The effect of affiliated analysts on stock recommendations: Evidence from share pledges in China

We use the share pledge context in China to examine how affiliated analysts whose securities companies are pledgees of share pledge firms issue stock recommendations on these listed firms.We find that their recommendations are more optimistic than those of non-affiliated analysts,and they are more likely to issue Buy and Add recommendations,suggesting that they issue optimistic rating reports for share pledge firms due to their conflicts of interest.We also find a dynamic adjustment in the stock recommendation behavior of these analysts,and their probability after issuing optimistic stock recommendations is significantly reduced before and after the years that the affiliation relationship between them and share pledge firms both began and ended.These affiliated analysts continue to issue optimistic stock recommendations after visiting the share pledge firms if they work in the same location as the firms,or if they are star analysts among New Fortune’s‘‘top five analysts,"and when the information transparency of the share pledge firms is higher.In addition,the optimistic stock recommendation behavior of affiliated analysts is more significant in our sample of firms with high share pledge ratios and downward stock price pressure.The earnings forecast quality of affiliated analysts is also found to be lower,and they are less inclined to downgrade stock recommendations for these share pledge firms.Buy recommendations issued by both nonaffiliated and affiliated analysts can bring cumulative excess returns in the short event window,but those issued by affiliated analysts are significantly negative in the long-term event window,and significantly lower than those issued by non-affiliated analysts.Overall,our study shows that affiliated analysts issue optimistic rating reports on share pledge firms due to conflicts of interest,which leads to decision-making bias in investors and thus decreases the stock price crash risk of the firms.Our findings further reveal the economic consequences of share pledging and extend our understanding of the behavior of analysts in a conflict of interest situation from the share pledge perspective.

关联分析师荐股、基金持股与投资者利益

本文通过将受雇于基金公司控股股东或发起人的分析师与这些基金公司进行配对，研究这种雇佣关联的分析师荐股和基金持股之间的交互行为及其对投资者利益的影响。研究发现，分析师荐股评级是非独立的，存在为基金持股服务的行为，并且与基金公司有雇佣关联的分析师和声誉低的分析师的独立性更差。这些与基金公司具有关联关系的分析师在以下行为中表现得更为明显：分析师倾向于对基金公司已持有的股票发布更强的推荐，而基金公司则在分析师的推荐发布后显著减少该股票的持股数量。另外，虽然投资者按分析师荐股可以获得正的超额收益，但是分析师和基金的雇佣关联依然会负向影响投资者的利益。

基金股权关联分析师损害了股票市场信息效率吗——基于股价同步性的经验证据

结合我国股票市场信息效率亟待提高,及卖方研究兴起与基金业发展关系密切的现实背景,本文探讨了分析师任职券商与基金之间普遍存在的一种关系——券商参股基金的股权关联关系对股票市场信息效率的影响。研究发现:(1)基金股权关联分析师关注程度与公司股价同步性显著负相关;(2)当股东基金对公司特质信息需求增加时,这种负相关关系更显著;(3)投入更多的精力进行实地调研是其降低股价同步性的一个重要途径;(4)基金股权关联分析师的盈余预测更准确,排除了噪音导致股价同步性降低的可能。本文研究将丰富和发展分析师与基金关系、分析师与市场信息效率等相关领域的文献;对全面认识基金股权关联分析师扮演的信息角色,激励分析师更有效地为市场提供信息服务,促进股票市场信息效率的提高具有重要的现实启示。

参股基金公司持股与分析师乐观性

文章研究了券商所参股基金公司的重仓持股对旗下分析师评级客观性的影响以及市场对这种利益冲突行为的反应。研究发现:(1)关联分析师对参股基金公司重仓持有股票的评级显著高于非关联分析师,而且其乐观程度与券商参股比例、参股基金公司规模以及股票在关联基金公司投资组合中的比重成正比。(2)关联分析师的乐观评级主要针对绩优基金的重仓股,对新基金和绩差基金重仓股的评级则与非关联分析师不存在显著差异。(3)投资者并不能有效识别这种利益冲突行为,关联评级仍会对投资者行为产生显著影响,相同评级下关联评级与非关联评级的短期市场反应并无显著差异,但其长期投资价值显著低于非关联评级。

信息优势还是利益冲突:关联分析师盈余预测行为研究——基于股权质押的经验证据

本文将因隶属券商开展股权质押业务与上市公司形成关联关系的分析师(分析师-券商-股权质押公司)界定为关联分析师,并在此基础上系统地考察关联分析师的盈余预测行为。研究发现,关联分析师的盈余预测偏差更大、精度更低,这一盈余预测行为并未因信息优势和其他关联关系剔除而改善,且与股权质押类型、融资资金去向无关,表明关联分析师因利益冲突发布了乐观性盈余预测报告,研究结论支持利益冲突假说。而且,关联分析师的利益冲突行为在股权质押率高、券商风险管理能力较差时更为突出。股权质押影响关联分析师利益冲突的作用路径是分析师私有信息获取和券商业务拓展需求,导致关联分析师与股权质押公司、隶属券商间的双重利益冲突。本文从质押权人视角丰富了股权质押经济后果研究文献,研究结论有助于增进分析师盈余预测行为的理解。