An existence theorem of maximal elements for a new type of preference correspondences which are Q(0)-majorized is given. Then some existence theorems of equilibrium for abstract economy and qualitative game in which t...An existence theorem of maximal elements for a new type of preference correspondences which are Q(0)-majorized is given. Then some existence theorems of equilibrium for abstract economy and qualitative game in which the constraint or preference correspondences are Q(0)-majorized are obtained in locally convex topological vector spaces.展开更多
We generalize an existence theorem of equilibrium of abstract economics byTulcea to a non-compact strategy, space. Our theorem also improves a recent result ofTian.
An existence theorem of maximal elements for an L＊-majorized correspondence defined on a non-paracompact H-space is established. As applications of the result, an equilibrium existence theorem for a non-paracompact g...An existence theorem of maximal elements for an L＊-majorized correspondence defined on a non-paracompact H-space is established. As applications of the result, an equilibrium existence theorem for a non-paracompact generalized game in H-spaces with infinitely many players and with L＊-majorized correspondences is given.展开更多
As we know, the Pareto efficient (optimal) solution or in other words, thenoninferior solution, is a basic concept in multiobjective programming. In thesense of this kind of solution, much theoretical and application ...As we know, the Pareto efficient (optimal) solution or in other words, thenoninferior solution, is a basic concept in multiobjective programming. In thesense of this kind of solution, much theoretical and application work has been doneon solutions in multiobjective programming since the 1950s. However, because thePareto efficient solution is only a solution with respect to a vector objective beingnoinnferior, as for a given multiobjective programming problem, its set is large whenthe number of objectives is great. This is an inevitable flaw caused by definingPareto efficient solution with the partial order induced by a positive cone. Yu intro-duced the nondominated solution on the basis of a general convex cone or展开更多
文摘An existence theorem of maximal elements for a new type of preference correspondences which are Q(0)-majorized is given. Then some existence theorems of equilibrium for abstract economy and qualitative game in which the constraint or preference correspondences are Q(0)-majorized are obtained in locally convex topological vector spaces.
文摘We generalize an existence theorem of equilibrium of abstract economics byTulcea to a non-compact strategy, space. Our theorem also improves a recent result ofTian.
基金Supported by the NNSF of China(10571081)the Natural Science Foundation of Beijing Education Department(KM200710772007).
文摘An existence theorem of maximal elements for an L＊-majorized correspondence defined on a non-paracompact H-space is established. As applications of the result, an equilibrium existence theorem for a non-paracompact generalized game in H-spaces with infinitely many players and with L＊-majorized correspondences is given.
文摘As we know, the Pareto efficient (optimal) solution or in other words, thenoninferior solution, is a basic concept in multiobjective programming. In thesense of this kind of solution, much theoretical and application work has been doneon solutions in multiobjective programming since the 1950s. However, because thePareto efficient solution is only a solution with respect to a vector objective beingnoinnferior, as for a given multiobjective programming problem, its set is large whenthe number of objectives is great. This is an inevitable flaw caused by definingPareto efficient solution with the partial order induced by a positive cone. Yu intro-duced the nondominated solution on the basis of a general convex cone or
