A Two-Stage Evolutionary Game Model for Collaborative Emergency Management Between Local Governments and Enterprises

Enterprises play a vital role in emergency management,but few studies have considered the strategy choices behind such participation or the collaborative relationship with the government.This study contended that enterprises have at least three strategies regarding emergency management:non-participation,short-term participation,and long-term participation.We constructed a two-stage evolutionary game model to explore the behavioral evolution rules and evolutionary stability strategies of the government and enterprises,and employed numerical simulation to analyze how various factors influence the strategy selection of the government and enterprises.The results show that if and only if the utility value of participation is greater than 0,an enterprise will participate in emergency management.The evolutionary game then enters the second stage,during which system stability is affected by a synergistic relationship between participation cost,reputation benefit,and government subsidies,and by an incremental relationship between emergency management benefit,government subsidies,and emergency training cost.This study provides a new theoretical perspective for research on collaborative emergency management,and the results provide important references for promoting the performance of collaborative emergency management.

Smart logistics transformation collaboration between manufacturers and logistics service providers:A supply chain contracting perspective

Intelligent transformation of manufacturers requires smart logistics transformation collaboration,which improves competitiveness.In this study,we construct a Stackelberg game model based on the mutual influence and restriction in the relationship between a manufacturer and a logistics service provider(LSP)undergoing smart logistics transformation.We investigate whether cost-sharing(CS)or revenue-sharing(RS)contracts can coordinate the supply chain and suggest a hybrid CSeRS contract to improve performance.We find that,compared with decentralized options,CS and RS contracts achieve a higher level of smart logistics transformation.While the coordination and effectiveness of CS contracts are superior to those of RS contracts,neither can fully coordinate the supply chain.The proposed hybrid CSeRS contract allows the manufacturer to share the LSP’s costs before the transformation and its partial revenue after transformation,so that the LSP can reduce its service charge,thereby achieving full supply chain coordination.