In this paper, I revisit the question of the consistency of Thrasymachus＇ position on justice in the First Book of the Republic. The paper falls into four parts. （The first part is an introduction.） In the second p...In this paper, I revisit the question of the consistency of Thrasymachus＇ position on justice in the First Book of the Republic. The paper falls into four parts. （The first part is an introduction.） In the second part, I examine two influential interpretations of the sophist＇s views, George B. Kerferd＇s and Timothy D. J. Chappell＇s, and argue that neither one fully resolves the riddle of Thrasymachus. In the third part, I claim that the sophist has a ＂descriptive＂ theory of justice, not a ＂prescriptive＂ one, and that no moral command to act in any particular way follows from this theory. In the fourth and final part, I propose a new approach to the whole issue by arguing that the essential problem with Thrasymachus＇ theory is not the incompatibility between his two definitions of justice in 338c and 343c, as it is usually assumed, but the fact that in Book One he uses two different and irreconcilable conceptions of justice. It is because the sophist uses the term ＂justice＂ to mean different things in different parts of the text that his overall position is ultimately inconsistent.展开更多
文摘In this paper, I revisit the question of the consistency of Thrasymachus＇ position on justice in the First Book of the Republic. The paper falls into four parts. （The first part is an introduction.） In the second part, I examine two influential interpretations of the sophist＇s views, George B. Kerferd＇s and Timothy D. J. Chappell＇s, and argue that neither one fully resolves the riddle of Thrasymachus. In the third part, I claim that the sophist has a ＂descriptive＂ theory of justice, not a ＂prescriptive＂ one, and that no moral command to act in any particular way follows from this theory. In the fourth and final part, I propose a new approach to the whole issue by arguing that the essential problem with Thrasymachus＇ theory is not the incompatibility between his two definitions of justice in 338c and 343c, as it is usually assumed, but the fact that in Book One he uses two different and irreconcilable conceptions of justice. It is because the sophist uses the term ＂justice＂ to mean different things in different parts of the text that his overall position is ultimately inconsistent.
