To determine the optimal pricing and carbon emission reduction decision, a closed-loop supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer is investigated. In this system, the manufacturer manufactures new products and re...To determine the optimal pricing and carbon emission reduction decision, a closed-loop supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer is investigated. In this system, the manufacturer manufactures new products and remanufactures used products while the retailer is responsible for selling new products and remanufactured products. The profit functions of the manufacturer and the retailer are developed, and the corresponding solution formulae for decision variables are given by the Stackelberg game model. Finally, a numerical example is given, and the optimal wholesale price, retail price, carbon emission reduction and others are obtained. Through the sensitivity of the unit carbon allowance price, some significant managerial insights are derived.展开更多
Low-carbon regulation and market competition present new opportunities and challenges for supply chain firms,emphasizing the significance of carbon reduction and channel encroachment in enhancing competitiveness.This ...Low-carbon regulation and market competition present new opportunities and challenges for supply chain firms,emphasizing the significance of carbon reduction and channel encroachment in enhancing competitiveness.This study formulates various game models to evaluate manufacturers’encroachment strategies(with or without encroachment)under different conditions of low-carbon investment by retailers.It investigates the operational decisions and carbon abatement strategies of firms under various scenarios.The findings reveal that encroachment elevates unit abatement levels but decreases wholesale prices and retailer profits when unit encroachment costs are below certain thresholds.In contrast,the manufacturer consistently benefits from channel encroachment.Retailer-initiated low-carbon investments can motivate manufacturers to reduce emissions.A lower carbon price potentially offers financial advantages to retailer engaging in such investments.Additionally,the likelihood of reduced environmental damage postchannel encroachment,compared to preprofessional encroachment,increases when the retailer invests in low-carbon initiatives.The retailer’s profit is inversely related to the carbon price,and a higher carbon price can strengthen the incentive effect of low-carbon investment on the manufacturer’s abatement endeavors.展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 71661003)
文摘To determine the optimal pricing and carbon emission reduction decision, a closed-loop supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer is investigated. In this system, the manufacturer manufactures new products and remanufactures used products while the retailer is responsible for selling new products and remanufactured products. The profit functions of the manufacturer and the retailer are developed, and the corresponding solution formulae for decision variables are given by the Stackelberg game model. Finally, a numerical example is given, and the optimal wholesale price, retail price, carbon emission reduction and others are obtained. Through the sensitivity of the unit carbon allowance price, some significant managerial insights are derived.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.71871153 and 72371179)the sponsorship of the Tang Scholar of Soochow University.
文摘Low-carbon regulation and market competition present new opportunities and challenges for supply chain firms,emphasizing the significance of carbon reduction and channel encroachment in enhancing competitiveness.This study formulates various game models to evaluate manufacturers’encroachment strategies(with or without encroachment)under different conditions of low-carbon investment by retailers.It investigates the operational decisions and carbon abatement strategies of firms under various scenarios.The findings reveal that encroachment elevates unit abatement levels but decreases wholesale prices and retailer profits when unit encroachment costs are below certain thresholds.In contrast,the manufacturer consistently benefits from channel encroachment.Retailer-initiated low-carbon investments can motivate manufacturers to reduce emissions.A lower carbon price potentially offers financial advantages to retailer engaging in such investments.Additionally,the likelihood of reduced environmental damage postchannel encroachment,compared to preprofessional encroachment,increases when the retailer invests in low-carbon initiatives.The retailer’s profit is inversely related to the carbon price,and a higher carbon price can strengthen the incentive effect of low-carbon investment on the manufacturer’s abatement endeavors.
