China＇s economic growth miracle despite complicated administrative approval formalities prompted us to raise the following question： ls it true that reforming administrative approval will promote economic growth？ B...China＇s economic growth miracle despite complicated administrative approval formalities prompted us to raise the following question： ls it true that reforming administrative approval will promote economic growth？ Based on our analysis on market entry, we discovered that reforming administrative approval will spur economic growth by reducing transaction cost for firms. Administrative approval may suppress social cost and propel China＇s economic growth; China＇s gradualist approval reforms may indeed propel economic growth by reducing transaction cost for firms. With the data of prefecture-level cities during 2000-2013 and data of companies listed on the SME board during 2010-2014, we tested the effects of approval reforms on economic growth and on transaction cost, and employed instrumental variable and PSM for the treatment of the endogeneity problem - all these tests led to robust and consistent results. Moreover, we discovered that difference in government policy implementation in the approval process is the root cause of corruption and rent seeking.展开更多
Based on the features of China's project investment,we consider the formation of production capacity as a matching behavior between local governments and investment enterprises.Using the search and matching model,...Based on the features of China's project investment,we consider the formation of production capacity as a matching behavior between local governments and investment enterprises.Using the search and matching model,we illustrate that the excess capacity in China mainly results from the asymmetry between the gains from and contribution to the project matching:The capacity will be excessive when the proportion of local governments' return exceeds its contribution to the project,and the more unbalanced the return-contribution relationship,the more severe the overcapacity.Meanwhile,we test this theoretical prediction based on a quasi-natural experiment:the reform of administrative approval system.The empirical results show that the reduction of the local governments' return-contribution ratio will significantly raise the capacity utilization rate and mitigate the overcapacity.Industry-specific regression results further indicate that governments' return-contribution asymmetry is more prominent in industries dominated by state-owned enterprises,high-monopoly industries,heavy industries,and industries with serious overcapacity.This paper offers a novel mechanism of overcapacity,a theoretical criterion for judging optimal capacity,and some new regulatory tools with the micro foundation.展开更多
文摘China＇s economic growth miracle despite complicated administrative approval formalities prompted us to raise the following question： ls it true that reforming administrative approval will promote economic growth？ Based on our analysis on market entry, we discovered that reforming administrative approval will spur economic growth by reducing transaction cost for firms. Administrative approval may suppress social cost and propel China＇s economic growth; China＇s gradualist approval reforms may indeed propel economic growth by reducing transaction cost for firms. With the data of prefecture-level cities during 2000-2013 and data of companies listed on the SME board during 2010-2014, we tested the effects of approval reforms on economic growth and on transaction cost, and employed instrumental variable and PSM for the treatment of the endogeneity problem - all these tests led to robust and consistent results. Moreover, we discovered that difference in government policy implementation in the approval process is the root cause of corruption and rent seeking.
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71203233)the Young Scientists Fund of the National Social Science Fund of China(No.16CJY036).
文摘Based on the features of China's project investment,we consider the formation of production capacity as a matching behavior between local governments and investment enterprises.Using the search and matching model,we illustrate that the excess capacity in China mainly results from the asymmetry between the gains from and contribution to the project matching:The capacity will be excessive when the proportion of local governments' return exceeds its contribution to the project,and the more unbalanced the return-contribution relationship,the more severe the overcapacity.Meanwhile,we test this theoretical prediction based on a quasi-natural experiment:the reform of administrative approval system.The empirical results show that the reduction of the local governments' return-contribution ratio will significantly raise the capacity utilization rate and mitigate the overcapacity.Industry-specific regression results further indicate that governments' return-contribution asymmetry is more prominent in industries dominated by state-owned enterprises,high-monopoly industries,heavy industries,and industries with serious overcapacity.This paper offers a novel mechanism of overcapacity,a theoretical criterion for judging optimal capacity,and some new regulatory tools with the micro foundation.
