Audit Quality in Kazakhstan： Does Big 4 Provide High-Quality Audits？

This paper provides empirical evidence on audit quality in Kazakhstan as measured by audit tenure and the frequency of issuing modified opinions. In addition, an overview of audit institutions of Kazakhstan and an analysis of the current audit market for public companies are offered. This paper also sheds light upon the potential independence problems resulting in low audit quality and current barriers to audit researches in Kazakhstan. Consistent with the findings of extant researches on audit quality and the general perceptions of investors, two hypotheses were developed, i.e., the audits performed by Big 4 audit firms in Kazakhstan also have higher quality than non-Big 4 audit firms in terms of audit tenure and the frequency of issuing modified opinions. The result confirms the hypothesis that Big 4 audit firms provide higher audit quality than smaller local firms in association with audit tenure instead of in relation to the frequency of issuing modified opinions. The result indicates that Big 4 audit firms may not be as independent as they will be in a highly litigious market. Therefore, an independent inspection should be regularly implemented according to the audit law, and the inspection report should be publicized by Chamber of Auditors （COA）1. If this is not practical due to the lack of qualified inspectors, a peer review may be an altemative to implement the quality control policy immediately. To the author＇s best knowledge, this is the first audit quality research in countries of the Commonwealth of Independence States （CIS）.

Does Independent External Auditing Play a Role in Corporate Governance？ An Empirical Study on Chinese A-Share Listed Firms

In China, an emerging economy, where investor protection is relatively weak, it is worthwhile and interesting to investigate whether independent external auditing, a sort of external corporate governance mechanism, exerts its influence. Using a sample of all A-share listed firms in 2005, this paper investigates the effects of independent external auditing on corporate governance via three aspects： （1） choice of auditing institution; （2） auditing fee; and （3） auditing opinion for annual reports. Empirical results show that, with worse agency problems in firms, the possibility of employing the “Big 41” to audit its annual reports is bigger. When determining auditing fees, auditing institutions take both firms＇ agency problems and the firm size into account. When issuing qualified opinions for poor-performing firms, auditors do not consider agency problems embedded in concentrated ownership. Overall, external independent auditing plays a limited role in corporate governance.

Game for Information Disclosure and the Auditing Institution

This paper takes Principal-agent Theory as the basic analysis flame to analyze the modern corporate principal and agent in a state of the two sides in asymmetric information on the basis of self-interest maximization, and the game strategy which revolves the information disclosure and hideaway to launch, and therefore can get the game way which causes the auditing institution. The equilibrium in game of the information disclosure causes the auditing institution, the expense and cost which the audit profession consumes is the company governs reduces the information not asymmetrical diligently center essential agency costs.