Unlicensed Band Sharing Based on Bargaining Game for Heterogeneous Networks

Currently,limited licensed frequency bands cannot meet the increasing demands for various wireless communication applications any more.It is necessary to extend wireless communication networks to unlicensed spectrum.In this paper,we propose a new bargaining framework for unlicensed band access to achieve high spectrum efficiency,where one radio access technology(RAT)(such as macro cellular network)“competes”the unlicensed bands with multiple other RATs(such as small cellular networks or Wi-Fi)virtually.Considering that macro cell can share unlicensed frequencies with multiple small cells which are in the same coverage area for more freedom,we use bargaining game theory to fairly and effectively share the unlicensed spectrum between macro and multiple heterogeneous small cell networks,where bargaining loss and time dissipation loss for virtual“price”of unlicensed bands are mainly considered.In the oneto-many bargaining process,we also develop a multiple RAT alliance game strategy to reduce transmission loss in a joint manner.Simulation results show that the proposed unlicensed band sharing algorithm significantly improves the spectrum efficiency performance compared with the other practical schemes for heterogeneous networks.

Modelling the Iranian Petroleum Contract fiscal regime using bargaining game theory to guide contract negotiators

Based on Iran's sixth development plan,the country's oil and gas industry requires an investment of about$200 bn in the next five years to increase production.The Iranian government,to attract and motivate international oil company investment in their oil and gas fields,has presented a new type of risk service contract:the Iranian Petroleum Contract(IPC).This paper summarizes the features of the IPC and presents mathematical models of its fiscal regime for the benefit and guidance of both the National Iranian Oil Company(NIOC)and the contractors.Next,adopting bargaining game theory provides a mathematical model for reaching a win-win situation between the NIOC and the contractor.Finally,a numerical example is given and a sensitivity analysis performed to illustrate the implementation of the proposed models.The contractor and the NIOC may use these models when preparing their proposal and in the course of actual negotiations to calculate their internal rate of return,remuneration fee,and net present value for developing the fields at different conditions of their bargaining power,and derive a logical bargain to protect their best possible interests.

A Dynamic Multi-Player Bargaining Game with Veto Players

This paper studies the effect of veto right on players’income in multi-player dynamic bargaining game.Based on a basic multi-person dynamic bargaining model generalized by the Rubinstein’s two-person alternating-offer bargaining model,the authors construct a dynamic multi-player bargaining game with veto players by adding a constraint to its negotiation process,which is obtained by studying the influence of exercising the veto right exercised by veto players.The authors emphatically describe the strategic game form of this dynamic bargaining game and study its equilibrium,then we analyze the relationship between the minimum acceptable payoff of the veto players and the equilibrium income.The research shows that veto right may increase the benefits of veto players and decrease the benefits of non-veto players.Veto players will not affect the players’benefits and the form of equilibrium when the minimum acceptable payoff of every veto player is relatively low.When the minimum acceptable payoff of the veto player is high enough,he can only get the minimum acceptable payoff,and his benefit increases as his minimum acceptable payoff increases.In this case,the veto player has intention to obtain more resources by presenting a higher minimum acceptable payoff.

Some Kinds of Bargaining Equilibria of Multi-objective Games

To solve the choice of multi-objective game's equilibria,we construct general bargaining games called self-bargaining games,and define their individual welfare functions with three appropriate axioms.According to the individual welfare functions,we transform the multi–objective game into a single-objective game and define its bargaining equilibrium,which is a Nash equilibrium of the single-objective game.And then,based on certain continuity and concavity of the multi-objective game's payoff function,we proof the bargaining equilibrium still exists and is also a weakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium.Moreover,we analyze several special bargaining equilibria,and compare them in a few examples.

Cooperative spectrum sharing of multiple primary users and multiple secondary users

This paper proposes a multiple-input multiple-output （MIMO） based cooperative dynamic spectrum access （DSA） framework that enables multiple primary users （PUs） and multiple secondary users （SUs） to cooperate in spectrum sharing. By exploiting MIMO in cooperative DSA, SUs can relay the primary traffic and send their own data at the same time, which greatly improves the performance of both PUs and SUs when compared to the non- MIMO time-division spectrum sharing schemes. Especially, we focus on the relay selection optimization problem among multiple PUs and multiple SUs. The network-wide cooperation and competition are formulated as a bargaining game, and an algorithm is developed to derive the optimal PU-SU relay assignment and resource allocation. Evaluation results show that both primary and secondary users achieve significant utility gains with the proposed framework, which gives all of them incentive for cooperation.

Game Theoretic Subcarrier and Power Allocation for Wireless OFDMA Networks

This paper proposes a bargaining game theoretic resource(including the subcarrier and the power) allocation scheme for wireless orthogonal frequency division multiple access(OFDMA) networks.We define a wireless user s payoff as a function of the achieved data-rate.The fairness resource allocation problem can then be modeled as a cooperative bargaining game.The objective of the game is to maximize the aggregate payoffs for the users.To search for the Nash bargaining solution(NBS) of the game,a suboptimal subcarrier allocation is performed by assuming an equal power allocation.Thereafter,an optimal power allocation is performed to maximize the sum payoff for the users.By comparing with the max-rate and the max-min algorithms,simulation results show that the proposed game could achieve a good tradeoff between the user fairness and the overall system performance.

Inter-operator spectrum sharing scheme for reconfigurable system

Bargaining based mechanism for sharing spectrum between radio access networks （RANs） belonging to multioperators is studied, to improve spectrum utilization efficiency and maximize network revenue. By introducing an intelligent agent, each RAN has the ability, which includes trading information exchanging, final decision making, and so on, to trade the spectrum with other RANs. The proposed inter-operator spectrum sharing mechanism is modeled as an infinite-horizon bargaining game with incomplete information, and the resulting bargaining game has unique sequential equilibrium. Consequently, the implementation is refined based on the analysis. Simulation results show that the proposed mechanism outperforms the conventional fixed spectrum management （FSM） method in network revenue, spectrum efficiency, and call blocking rate.

Multi-Agent Decision Making in Large-Scale Systems

In this,the decision problem in a large-scale system consisting of sevral subeys subeystm are considerde and the metheds for cofliect between the subsystems are explored.Based on the multiperson multiobjective conflict decision(MMCD) model proposed in Ref.[6],the concept,of bargaining solution for conflicts in large-scale systems is presented,and an approach to achieving th bargaining soltion is proposed.