Do agency and stewardship behaviors coexist at firms, or does one dominate the other？ We use data from listed companies in China over the period 2007-2016 to show that powerful chief executive officers （CEOs） simul...Do agency and stewardship behaviors coexist at firms, or does one dominate the other？ We use data from listed companies in China over the period 2007-2016 to show that powerful chief executive officers （CEOs） simultaneously incur self-interested agency costs while acting as stewards to benefit the firm. In balancing the push-and-pull forces of stewardship and agency behaviors, powerful CEOs in Chinese firms ultimately improve short-term and long-term firm performance. Our results have important implications for understanding how CEOs affect firms and how cultural factors can motivate CEOs to work in the interest of the firm.展开更多
基金国家自然科学基金地区项目(72162032)国家社会科学基金项目(21BSH112)+4 种基金2017年度河南财经政法大学青年拔尖人才资助计划(Young Talents Fund Of HUEL)2019年度校级国家重点项目培育项目2021年度河南省高校科技创新人才支持计划(人文社科类)(2021-CX-041)河南省哲学社会科学项目(2021BJJ008)新疆社会科学基金项目(22VZX017)。
基金The authors are grateful for the financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China （Grant Nos. 71702084 and 71372179）, and through the research projects of the Humanity and Social Science Youth foundation of the Ministry of Education of China （No. 17YJC630112）.
文摘Do agency and stewardship behaviors coexist at firms, or does one dominate the other？ We use data from listed companies in China over the period 2007-2016 to show that powerful chief executive officers （CEOs） simultaneously incur self-interested agency costs while acting as stewards to benefit the firm. In balancing the push-and-pull forces of stewardship and agency behaviors, powerful CEOs in Chinese firms ultimately improve short-term and long-term firm performance. Our results have important implications for understanding how CEOs affect firms and how cultural factors can motivate CEOs to work in the interest of the firm.
