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China's Decision-making System from Centralization to Democracy
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作者 周光辉 《China Economist》 2011年第6期18-28,共11页
Established during the long years of revolutionary struggle and the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Communist Party of China(CPC)-led decision-making system has a historical rationality. Bef... Established during the long years of revolutionary struggle and the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Communist Party of China(CPC)-led decision-making system has a historical rationality. Before China's reform and opening-up was implemented in 1978, the decision-making system highlighted centralization which led to disadvantages such as non-existent specialized division of functions, a low level of institutionalization, heavy reliance on experience, an enclosed decision-making mode and non-existent self-correction mechanisms. These disadvantages were institutional factors which ultimately caused the historic tragedy of " Cultural Revolution. "After the reform and opening-up, the decision-making structure, mode and mechanism were reformed in order to promote scientific, democratic and law-based decisions. History has shown that the reform has successfully overcome various challenges brought about by China's rapidly changing economy and society. From the perspective of political development, the reform has promoted several transitions: from individual controlled decision-making system to a more democratic decision-making process, from being empirical to scientifically-based, from highly centralized decision-making organizations to decentralized one, from an enclosed mode to an open mode, from passive to active participation in the decision-making process and from a non-institutionalized to an institutionalized system. Therefore, the CPC-led open decision-making model based on science and laws and participated by other parties has taken an initial shape. 展开更多
关键词 decision-making system centralized decision-making democratic decision-making scientific decision-making law-based decision-making
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基层政府间的“共谋现象”——一个政府行为的制度逻辑 被引量:1183
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作者 周雪光 《社会学研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第6期1-21,共21页
中国一些基层上下级政府行为的一个突出现象是,在执行来自上级部门特别是中央政府的各种指令政策时,常常采取"上有政策、下有对策"的各种手段,来应付这些政策要求以及随之而来的各种检查,导致了实际执行过程偏离政策初衷的结... 中国一些基层上下级政府行为的一个突出现象是,在执行来自上级部门特别是中央政府的各种指令政策时,常常采取"上有政策、下有对策"的各种手段,来应付这些政策要求以及随之而来的各种检查,导致了实际执行过程偏离政策初衷的结果。本文从组织学角度,对这类现象提出一个理论解释。本文的中心命题是:在中国行政体制中,基层政府间的共谋行为已经成为一个制度化了的非正式行为;这种共谋行为是其所处制度环境的产物,有着广泛深厚的合法性基础。本文讨论组织制度的三个悖论,对这一现象提出理论解释:(1)政策一统性与执行灵活性的悖论;(2)激励强度与目标替代的悖论;(3)科层制度非人格化与行政关系人缘化的悖论。本研究强调,共谋行为不能简单地归咎于政府官员或执行人员的素质或能力,其稳定存在和重复再生是政府组织结构和制度环境的产物,是现行组织制度中决策过程与执行过程分离所导致的结果,在很大程度上也是近年来政府制度设计特别是集权决策过程和激励机制强化所导致的非预期结果。而欲改变这一状况,首先需要对政府组织现象进行深入系统的研究,提出有力的理论解释。 展开更多
关键词 基层政府 共谋现象 制度环境 集权决策过程
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