In this paper we highlight how the apparent double coverage of toxins and bioregulators by both the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention(BTWC)and the Chemical Weapons Convention(CWC)in fact masks a regulatory gap t...In this paper we highlight how the apparent double coverage of toxins and bioregulators by both the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention(BTWC)and the Chemical Weapons Convention(CWC)in fact masks a regulatory gap that has left such potentially dangerous agents neglected by both the control regimes during a period of rapid advances in relevant chemical,life and associated sciences and technologies.We first review what toxins,bioregulators and other mid-spectrum agents are and why they are of such concern and then examine how they are regulated under the BTWC and CWC.This paper then examines an illustrative range of contemporary chemical and life science research and associated activities of concern drawn from case study research on China,India,Iran,Russia,Syria and the United States,and assesses how the CWC and BTWC States Parties have inadequately addressed these threats.We then examine how both the CWC and BTWC Review Conferences failed to address these long-term challenges,and we end by providing a series of recommendations for how both regimes can be strengthened in this area.展开更多
It is necessary to assess the risks generated by various micro-organisms that can be used as biological weapons and to understand the process of their development and the use of biological agents over time.Biological ...It is necessary to assess the risks generated by various micro-organisms that can be used as biological weapons and to understand the process of their development and the use of biological agents over time.Biological agents used for military purposes may be more powerful than conventional weapons and chemical weapons.Over the past century,advances in biotechnology and biochemistry have simplified the development and production of such weapons,and genetic engineering probably holds the most dangerous potential for making biological weapons.Ease of production,broad availability of biological agents and technical knowledge has led to the proliferation of biological weapons and a growing desire among developing countries to hold them.展开更多
The devastating effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have acutely shown the need for maintaining robust international and national systems for biological security and ensuring that life sciences are used only for peaceful...The devastating effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have acutely shown the need for maintaining robust international and national systems for biological security and ensuring that life sciences are used only for peaceful purposes.Life science stakeholders can play an important role in safeguarding scientific and technological advances in biology and related fields against accidental or deliberate misuse,not least because they are on the frontlines of driving innovation.In this paper,we argue that enhancing awareness and understanding of the risk of deliberate disease is essential for effective biological security.We first discuss the issue of‘dual use’in science and technology as it relates to disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.Second,we review how scientist engagement with dual-use risks has been addressed in the context of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention(BTWC).Third,we report on the development of an innovative awarenessraising tool,a cartoon series,that can be used for engaging life science stakeholders with BTWC issues.Finally,we outline a set of practical considerations for promoting sustainable life science engagement with the BTWC.展开更多
Biological weapons are used in wars to wound or kill people or animals and destroy crops with pathogenic microorganisms such as bacteria and viruses,as well as toxins and other biologically active substances.These are...Biological weapons are used in wars to wound or kill people or animals and destroy crops with pathogenic microorganisms such as bacteria and viruses,as well as toxins and other biologically active substances.These are highly infectious,easily communicable,widely destructive,long-acting,and difficult to prevent and treat.Thus,a major challenge for the international community is preventing the spread of biological weapons throughout the world.The Biological Weapons Convention(BWC)is a multilateral treaty that clearly prohibits the development,production,stockpiling,acquisition and preservation of biological and toxic weapons,as well as the design and delivery of biological warfare agents,except for the purpose of prevention,protection and other peaceful uses.The BWC is,to a certain extent,binding on countries capable of manufacturing biological weapons,and has become a powerful tool enabling the international community to jointly deal with the threats posed by biological weapons.However,its effectiveness has been reduced by the lack of a corresponding verification mechanism.With the rapid development of biotechnology,global biosecurity is faced with new and highly uncertain challenges and threats,which requires the member countries of the BWC to cooperate with,promote,and supervise each other in making constant improvements to the BWC in an effort to maintain global peace and stable development.展开更多
In order to effectively implement the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists,biosecurity awareness-raising and education are essential because if these are not in place scientists will not ...In order to effectively implement the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists,biosecurity awareness-raising and education are essential because if these are not in place scientists will not understand the need for biosecurity codes of conduct.In an effort to assist in the implementation of the guidelines,a smallscale survey was carried out in early 2022 of biosecurity awareness-raising and education projects that have been developed over the last two decades to discover what resources and experience have been accumulated.It is argued that the survey demonstrates that much of what is needed to implement the guidelines effectively has been developed,but that there are specific deficiencies that need to be remedied quickly.In particular,an updated teaching resource covering the core issues related to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention(BTWC)and the problem of dual use in scientific research needs to be made widely available and translated into at least the six official United Nations(UN)languages.Additionally,more specialists from the Humanities with expertise in ethics need to become involved in biosecurity awareness-raising and education activities.While advantage should be taken now of the available national,regional and international networks of people involved in related activities,it is suggested that in the longer term cooperation in biosecurity awareness-raising and education will benefit from the development of an equivalent organisation to the International Nuclear Security Education Network(INSEN)organised through the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA).展开更多
基金supported by an Emeritus Fellowship from the Leverhulme Trust(EM-2018-005/10)to Professor Malcolm Dando.
文摘In this paper we highlight how the apparent double coverage of toxins and bioregulators by both the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention(BTWC)and the Chemical Weapons Convention(CWC)in fact masks a regulatory gap that has left such potentially dangerous agents neglected by both the control regimes during a period of rapid advances in relevant chemical,life and associated sciences and technologies.We first review what toxins,bioregulators and other mid-spectrum agents are and why they are of such concern and then examine how they are regulated under the BTWC and CWC.This paper then examines an illustrative range of contemporary chemical and life science research and associated activities of concern drawn from case study research on China,India,Iran,Russia,Syria and the United States,and assesses how the CWC and BTWC States Parties have inadequately addressed these threats.We then examine how both the CWC and BTWC Review Conferences failed to address these long-term challenges,and we end by providing a series of recommendations for how both regimes can be strengthened in this area.
文摘It is necessary to assess the risks generated by various micro-organisms that can be used as biological weapons and to understand the process of their development and the use of biological agents over time.Biological agents used for military purposes may be more powerful than conventional weapons and chemical weapons.Over the past century,advances in biotechnology and biochemistry have simplified the development and production of such weapons,and genetic engineering probably holds the most dangerous potential for making biological weapons.Ease of production,broad availability of biological agents and technical knowledge has led to the proliferation of biological weapons and a growing desire among developing countries to hold them.
基金The graphic design of the Cartoon Series and the publication of this manuscript have been funded by a grant provided by the UK Research and Innovation Strategic Priorities Fund and HEIF Rescaling Fund through London Metropolitan University,UK.
文摘The devastating effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have acutely shown the need for maintaining robust international and national systems for biological security and ensuring that life sciences are used only for peaceful purposes.Life science stakeholders can play an important role in safeguarding scientific and technological advances in biology and related fields against accidental or deliberate misuse,not least because they are on the frontlines of driving innovation.In this paper,we argue that enhancing awareness and understanding of the risk of deliberate disease is essential for effective biological security.We first discuss the issue of‘dual use’in science and technology as it relates to disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.Second,we review how scientist engagement with dual-use risks has been addressed in the context of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention(BTWC).Third,we report on the development of an innovative awarenessraising tool,a cartoon series,that can be used for engaging life science stakeholders with BTWC issues.Finally,we outline a set of practical considerations for promoting sustainable life science engagement with the BTWC.
基金This study was supported by the Key Laboratory on Emerging Infectious Diseases and Biosafety in Wuhan(2018201261638501)a project of the Wuhan Science and Technology Program.
文摘Biological weapons are used in wars to wound or kill people or animals and destroy crops with pathogenic microorganisms such as bacteria and viruses,as well as toxins and other biologically active substances.These are highly infectious,easily communicable,widely destructive,long-acting,and difficult to prevent and treat.Thus,a major challenge for the international community is preventing the spread of biological weapons throughout the world.The Biological Weapons Convention(BWC)is a multilateral treaty that clearly prohibits the development,production,stockpiling,acquisition and preservation of biological and toxic weapons,as well as the design and delivery of biological warfare agents,except for the purpose of prevention,protection and other peaceful uses.The BWC is,to a certain extent,binding on countries capable of manufacturing biological weapons,and has become a powerful tool enabling the international community to jointly deal with the threats posed by biological weapons.However,its effectiveness has been reduced by the lack of a corresponding verification mechanism.With the rapid development of biotechnology,global biosecurity is faced with new and highly uncertain challenges and threats,which requires the member countries of the BWC to cooperate with,promote,and supervise each other in making constant improvements to the BWC in an effort to maintain global peace and stable development.
文摘In order to effectively implement the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists,biosecurity awareness-raising and education are essential because if these are not in place scientists will not understand the need for biosecurity codes of conduct.In an effort to assist in the implementation of the guidelines,a smallscale survey was carried out in early 2022 of biosecurity awareness-raising and education projects that have been developed over the last two decades to discover what resources and experience have been accumulated.It is argued that the survey demonstrates that much of what is needed to implement the guidelines effectively has been developed,but that there are specific deficiencies that need to be remedied quickly.In particular,an updated teaching resource covering the core issues related to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention(BTWC)and the problem of dual use in scientific research needs to be made widely available and translated into at least the six official United Nations(UN)languages.Additionally,more specialists from the Humanities with expertise in ethics need to become involved in biosecurity awareness-raising and education activities.While advantage should be taken now of the available national,regional and international networks of people involved in related activities,it is suggested that in the longer term cooperation in biosecurity awareness-raising and education will benefit from the development of an equivalent organisation to the International Nuclear Security Education Network(INSEN)organised through the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA).
