Executive Stock Option, Mediation of Agency Costs and Allocation of Power in Levered Firms

The relationship between options and agency costs in levered firms is studied by modeling the effect of executive stock options on the manager's investment strategy in levered firms. Stock options do not necessarily aggravate agency costs in levered firms. The corporate governance affects agency costs greatly. If debt-holders were entitled to design executive stock options together with stockholders, by allocating power properly between stockholders and debt-holders, firm value could be enhanced greatly. The following way of allocating power between the two parties is proposed: the exercise price should be the weighted average of the stockholders' and debt-holders' suggested exercise prices. The weight allocated to debt-holders is positively related to the amount of debts that debt-holders lend to stockholders.

Can differences in the background characteristics of the chairperson-CEO vertical dyad reduce management agency costs?——A perspective Based on the internal configuration of the top management team

We test whether differences in the background characteristics of firms’chairperson and CEO can reduce management agency costs.We find that when the chairperson is older,has a higher level of education,and has more overseas experience than the CEO,the management agency costs will be lower.A series of robustness tests do not change our conclusions.In further analysis,we find that the negative relationship between the two is more significant for SOEs or firms experiencing fierce market competition.Finally,we also find that the chairman-CEO’s vertical dyad background characteristics differences can help to improve firm performance.Our study provides theoretical and practical implications for companies on how to best configure their top management team.

Annual report readability and corporate agency costs

Annual reports are the main sources of information for outside investors' investment decisions and enable shareholders to supervise the management.Difficulties with the readability of these reports may therefore have serious consequences. Using 19,221 firm-year observations of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2001 to 2015, we investigate the association between annual report readability and corporate agency costs, where readability is proxied by report file length and/or file size. We find that firms with better annual report readability experience lower agency costs, and the negative association between readability and agency costs is more pronounced in firms with higher external audit quality, internal control quality or analyst coverage. These results hold after several robustness checks. The positive effect of annual report readability is stronger in private firms than in state-owned enterprises, and becomes stronger after the implementation of new accounting standards in 2007. Readable annual reports can help in monitoring corporate insiders' opportunistic behavior and thus reduce agency costs.

A Legal Structure for Limiting the Agency Cost of Stock Rights Transfer

The unilateral disposition of stock rights＇ voting rights detracts from the welfare of the other shareholders. Contractual arrangements restricting or prohibiting the transfer of stock rights under the capital majority rule may infringe upon shareholders＇ fight of withdrawal, further weakening stock market constraints on senior management and indirectly raising the agency cost of management abuse of power for private ends. In creating a legal structure for stock rights transfer, we need to find an appropriate balance between freedom of contract, capital majority rule and reduction of agency costs. Judges should determine that the transfer of voting rights is invalid in order to ensure that voting rights match residual claim rights and maintain the constraints on senior management represented by shareholder voting rights. The general prohibition of stock fights transfer in the articles of association blocks shareholders＇ right of withdrawal; this is not conducive to restraining potential abuses of power on the part of senior management and should be made invalid. Judges must differentiate between long- and short-term contracts and the initial and revised clauses of the articles of association in order to distinguish between the efficacy of different arrangements limiting transfer of stock rights as laid down in the articles of association.

Directors and Officers Liability Insurance and High-Quality Development of Enterprises:From the Perspective of Agency Cost and Innovation Incentive

High-quality economic development can be achieved if a major strategic direction for China are delivered from the macro level to the micro level.Taking A-listed enterprises in China from 2005 to 2018 as samples,this paper studies the impact of directors and officers liability insurance(D&O insurance)on the high-quality enterprise development.The research results show that D&O insurance can promote high-quality development.In addition,the mechanism test shows that D&O insurance can reduce agency costs and improve innovations and high-quality enterprise development.Further analysis shows that when state-owned enterprises including their internal controls has no major defects,D&O insurance has more significant positive impact.Thus,this paper suggests that the insurance should be promoted for realizing high-quality enterprise development.

Internal Mechanisms of Corporate Governance and Firm Performance： A Review of Theory and Empirical Evidence

Literature has revealed the existence of several external and internal disciplining mechanisms that are hypothesized as factors influencing corporate governance. This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on five internal mechanisms of corporate governance, namely, dividend payouts, financial leverage, institutional shareholding, board duality, and board size. These mechanisms have received the greatest deal of attention in the literature. The paper makes an original contribution to the literature as it is the first of its type, to the best of our knowledge, to provide a comprehensive idea on these five internal mechanisms of corporate governance. This study will help in investigating the relationship between internal corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance with the main aim of extending the existing literature on firm performance by empirically investigating the contribution of these mechanisms in the smooth conduct of business operations. The empirical evidence amassed favors a smaller board size, non-existence of duality and favorable dividend mechanisms as effective internal governance mechanisms affecting firm performance. At the same time, there is no conclusive evidence on the relationship between leverage and institutional ownership as internal governance mechanisms influencing agency cost and firm performance.

Fraud Detection and Prevention:A Review of the Latest Developments in U.K.Audit

Proposed reforms to U.K.audit are reviewed from a fraud detection and prevention perspective.A holistic four-actor model that encompasses:the directors,auditor,shareholders,and the regulator,is used to frame the discussion.Focus is drawn to the mediating role of the Audit and Assurance Policy.The paper argues that the proposed reforms have some potential to reduce the audit expectations gap.However,the problem of agency costs and the advisory nature of shareholder voting on the Audit and Assurance Policy significantly limit the possible effectiveness of the reforms from a fraud detection and prevention perspective.Suggestions for future research are made.

The Impact of Membership in Non-Local Chambers of Commerce on Corporate Innovation:The Dual Role of Business Culture and Social Networks

Using a sample of A-share listed companies from the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2010 to 2020,this study examines the impact of membership in non-local chambers of commerce(NLCCs)on corporate innovation,considering the dual attributes of business culture and social networks associated with these chambers.The research finds that joining a NLCC significantly promotes corporate innovation.Agency costs play a partial mediating role between membership in NLCCs and corporate innovation,with a chain mediation path of“NLCC-social capital-agency costs-corporate innovation.”Further analysis reveals that the more NLCCs there are in a company’s location,the greater the positive impact of joining one on corporate innovation.The promotion effect of joining a NLCC on corporate innovation is stronger for state-owned enterprises(SOEs)compared to non-state-owned enterprises(non-SOEs).In addition,membership in NLCCs fosters both invention and non-invention innovation.

Powerful Chief Executive Officers and Firm Performance： Integrating Agency and Stewardship Theory

Do agency and stewardship behaviors coexist at firms, or does one dominate the other？ We use data from listed companies in China over the period 2007-2016 to show that powerful chief executive officers （CEOs） simultaneously incur self-interested agency costs while acting as stewards to benefit the firm. In balancing the push-and-pull forces of stewardship and agency behaviors, powerful CEOs in Chinese firms ultimately improve short-term and long-term firm performance. Our results have important implications for understanding how CEOs affect firms and how cultural factors can motivate CEOs to work in the interest of the firm.

Life-cycle cost analysis of optimal timing of pavement preservation

Optimal application of pavement preservation or preventive maintenance is critical for highway agencies to allocate the limited budget for different treatments. This study developed an integrated life-cycle cost analysis （LCCA） model to quantify the impact of pavement preservation on agency cost and vehicle operation cost （VOC） and analyzed the optimal timing of preservation treatments. The international roughness index （IRI） data were extracted from the long-term pavement performance （LTPP） program specific pavement studies 3 （SPS-3） to determine the long-term effectiveness of preservation treatments on IRI deterioration. The traffic loading and the initial IRI value significantly affects life extension and the benefit of agency cost caused by pavement preservation. The benefit in VOC is one to two orders greater in magnitude as compared to the benefit in agency cost. The optimal timing calculated based on VOC is always earlier than the optimal timing calculated based on agency cost. There are considerable differences among the optimal timing of three preservation treatments.

Ultimate Government Control Structures and Firm Value:Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

We show that 70% of Chinese listed companies are ultimately controlled by government agencies, thereby indicating that state ownership remains widespread in China's stock markets. Three questions are considered that are related to government control structures and their impact on firm value:(1) how do government agencies maintain their control of listed companies;(2) what are the impacts of different government control structures on firm value; and(3) are these impacts different in local government and central government-controlled firms? We find that the Chinese government controls listed companies directly or indirectly through solely state-owned enterprises(SSOEs). Taking into account the trade-off between political and agency costs, we show that firm value increases when some control rights are decentralized from the government to state-owned enterprises(SOEs). Moreover, decentralization improves significantly the performance of local government- controlled, but not central government-controlled firms.

Large shareholders and accounting research

Large shareholders are a potentially very important element of firms' corporate governance system. Whereas analytical research is typically vague on who these large shareholders are, in practice there are important variations in the types of large owners(and the different types of large owners could play very different governance roles). After briefly reviewing the standard agency cost arguments, in this article I emphasize the heterogeneity of concentrated ownership and in particular focus on the roles of families, institutions, governments, and employee ownership. I also discuss the role of large shareholders in private(i.e., unlisted) firms, where ownership tends to be more concentrated than in publicly traded firms. Finally, I briefly discuss variations in ownership structures across selected countries.

Non-actual controllers and corporate innovation:Evidence from China

As the number of“ownerless”enterprises in China’s capital market increases,so does the importance of paying attention to their behavior.From the perspective of enterprises’control rights allocation,we find that non-actual controllers can inhibit corporate innovation by intensifying agency conflicts,reducing corporate risk-taking and strengthening financing constraints.We also find that a larger proportion of independent directors,higher audit quality,greater managerial ownership and less environmental uncertainty weaken the negative effect of non-actual controllers on corporate innovation.In contrast,multiple large shareholders strengthen the inhibitory effect of nonactual controllers on corporate innovation,but this inhibitory effect comes from over-supervision rather than from collusion.We further divide nonactual controllers into real and hidden types and find that real non-actual controllers still have a significant inhibitory effect on corporate innovation.Finally,we rule out the competitive explanation of equity dispersion,whereby non-actual controllers inhibit corporate innovation.This study enriches the literature on the factors influencing corporate innovation and provides evidence of the adverse impact of non-actual controllers.

An Analysis of Chinese Stakeholders of Listed Company Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

This paper concentrate on related theories based on moral hazard and agency costs to divide the stakeholder into two categories. By making several assumptions, we establish the overlapping-generations model based on genetic replication equation and analyze the stakeholder in stock market with evolutionary game and then conclude the evolutionary equilibrium based on data of Chinese stock market.