Retailers'incentives for green investment in differentiated competition channels

With increasing public environmental awareness,green activities in retail and distribution processes have become crucial tools for retailers to boost demand and enhance competitiveness.This study develops an analytical model to study the green investment choices of two differentiated retailers dealing with a common green manufacturer.It also explores the impacts of these investment choices on the manufacturer's operational decisions,channel efficiency,consumer welfare,and the environment.We derive three main results.First,the powerful retailer always favors green investments,whereas the less powerful(inferior)retailer may either prefer or avoid green investments.The fiercer the interretailer competition,the lower the willingness of the inferior retailer to introduce green investments.Second,although all supply chain parties may disagree on their preferences for retailers'green investments,a bilateral green investment(i.e.,both retailers make green investments)can reach an incentive alignment for all firms if the differentiation between retailers is low enough and the competition between them is not substantially fierce.Moreover,a bilateral green investment improves consumer welfare and channel efficiency because of the great demand expansion and double marginalization reduction.Third,the retailers'green investments can motivate the manufacturer to produce greener products,but they do not necessarily benefit the environment.We show that the supply chain's economic sustainability aligns with its environmental sustainability only if the environmental improvement efficiency of green investments is substantially high.We further examine the impact of retailers with differentiated green investment abilities and the manufacturer's green investment efficiency to verify the robustness of the main results.

Competition Between Two Excitation-dissociation Channels for Molecular Ions

When the molecular ions XYZ＋ （XY2＋） are excited simultaneously from an electronic state E0 into two higher electronic states Ea and EZ with supervened dissociation or predisso- ciation, competition between the α and β excitation-dissociation channels occurs. A the- oretical model is provided to deal with the competition of the two excitation-dissociation channels with more than two kinds of ionic products for XYZ＋ （XY2＋）. Supposing that the photo-excitation rates of two states Eα and Eβ are much less than their dissociation or pre-dissociation rates, a theoretical equation can be deduced to fit the measured data, which reflects the dependence of the product branching ratios on the intensity ratios of two excitation lasers. From the fitted parameters the excitation cross section ratios are obtained. In experiment, we studied the competition between two excitation-dissociation channels of CO^2＋. By measuring the dependence of the product branching ratio on the intensity ratio of two dissociation lasers and fitting the experiment data with the theoretical equation, excitation cross section ratios were deduced.

The Strategic Analysis of Demand Forecast-Sharing in a Hybrid-Format Online Platform Supply Chain

This paper examines the optimal forecast-sharing strategy in a hybrid-format online platform supply chain where a supplier sells a product through agency format and reselling format provided by a platform retailer who possesses demand forecasts from two channels.Forecast asymmetry and co-opetitive relationship arise between the platform retailer and the supplier,which affect their operational decisions and the supply chain’s performance.To improve supply chain efficiency,we compare different forecast-sharing strategies(i.e.,no forecast sharing,sharing a single forecast,and sharing two forecasts),and analyze the effects of co-opetitive parameters on the optimal forecast-sharing strategy.Our analysis shows that forecast sharing is always beneficial to the supplier,and sharing two forecasts is more beneficial than sharing a single forecast.Whereas for the platform retailer and the whole supply chain,forecast sharing is beneficial only under certain conditions,depending on the co-opetitive parameters.The optimal forecast-sharing strategy is the result of a combination of the negative effect of double marginalization in reselling channel and the positive effect of responding pricing to demand uncertainty in agency channel.We illustrate the parameter regions of the platform retailer’s voluntary sharing,contract sharing,and no sharing,and also find that higher channel competition intensity,higher market share of agency channel,and higher commission rate can promote the platform retailer’s voluntary sharing.Our study extends the research scope of demand forecast-sharing and sheds light on the decision-making processes for managing a hybrid-format online platform supply chain.

Interaction between service investment and store-brand introduction in a dual-channel supply chain

This study examines service investment decisions in the context of two store brand introduction modes and the mode selection of a retailer.The research focuses on a supply chain comprised of a national brand manufacturer(NBM),an external store brand supplier(SBS),and a retailer.A national brand product(NB)is distributed to the market through both direct and retail channels.The retailer consistently offers service efforts within the retail channel and has two options for launching a store brand product(SB):producing the SB or procuring it from an external source.The findings indicate that,when the retailer has a low fixed cost and a substantial market size for one-stop consumers,the retailer internally producing its own SB is more profitable.However,when the market size for one-stop consumers and the fixed cost of producing the SB are both low,or when the retailer possesses a relatively high fixed cost,it is advisable for the retailer to procure a lower-quality SB from the SBS.Alternatively,the retailer could establish its own production facilities to launch a higher-quality SB.Furthermore,it is noteworthy that the NBM consistently favors the retailer outsourcing the SB production to an external SBS.This implies that both the NBM and the retailer can achieve a“win-win”outcome when the retailer procures the SB.