An Empirical Study on CEO’s Academic Experience and Financing Constraints-Taking Shanghai and Shenzhen A-Share Listed Companies as Samples

Taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2018 as samples,this paper analyzes the influence of CEO’s academic experience on corporate financing constraints.The empirical results show that there is a negative correlation between CEO’s academic experience and enterprise financing constraint level.Compared with state-owned enterprises,the academic experience of CEO in private enterprises is significantly negatively correlated with the level of corporate financing constraints.It also suggests that CEO’s academic experience can significantly reduce the level of financing constraints in the company samples audited by accounting firms(not Big 4).The conclusion of this paper is helpful to enrich the research of manager characteristics and corporate governance.At the same time,the research in this paper has reference significance for enterprises to ease the level of financing constraints.

CEOs’Diverse Career Experiences and the Effectiveness of Compensation Contracts:Evidence from Compensation Stickiness

CEO compensation stickiness represents an important indicator to measure the effectiveness of compensation contracts.This study uses CEO career experience data and compensation stickiness data from Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2020 to investigate the compensation contracts’effectiveness of CEOs with diverse career experiences.The findings are as follows:1)Compensation stickiness is more pronounced for CEOs with diverse career experiences.According to the mechanism test,these CEOs with diverse career experiences can obtain compensation incentives by reducing corporate uncertainty perception and improving total factor productivity.This approach leads to increased compensation stickiness and the effectiveness of compensation contracts.CEOs with diverse career experiences may receive excess compensation by raising agency costs,which intensifies compensation stickiness and weakens the effectiveness of compensation contracts.2)Compensation stickiness of CEOs with diverse career experiences is more significant in companies with lower investor protection,which brings about less effective compensation contracts.In contrast,in companies with higher diversification,the compensation stickiness of CEOs with diverse career experiences is more significant,which delivers more effective compensation contracts.The conclusions deepen the research of CEO compensation contracts and provide a helpful reference for CEO compensation management practices.