信息不对称情况下公益创投的道德风险

本文在阐述公益创投兴起的背景、内涵及在国内的实践基础上,基于舞弊三角理论,以无锡市公益创投为分析对象,通过理顺公益创投运作各主体间的关系,具体分析社会组织在创投项目申报及实施过程中的隐蔽性行为。分析结果表明:社会组织在公益创投各个阶段都存在舞弊的压力、机会和借口,形成不同程度的道德风险,但执行报告和内评估等问责工具的有效性并不高。失真的信息直接影响第三方承办组织的协调、督导及评估职能,最终使公益创投的目标无法实现。最后,基于分析结果,本文以道德风险的"机会"要素作为突破点,从社会组织及创投项目、创投项目综合效应评价体系、专家工作等多方面提出政策建议。

The Reputation Model of Multi-Stage Dynamic Game

Aim To study the implicit restriction mechanism for hidden action in multi stage dynamic game. Methods A reputation model for restriction on repeated principal agent relationship was established by using the theory on principal agent problem in information economics and the method of game theory to study the implicit restriction mechanism for hidden action. Results and Conclusion It is proved that there exists implicit restriction mechanism for the multi stage principal agent relationship, some conditions for effective restriction are derived, the design methods of implicit restriction mechanism are presented.