In this paper,the transformative and critical potential of the groundlessness of praxis--a central issue in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty--is outlined.It argues that the groundlessness of human praxis entails neither a...In this paper,the transformative and critical potential of the groundlessness of praxis--a central issue in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty--is outlined.It argues that the groundlessness of human praxis entails neither a relativistic nor a foundationalistic epistemological position.On the contrary,following Stanley Cavell and a“resolute reading”of Wittgenstein’s philosophy,it claims that Wittgenstein’s aim is to let us acknowledge that both epistemological foundationalism and epistemic relativism are apparent needs,so as to invite us to change our practical way of acting.From this perspective,this paper suggests that Wittgenstein’s account of philosophy addresses the readers and involves a transformation of their own practical attitude and way of acting.展开更多
Conventionalism makes far too much of conventions,alleging that not only matters of fact,but also the adoption of a framework,are merely matters of convention.Evidential,experiential,and other forms of compulsion are,...Conventionalism makes far too much of conventions,alleging that not only matters of fact,but also the adoption of a framework,are merely matters of convention.Evidential,experiential,and other forms of compulsion are,tout court,dismissed.Justus Buchler,however,crafts a general theory of human judgment in which both conventionality and compulsion are given their due.1 Moreover,he does so in a manner attuned to the axiological dimensions of human communication(whatever its modes or media).These conventions are hardly an ultimately dispensable scaffold.They are rather intrinsically constitutive resources.They also are in countless instances normative.The nature and authority of the normative constraints inherent in many shared conventions(more often than not,enabling constraints)are,however,neither appreciated nor understood.Buchler’s account facilitates us in appreciating and understanding such constraints and much else.展开更多
文摘In this paper,the transformative and critical potential of the groundlessness of praxis--a central issue in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty--is outlined.It argues that the groundlessness of human praxis entails neither a relativistic nor a foundationalistic epistemological position.On the contrary,following Stanley Cavell and a“resolute reading”of Wittgenstein’s philosophy,it claims that Wittgenstein’s aim is to let us acknowledge that both epistemological foundationalism and epistemic relativism are apparent needs,so as to invite us to change our practical way of acting.From this perspective,this paper suggests that Wittgenstein’s account of philosophy addresses the readers and involves a transformation of their own practical attitude and way of acting.
文摘Conventionalism makes far too much of conventions,alleging that not only matters of fact,but also the adoption of a framework,are merely matters of convention.Evidential,experiential,and other forms of compulsion are,tout court,dismissed.Justus Buchler,however,crafts a general theory of human judgment in which both conventionality and compulsion are given their due.1 Moreover,he does so in a manner attuned to the axiological dimensions of human communication(whatever its modes or media).These conventions are hardly an ultimately dispensable scaffold.They are rather intrinsically constitutive resources.They also are in countless instances normative.The nature and authority of the normative constraints inherent in many shared conventions(more often than not,enabling constraints)are,however,neither appreciated nor understood.Buchler’s account facilitates us in appreciating and understanding such constraints and much else.
