Companies are directed and controlled by corporate governance.It acts on the company internally and externally.The board of directors is responsible for the governance of the company;that is to say,the board of direct...Companies are directed and controlled by corporate governance.It acts on the company internally and externally.The board of directors is responsible for the governance of the company;that is to say,the board of directors is the brain of the company,while corporate governance is the blood distributed throughout the company,which not only supplies blood to the whole,but also reflects the situation.Therefore,with regard to the role of the board of directors in corporate governance,this paper objectively analyzes the importance of the board of directors in corporate governance from theory to practice and from the internal composition of the board of directors to the impact of the board’s actions on the enterprise as a whole based on United Kingdom(UK)listed companies.展开更多
Based on the relevant theories of corporate governance and the special institutional background of Chinese state-owned enterprises(SOEs),this paper systematically reviews the literature on the independence and governa...Based on the relevant theories of corporate governance and the special institutional background of Chinese state-owned enterprises(SOEs),this paper systematically reviews the literature on the independence and governance effect of SOE boards.We find that the governance effect of SOE boards is driven by the dual characteristics of SOEs:state involvement in ownership and market incentives.With the state involved in ownership,SOEs adhere to the leadership of the Communist Party of China(CPC),which results in an enhanced governance effect.Under market incentives,SOEs tend to have an optimal board structure that helps mitigate both the shareholder–management agency problem(Type I agency problem)and the controlling shareholder–minority shareholder agency problem(Type II agency problem).In terms of the governance effect of boards,directors appointed by non-controlling shareholders are effective in alleviating Type I and Type II agency problems,and this highlights the importance of mixed-ownership reforms in SOEs.Independent directors,especially those with a professional background,also play a role in improving corporate governance.However,independent directors in SOEs have relatively weak incentives to monitor,which limits their governance effect.This paper shows positive implications for promoting mixed-ownership reforms and improving board governance in SOEs.展开更多
In this study we examine how the regulation of director attendance disciplines directors’behavior,and consider the governance effect of such regulations.This examination exploits the differences between the requireme...In this study we examine how the regulation of director attendance disciplines directors’behavior,and consider the governance effect of such regulations.This examination exploits the differences between the requirements for director attendance at board meetings enacted by the Shanghai Stock Exchange(SHSE)and by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange(SZSE).Using a difference-indifferences model with a sample of A-share listed firms from 2006 to 2017,we document that the rate of meeting attendance by independent directors who serve with firms listed on the SHSE(SHIDs)has increased significantly since the exchange’s enforcement of the regulation on attendance.This positive effect has been more pronounced for independent directors with legal backgrounds.Further investigations find that the regulation of attendance plays a corporate governance role through the mechanism of enhanced monitoring.The attendance regulation increases the SHIDs likelihood of casting dissenting votes,and it leads to both better accounting performance and higher firm value.In addition,SHIDs are more likely to depart from firms listed on the SHSE,and to transfer their directorships to firms listed on the SZSE,which has a less constraining attendance requirement.Our findings provide evidence of how external regulation shapes director attendance and voting behavior in emerging markets.展开更多
文摘Companies are directed and controlled by corporate governance.It acts on the company internally and externally.The board of directors is responsible for the governance of the company;that is to say,the board of directors is the brain of the company,while corporate governance is the blood distributed throughout the company,which not only supplies blood to the whole,but also reflects the situation.Therefore,with regard to the role of the board of directors in corporate governance,this paper objectively analyzes the importance of the board of directors in corporate governance from theory to practice and from the internal composition of the board of directors to the impact of the board’s actions on the enterprise as a whole based on United Kingdom(UK)listed companies.
基金the financial support from the National Social Science Fund of China Key Research Project(Project No.17ZDA086):Research on Reforms and Innovations of Monitoring System in State-Owned Enterprises
文摘Based on the relevant theories of corporate governance and the special institutional background of Chinese state-owned enterprises(SOEs),this paper systematically reviews the literature on the independence and governance effect of SOE boards.We find that the governance effect of SOE boards is driven by the dual characteristics of SOEs:state involvement in ownership and market incentives.With the state involved in ownership,SOEs adhere to the leadership of the Communist Party of China(CPC),which results in an enhanced governance effect.Under market incentives,SOEs tend to have an optimal board structure that helps mitigate both the shareholder–management agency problem(Type I agency problem)and the controlling shareholder–minority shareholder agency problem(Type II agency problem).In terms of the governance effect of boards,directors appointed by non-controlling shareholders are effective in alleviating Type I and Type II agency problems,and this highlights the importance of mixed-ownership reforms in SOEs.Independent directors,especially those with a professional background,also play a role in improving corporate governance.However,independent directors in SOEs have relatively weak incentives to monitor,which limits their governance effect.This paper shows positive implications for promoting mixed-ownership reforms and improving board governance in SOEs.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China,Grant No.71972180
文摘In this study we examine how the regulation of director attendance disciplines directors’behavior,and consider the governance effect of such regulations.This examination exploits the differences between the requirements for director attendance at board meetings enacted by the Shanghai Stock Exchange(SHSE)and by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange(SZSE).Using a difference-indifferences model with a sample of A-share listed firms from 2006 to 2017,we document that the rate of meeting attendance by independent directors who serve with firms listed on the SHSE(SHIDs)has increased significantly since the exchange’s enforcement of the regulation on attendance.This positive effect has been more pronounced for independent directors with legal backgrounds.Further investigations find that the regulation of attendance plays a corporate governance role through the mechanism of enhanced monitoring.The attendance regulation increases the SHIDs likelihood of casting dissenting votes,and it leads to both better accounting performance and higher firm value.In addition,SHIDs are more likely to depart from firms listed on the SHSE,and to transfer their directorships to firms listed on the SZSE,which has a less constraining attendance requirement.Our findings provide evidence of how external regulation shapes director attendance and voting behavior in emerging markets.
