Faultlines can affect a board of director’s effectiveness in supervising senior managers,which in turn affects the value of a company’s cash holdings.Based on sample data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2...Faultlines can affect a board of director’s effectiveness in supervising senior managers,which in turn affects the value of a company’s cash holdings.Based on sample data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2004 to 2016,we examine the relationship between board faultlines and the value of cash holdings.The empirical results indicate that board faultlines have a significant inhibitory effect on cash holding value.This inhibitory effect is stronger for board faultlines resulting from deep-level attributes.Furthermore,the inhibitory effect of board faultlines is stronger in state-owned enterprises(SOEs)than in non-SOEs.As an important governance mechanism,management shareholdings can reduce agency costs and mitigate the negative impact of board fissures on cash holdings.Overall,we enrich the literature on the economic consequences of board faultlines and their influence on cash holding value.We also offer companies practical suggestions for improving the supervisory mechanism of their board of directors.展开更多
We examine whether business groups' influence on cash holdings depends on ownership. Group affiliation can increase firms' agency costs or benefit firms by providing an internal capital market, especially in t...We examine whether business groups' influence on cash holdings depends on ownership. Group affiliation can increase firms' agency costs or benefit firms by providing an internal capital market, especially in transition economies characterized by weak investor protection and difficult external capital acquisition. A hand-collected dataset of Chinese firms reveals that group affiliation decreases cash holdings, alleviating the free-cash-flow problem of agency costs.State ownership and control of listed firms moderate this benefit, which is more pronounced when the financial market is less liquid. Group affiliation facilitates related-party transactions, increases debt capacity and decreases investmentcash-flow sensitivity and overinvestment. In transitional economies, privately controlled firms are more likely to benefit from group affiliation than statecontrolled firms propped up by the government.展开更多
基金the financial support of the National Natural Science Foundation of China(71872196,71402198)the National Social Science Foundation of China(19ZDA098)+2 种基金the MOE Project of Humanities and Social Sciences of China(19YJA790032)the Beijing Social Foundation of China(15JGC176)the support of the Program for Innovation Research of the Central University of Finance and Economics and the Graduate Student Research Grant awarded by the Graduate School of the Central University of Finance and Economics(20182Y005)
文摘Faultlines can affect a board of director’s effectiveness in supervising senior managers,which in turn affects the value of a company’s cash holdings.Based on sample data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2004 to 2016,we examine the relationship between board faultlines and the value of cash holdings.The empirical results indicate that board faultlines have a significant inhibitory effect on cash holding value.This inhibitory effect is stronger for board faultlines resulting from deep-level attributes.Furthermore,the inhibitory effect of board faultlines is stronger in state-owned enterprises(SOEs)than in non-SOEs.As an important governance mechanism,management shareholdings can reduce agency costs and mitigate the negative impact of board fissures on cash holdings.Overall,we enrich the literature on the economic consequences of board faultlines and their influence on cash holding value.We also offer companies practical suggestions for improving the supervisory mechanism of their board of directors.
基金financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Project No. 71402005)Social Science Foundation of Beijing (Project No. 15JGC155)
文摘We examine whether business groups' influence on cash holdings depends on ownership. Group affiliation can increase firms' agency costs or benefit firms by providing an internal capital market, especially in transition economies characterized by weak investor protection and difficult external capital acquisition. A hand-collected dataset of Chinese firms reveals that group affiliation decreases cash holdings, alleviating the free-cash-flow problem of agency costs.State ownership and control of listed firms moderate this benefit, which is more pronounced when the financial market is less liquid. Group affiliation facilitates related-party transactions, increases debt capacity and decreases investmentcash-flow sensitivity and overinvestment. In transitional economies, privately controlled firms are more likely to benefit from group affiliation than statecontrolled firms propped up by the government.
