组织隐性知识共享的博弈分析

组织隐性知识的共享已经成为知识管理理论和实践的重要内容,也是知识管理需要解决的难点。针对组织知识社会化过程中可能产生的博弈,分析了其产生的原因和各种博弈存在的均衡策略,并提出了相应的组织如何改善知识共享的对策。

经济政策协调的负效应

目前流行的观点是经济合作或协调对各方有利,即合作、协调有正效应.本文指出负效应也存在,参与合作或协调的国家其福利水平也有下降的情况.一个特别的数值例子说明由于负效应的存在,使得各国之间经济政策协调成为不可能.

Supply chain coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information with retailer cost disruptions

A two-level supply chain model involving one supplier and one retailer with linear demand is developed, and supply chain coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information （the retailer＇ s cost structure is asymmetric information） are proposed by employing game theory in two scenarios： coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information in a regular scenario （without disruption）; and coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information in an irregular scenario （ with retailer cost disruptions）. It is optimal for the supply chain to maintain the original production plan and to guarantee a steadily running system if variations of retailer costs are sufficiently low and do not exceed an upper bound. This shows that the original production plan has certain robustness under disruptions. Decisions must be re-made if a retailer＇ s cost change is greater and exceeds an upper bound. Impacts of retailer cost disruptions on the order quantity, the retail price, the wholesale price and each party＇ s as well as the system＇ s expected profits are investigated through numerical analyses.

企业减员增效的有效合同研究

金融危机来袭后，减员增效再次成为了陷入困境企业改革的一个重要举措，而事实上减员和增效是两个不同的问题，减员只是增效的一个手段，如果没有很好的制度安排，在很多时候减员并没有实现增效。本文从最优合同的角度出发，设计了一个减员增效的合同，通过比较静态分析和博弈分析论证了这个合同是如何实现减员和增效两个目标的，即在减少企业员工的同时使尽量多的工人留下来，从而实现增效的目的。