This study investigates the relationship between corporate R&D and creditor value.The empirical results suggest that such relationship is contingent on the situations of existing R&D investment and institution...This study investigates the relationship between corporate R&D and creditor value.The empirical results suggest that such relationship is contingent on the situations of existing R&D investment and institutional arrangement of corporate governance.We find that R&D investment increases creditor value when insufficient R&D threatens survival,while reduces creditor value when such threat is mitigated.Moreover,such curvilinear relationship is mainly driven by firms with relatively weak managerial entrenchment.Hypotheses are tested with 98 U.S.listed firms in manufacturing sector over 2001-2007.展开更多
China＇s international investment position is characterized by large net foreign assets, a dominance of low-return foreign exchange reserves and costly foreign direct investment in foreign assets and foreign liabiliti...China＇s international investment position is characterized by large net foreign assets, a dominance of low-return foreign exchange reserves and costly foreign direct investment in foreign assets and foreign liabilities. In addition, China＇s foreign investment positions are facing potentially large exchange risks. These features reflect entrenched institutional and structural problems in China, including underdeveloped capital markets, biased resource allocation and a defective social security system. China＇s net creditor status might actually be an indication of weakness rather than strength. To improve its international investment position, China must speed up economic reforms and allow the market to play a fundamental role in resource allocation.展开更多
Using creditor litigation data from China,we investigate whether creditors can participate in corporate governance when agency conflict between shareholders and creditors is severe.By comparing firms that have experie...Using creditor litigation data from China,we investigate whether creditors can participate in corporate governance when agency conflict between shareholders and creditors is severe.By comparing firms that have experienced creditor lawsuits(litigation firms)with those that have not(non-litigation firms),we find that litigation firms have lower pay-performance sensitivity before lawsuits,suggesting that these firms have weaker corporate governance.This result is consistent with our expectation that creditors participate in corporate governance by introducing external monitoring when internal monitoring,dominated by shareholders,is insufficient.We also find that the association is stronger for firms with more severe shareholder-creditor agency conflict.Moreover,creditor litigation is strongly related to low pay-performance sensitivity when the external legal environment is strong.Our results remain robust to different model specifications and after addressing endogeneity problems.展开更多
文摘This study investigates the relationship between corporate R&D and creditor value.The empirical results suggest that such relationship is contingent on the situations of existing R&D investment and institutional arrangement of corporate governance.We find that R&D investment increases creditor value when insufficient R&D threatens survival,while reduces creditor value when such threat is mitigated.Moreover,such curvilinear relationship is mainly driven by firms with relatively weak managerial entrenchment.Hypotheses are tested with 98 U.S.listed firms in manufacturing sector over 2001-2007.
文摘China＇s international investment position is characterized by large net foreign assets, a dominance of low-return foreign exchange reserves and costly foreign direct investment in foreign assets and foreign liabilities. In addition, China＇s foreign investment positions are facing potentially large exchange risks. These features reflect entrenched institutional and structural problems in China, including underdeveloped capital markets, biased resource allocation and a defective social security system. China＇s net creditor status might actually be an indication of weakness rather than strength. To improve its international investment position, China must speed up economic reforms and allow the market to play a fundamental role in resource allocation.
基金support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China(#71572210,#71802205)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(#SWU1909771)
文摘Using creditor litigation data from China,we investigate whether creditors can participate in corporate governance when agency conflict between shareholders and creditors is severe.By comparing firms that have experienced creditor lawsuits(litigation firms)with those that have not(non-litigation firms),we find that litigation firms have lower pay-performance sensitivity before lawsuits,suggesting that these firms have weaker corporate governance.This result is consistent with our expectation that creditors participate in corporate governance by introducing external monitoring when internal monitoring,dominated by shareholders,is insufficient.We also find that the association is stronger for firms with more severe shareholder-creditor agency conflict.Moreover,creditor litigation is strongly related to low pay-performance sensitivity when the external legal environment is strong.Our results remain robust to different model specifications and after addressing endogeneity problems.
