Financing Strategy of Low-Carbon Supply Chain with Capital Constraint under Cap-and-Trade Regulation

Cap-and-trade regulation provides incentives for manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions,but manufacturers’insufficient capital can disrupt the implementation of low-carbon emission reduction technologies.To alleviate capital constraints,manufacturers can adopt external financing for low-carbon emission reduction investments.This paper studies the independent financing and financing cooperation behavior in a supply chain in which the manufacturer and retailer first implement low-carbon emission reduction technologies and then organize production and sales in accordance with wholesale price contracts.Through comparing the optimal profits and low-carbon emission reduction levels under the independent financing and financing cooperation mode,we come to the following conclusions:(1)Although financing interest increases the cost of the supply chain,manufacturers prefer to invest in reducing carbon emissions rather than buying carbon quotas.(2)When financing independently,a decentralized decision-making mode(MD)is the best choice for manufacturers.(3)In cooperative financing,when the supply chain adopts a decentralized decision-making mode(SD)in which the retailer determines the financing cost-sharing ratio according to their optimal profit,the profits of the supply chain and its members are significantly improved.(4)When manufacturers and retailers adopt a centralized decision-making model(SC)in cooperative financing,they jointly determine the financing cost-sharing ratio and the level of low-carbon emission reduction.If the financing cost-sharing ratio meets a certain threshold range,the profits of manufacturers and retailers achieve Pareto improvement,indicating that this cooperative financing model is effective.

Competition vs cooperation:renewable energy investment under cap-and-trade mechanisms

This paper explores the incentives of investment in renewable energy of two utility firms who compete or cooperate under either a cap-and-trade grandfathering mechanism(GM)or benchmarking mechanism(BM).We find that utility firms will invest in renewable energy more under BM than under GM,in both competitive and cooperative markets,and they will invest more in a competitive market than in a cooperative market,under either GM or BM.Furthermore,utility firms will produce more electricity and generate more total carbon emissions under BM than under GM.The profits of two firms,however,are higher in cooperative market than in competitive market.The government will benefit from implementing a BM to encourage utility firms to invest in renewable energy in a competing market.

Fresh-Keeping Decision and Coordination of Fresh Agricultural Product Supply Chain Considering Carbon Cap-and-Trade under Different Dominance

In the context of low carbon,this paper discussed the impact of the carbon cap-and-trade policy on the fresh-keeping decision-making of two-echelon fresh agricultural product supply chains under different dominance,and designed cost-sharing contracts to coordinate the supply chain of fresh agricultural products dominated by suppliers and retailers respectively.The results showed that:dominance has no effect on the fresh-keeping decision and total revenue of fresh agricultural product supply chain,but it affects the internal income distribution,and dominance does not always bring more benefits;the implementation of carbon cap-and-trade reduces the fresh-keeping decision-making of fresh agricultural products supply chain and reduces the free-rider income of followers;the role of higher carbon trading price is twofold,which not only brings about the speculation of leading enterprises,but also promotes the application of low-carbon technologies;consumers’high preference for freshness,low-cost and high-efficiency low-carbon technology are all conducive to improving the fresh-keeping efforts and benefits of the supply chain;cost-sharing contracts can coordinate the supply chain of fresh agricultural products.

Manufacturer encroachment and carbon reduction decisions considering cap-and-trade policy and retailer investment

Low-carbon regulation and market competition present new opportunities and challenges for supply chain firms,emphasizing the significance of carbon reduction and channel encroachment in enhancing competitiveness.This study formulates various game models to evaluate manufacturers’encroachment strategies(with or without encroachment)under different conditions of low-carbon investment by retailers.It investigates the operational decisions and carbon abatement strategies of firms under various scenarios.The findings reveal that encroachment elevates unit abatement levels but decreases wholesale prices and retailer profits when unit encroachment costs are below certain thresholds.In contrast,the manufacturer consistently benefits from channel encroachment.Retailer-initiated low-carbon investments can motivate manufacturers to reduce emissions.A lower carbon price potentially offers financial advantages to retailer engaging in such investments.Additionally,the likelihood of reduced environmental damage postchannel encroachment,compared to preprofessional encroachment,increases when the retailer invests in low-carbon initiatives.The retailer’s profit is inversely related to the carbon price,and a higher carbon price can strengthen the incentive effect of low-carbon investment on the manufacturer’s abatement endeavors.

基于双边匹配-动态博弈的碳减排技术投资决策

在Cap-and-Trade规制下,本文通过匹配-博弈机制研究双寡头制造商(寡头)碳减排技术投资决策问题,考虑了碳交易(CET)过程。从纵向角度,构建寡头与碳减排技术供应商(供应商)的双边匹配模型,研究寡头最佳碳减排技术选择、供应商最佳投资者选择问题;从横向角度,以产量为决策变量,以供应商技术研发人员的努力程度为辅助变量,构建双寡头Stackelberg动态博弈模型,以确定最优产量和碳减排技术投资决策,有效实现碳减排。最后,通过数值模拟实验加以论证。研究发现,第一,寡头-供应商匹配对的整体期望效用与CET价格存在正相关关系;第二,寡头环境绩效对自身技术应用效率较敏感,而对对手技术应用效率不敏感;第三,CET实施与否会直接影响寡头-供应商匹配对效用最大化目标的实现。

Outsourcing or Not? The OEMrs Better Collecting Mode under Cap-and-Trade Regulation

Many original equipment manufacturers(OEMs)carry out collecting operations by themselves or a third party.Most of the existing research papers in the literature consider the collecting mode selection problem from an economic perspective.However,in practice,the firm's collecting decisions can be affected by the carbon policies at present.This paper aims to bridge the gap in research on remanufacturing supply chain by taking the effects of cap-and-trade regulation into consideration.Stackelberg models are established to study the quantity and price decisions under different collecting modes.We find that the OEM reaps more profits in the OEM collecting mode than the third-party collecting mode when collection cost is large.Otherwise,the third party has lower collection cost,and the third-party collecting mode may make the OEM more profitable.From an environmental perspective,with high collection cost,the third party collecting mode can reduce the carbon emissions unless the cost of new products and the emissions intensity are small.In addition,when the collection cost is low but the quantity of remanufacturing products is restricted by that of new products,the third party collecting mode may increase the carbon emissions.In addition,the implementation of cap-and-trade regulation can always reduce carbon emissions,and it may increase the OEM's profits if consumers preference for remanufactured products is small.

The Optimal Order and Production Strategies of Supply Chain with a Stochastic Demand under Carbon Cap-and-Trade Mechanism

In the context of the global low-carbon economy,the carbon cap-and-trade mechanism(CCATM)plays an important impact on the production and trade of enterprises and is widely implemented by most governments to reduce carbon emissions.In this paper,we investigate a two-stage supply chain game model with a stochastic demand under the CCATM,in which the manufacturer has two production modes and the retailer has two order opportunities,and both of them make green effort.The results show that the optimal decision is irrelevant to carbon cap while is relevant to carbon emissions per unit product.The profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer increase under the CCATM.Furthermore,we explore the optimal decisions under the buyback contract and the payment contract provided by the manufacturer to the retailer.We find that the transfer payment can't improve the profit while the buyback contract can do.We further extend our model by investigating the scenario with the risk-averse channel members,and find that the first optimal order quantity of the retailer would reduce due to risk aversion,while the manufacturer would invest more green effort and the manufacturer would be more likely to cooperate with alowerrisk-averse retailer.

The Supply Chain Contract Design under Cap-and-Trade Mechanism with Free Riding

This paper studies the influence of free riding on enterprise product pricing and carbon emissions reduction investment, as well as the contract design to achieve supply chain coordination under the carbon trading mechanism. First, we discuss the situation where carbon emissions reduction investment affects the product price and income. It demonstrates that the optimal investment of the upstream manufacturer increases with the degree of the free riding of the downstream manufacturer. The upstream manufacturer can improve their carbon reduction investment and the whole supply chain achieves Pareto improvement when the investment cost sharing contract is introduced. Nevertheless, under the cost-sharing contract the optimal investment of the decentralized supply chain is still lower than that of the centralized supply chain, and only in some particular cases can the two types of supply chain achieve equal total profits. Then, we preliminarily explore the situation where the product price and income is influenced by carbon emissions reduction investment. The consequences indicate that the optimal investment of the upstream manufacturers in this situation is less than the former one's, and the transfer payment mechanism is able to improve the level of the supply chain overall carbon emissions-reduction. Moreover, compared to the former situation, the effects of free riding of the downstream manufacturer are even more serious. The conclusions can provide some intellectual support for manufacturing enterprises to make reasonable emissions reduction strategies and coordinate the supply chain existing in free riding.