Geographical relationships and CEO compensation contracts

In this paper, we empirically analyze the effects that the geographical relationships between chairman and CEO have on the latter's compensation contracts,based on samples of listed A-share private firms from 2005 to 2014. We find that geographical relationships are related to lower pay–performance sensitivity, and that the correlation mainly exists in poor performance periods,suggesting that geographical relationships weaken the effectiveness of compensation contracts. We also find that geographical relationships can be substituted by external formal institutions.

Compensation Committee Quality and the Relationship between CEO Cash Compensation and Accounting Performance—Evidence From Taiwan

This paper examines the effect of compensation committee quality on the relationship between Chief Executive Officer(CEO)cash compensation and accounting earnings by using a sample of 1,247 publicly-traded Taiwan firms from 2009 to 2011.This paper finds that executive cash compensation is more positively associated with accounting earnings when firms have high compensation committee quality.Compensation committee quality is constructed by a multidimensional measure of compensation committee quality choosing from nine potential,individual measures of compensation committee quality.The results show that executive cash compensation is more positively associated with accounting earnings when firms with scholar directors,a higher proportion of senior directors,a higher proportion of directors who are CEOs of other firms sitting on their compensation committee,and a higher proportion of directors,appointed during the tenure of the incumbent CEO sitting on compensation committees.Findings in this paper imply that shareholders and directors should be concerned about the composition of compensation committees as this paper finds that compensation committee quality varies depending on individual director profession and other characteristics of the committee members.

CEO Compensation of Listed Companies in China

Recently many researches suggest that CEO compensation is not only related to performance. And this relation is non-linear. This paper analyzes CEO compensation, salary and stockholding value with BP neutral network with the data from listed companies during 2003--2005 in China. The results are： 1） The fitness of network outputs are 91.09%, 97：23% and 78.44% respectively; 2） The accurate of forecast improves 92.72%, 92.08% and 53.89% respectively comparing with the results of multi-regression model.

CEO Emotional Intelligence level and Compensation： Evidence From Tunisia

This article focuses on the impact of emotions on Tunisian chief executive officer （CEO） compensation. It examines specifically the role of executives＇ emotional intelligence （El） level and their emotional biases, namely optimism in explaining compensation plans. An empirical study was conducted in this respect, by using a questionnaire as a method of data collection, on a sample of 100 Tunisian companies＇ leaders. This research paper translates an original approach, since it highlights the behavioral aspects role in explaining the CEO＇s compensation policy level. To the best of the knowledge, this represents the first study in the Tunisian context that explored this area of research. Actually, the results show that Tunisian leaders may be subject to certain emotions thereby impacting their compensation characteristics. Indeed, they opt at first to contribute to the organizational performance by establishing a mutual trust within the organizational structure in order to achieve the objectives already set up. However, this could be done at the expense of their compensation plans

Missing quarterly earnings benchmarks, CEO cash compensation and institutional ownership

Research suggests that transient institutions, i.e., institutions with short-term investment horizon,make management focus on short-term earnings goals. This study examines incentive in terms of CEO cash compensation that explains why management concentrates on short-term earnings results when transient institutions hold high levels of ownership. Using quarterly consensus analysts＇ expectations as a proxy for short-term earnings benchmarks, the author finds that CEO cash compensation and the frequency with which management misses quarterly earnings benchmarks in a year （MISSNUMt） are more strongly negatively associated in firms with high transient institutional ownership than in firms with low transient institutional ownership, suggesting that transient institutions strengthen the inverse relation between CEO cash pay and missing short-term earnings benchmarks and hence increase pressure on management in terms of cash pay for short-term results. Moreover, the author shows that change in CEO cash compensation is positively associated with change in transient institutional ownership, consistent with the idea that selling shares by transient institutions influences the boards of portfolio firms in CEO cash compensation decision. This study contributes to the governance literature and is relevant to business managers by providing additional evidence that transient institutions provide less patient capital and may not benefit long-run firm value creation.