change in coordination where players agree in general but disagree on coordination methods. When players agree on the need to collaborate but are in conflict regarding the specific method, one player must always compromise. This situation is known as the Battle of the Sexes in game theory. It has ever been believed that if an agreement is reached under such circumstances, the players do not have the incentive to withdraw from the agreement. However, this study shows that this belief is not always true if the players were able to revise the outcome of their negotiations later. The wide-ranging fields use game theories for their analysis frameworks to analyze the success or failure of coordination. However, comparing with the possibility of betrayal illustrated as a well-known Prisoner Dilemma, it has been rare to discuss conflict regarding the specific method of coordination, although such situations are often observed in today's interdependent real world. The repeated Battle of the Sexes games presented in this study would be a useful framework to analyze conflict regarding the specific method of coordination.