In the realm of public goods game,punishment,as a potent tool,stands out for fostering cooperation.While it effectively addresses the first-order free-rider problem,the associated costs can be substantial.Punishers in...In the realm of public goods game,punishment,as a potent tool,stands out for fostering cooperation.While it effectively addresses the first-order free-rider problem,the associated costs can be substantial.Punishers incur expenses in imposing sanctions,while defectors face fines.Unfortunately,these monetary elements seemingly vanish into thin air,representing a loss to the system itself.However,by virtue of the redistribution of fines to cooperators and punishers,not only can we mitigate this loss,but the rewards for these cooperative individuals can be enhanced.Based upon this premise,this paper introduces a fine distribution mechanism to the traditional pool punishment model.Under identical parameter settings,by conducting a comparative experiment with the conventional punishment model,the paper aims to investigate the impact of fine distribution on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game.The experimental results clearly demonstrate that,in instances where the punishment cost is prohibitively high,the cooperative strategies of the traditional pool punishment model may completely collapse.However,the model enriched with fine distribution manages to sustain a considerable number of cooperative strategies,thus highlighting its effectiveness in promoting and preserving cooperation,even in the face of substantial punishment cost.展开更多
well、good、fine 和 nice 是英文里一组常见的表达满意和赞许的词,然而,它们在意义上、用法上各不相同,稍不注意就会出现错误,现比较如下:1.well 和 good 的区别1)well 指“身体健康”。如:How are you today?Well,thank you.你今天身...well、good、fine 和 nice 是英文里一组常见的表达满意和赞许的词,然而,它们在意义上、用法上各不相同,稍不注意就会出现错误,现比较如下:1.well 和 good 的区别1)well 指“身体健康”。如:How are you today?Well,thank you.你今天身体怎么样?很好,谢谢。(也可用 fine)John looks well.约翰看起来身体健康。(也可用 fine)在这两个句子里,well 用作形容词,意思是“健康的”、“安好的”(=ingood health)。注意 well 用作此意时通常放在 be、feel 等系动词后面作表语,展开更多
基金the Open Foundation of Key Lab-oratory of Software Engineering of Yunnan Province(Grant Nos.2020SE308 and 2020SE309).
文摘In the realm of public goods game,punishment,as a potent tool,stands out for fostering cooperation.While it effectively addresses the first-order free-rider problem,the associated costs can be substantial.Punishers incur expenses in imposing sanctions,while defectors face fines.Unfortunately,these monetary elements seemingly vanish into thin air,representing a loss to the system itself.However,by virtue of the redistribution of fines to cooperators and punishers,not only can we mitigate this loss,but the rewards for these cooperative individuals can be enhanced.Based upon this premise,this paper introduces a fine distribution mechanism to the traditional pool punishment model.Under identical parameter settings,by conducting a comparative experiment with the conventional punishment model,the paper aims to investigate the impact of fine distribution on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game.The experimental results clearly demonstrate that,in instances where the punishment cost is prohibitively high,the cooperative strategies of the traditional pool punishment model may completely collapse.However,the model enriched with fine distribution manages to sustain a considerable number of cooperative strategies,thus highlighting its effectiveness in promoting and preserving cooperation,even in the face of substantial punishment cost.
