Border Gateway Protocol(BGP)is a standard inter-domain routing protocol for the Internet that conveys network layer reachability information and establishes routes to different destinations.The BGP protocol exhibits s...Border Gateway Protocol(BGP)is a standard inter-domain routing protocol for the Internet that conveys network layer reachability information and establishes routes to different destinations.The BGP protocol exhibits security design defects,such as an unconditional trust mechanism and the default acceptance of BGP route announcements from peers by BGP neighboring nodes,easily triggering prefix hijacking,path forgery,route leakage,and other BGP security threats.Meanwhile,the traditional BGP security mechanism,relying on a public key infrastructure,faces issues like a single point of failure and a single point of trust.The decentralization,anti-tampering,and traceability advantages of blockchain offer new solution ideas for constructing secure and trusted inter-domain routing mechanisms.In this paper,we summarize the characteristics of BGP protocol in detail,sort out the BGP security threats and their causes.Additionally,we analyze the shortcomings of the traditional BGP security mechanism and comprehensively evaluate existing blockchain-based solutions to address the above problems and validate the reliability and effectiveness of blockchain-based BGP security methods in mitigating BGP security threats.Finally,we discuss the challenges posed by BGP security problems and outline prospects for future research.展开更多
发现目前安全性得到广泛认可的BGP源自治系统验证机制(如S-BGP)会受到一种上层ISP(Internet Service Provider,Internet服务提供商)前缀劫持攻击.这些机制基于前缀的分配路径,仅能保证前缀被分配路径上的ISP授权自治系统发起,不能保证...发现目前安全性得到广泛认可的BGP源自治系统验证机制(如S-BGP)会受到一种上层ISP(Internet Service Provider,Internet服务提供商)前缀劫持攻击.这些机制基于前缀的分配路径,仅能保证前缀被分配路径上的ISP授权自治系统发起,不能保证被分配路径上最后一个ISP(即前缀的拥有ISP)授权自治系统发起.只有获得前缀拥有ISP授权的自治系统才是该前缀的合法源自治系统.本文提出了一种基于前缀分配路径长度的源自治系统验证机制---LAP(the Length of Assignment Path,分配路径长度).基本思想是任一发出前缀可达路由通告的自治系统都必须提供该前缀的分配路径及证明,只有提供前缀最长有效分配路径的自治系统才是该前缀的合法源自治系统.LAP可保护域间路由系统免受有效前缀劫持、子前缀劫持、未使用前缀劫持,特别是上层ISP前缀劫持攻击,可无缝应用于BGP安全方案和一些下一代域间路由协议中.展开更多
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China,GrantNumbers(62272007,62001007)the Natural Science Foundation of Beijing,GrantNumbers(4234083,4212018)The authors also acknowledge the support from King Khalid University for funding this research through the Large Group Project under Grant Number RGP.2/373/45.
文摘Border Gateway Protocol(BGP)is a standard inter-domain routing protocol for the Internet that conveys network layer reachability information and establishes routes to different destinations.The BGP protocol exhibits security design defects,such as an unconditional trust mechanism and the default acceptance of BGP route announcements from peers by BGP neighboring nodes,easily triggering prefix hijacking,path forgery,route leakage,and other BGP security threats.Meanwhile,the traditional BGP security mechanism,relying on a public key infrastructure,faces issues like a single point of failure and a single point of trust.The decentralization,anti-tampering,and traceability advantages of blockchain offer new solution ideas for constructing secure and trusted inter-domain routing mechanisms.In this paper,we summarize the characteristics of BGP protocol in detail,sort out the BGP security threats and their causes.Additionally,we analyze the shortcomings of the traditional BGP security mechanism and comprehensively evaluate existing blockchain-based solutions to address the above problems and validate the reliability and effectiveness of blockchain-based BGP security methods in mitigating BGP security threats.Finally,we discuss the challenges posed by BGP security problems and outline prospects for future research.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.60673169 (国家自然科学基金)the National Basic Research Program of China under Grant No.2003CB314802 (国家重点基础研究发展计划(973))the National High-Tech Research and Development Plan of China under Grant No.2006AA01Z213 (国家高技术研究发展计划(863))
文摘发现目前安全性得到广泛认可的BGP源自治系统验证机制(如S-BGP)会受到一种上层ISP(Internet Service Provider,Internet服务提供商)前缀劫持攻击.这些机制基于前缀的分配路径,仅能保证前缀被分配路径上的ISP授权自治系统发起,不能保证被分配路径上最后一个ISP(即前缀的拥有ISP)授权自治系统发起.只有获得前缀拥有ISP授权的自治系统才是该前缀的合法源自治系统.本文提出了一种基于前缀分配路径长度的源自治系统验证机制---LAP(the Length of Assignment Path,分配路径长度).基本思想是任一发出前缀可达路由通告的自治系统都必须提供该前缀的分配路径及证明,只有提供前缀最长有效分配路径的自治系统才是该前缀的合法源自治系统.LAP可保护域间路由系统免受有效前缀劫持、子前缀劫持、未使用前缀劫持,特别是上层ISP前缀劫持攻击,可无缝应用于BGP安全方案和一些下一代域间路由协议中.
