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Study on coopetition relationship simulation among M-commerce information service subjects based on Lotka-Volterra model
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作者 Xiaojun Xu Linzhong Xu Xiaoli Wang 《Journal of Management Analytics》 EI 2023年第3期583-606,共24页
In order to explore the evolution law of coopetition relationship among Mcommerce information service(MIS)subjects and further reveal the allocation mechanism of information resources,the research extends Lotka-Volter... In order to explore the evolution law of coopetition relationship among Mcommerce information service(MIS)subjects and further reveal the allocation mechanism of information resources,the research extends Lotka-Volterra model,builds the coopetition relationship model of MIS subjects and simulates their coopetition relationship by Python and MATLAB to obtain the evolution trend of information resources possession(IRP)of MIS subjects in the coopetition process.The results show that the mutualism cooperation pattern dominated by promoting effect can maximize the value of information resources.This paper has significant reference value for how to optimize the allocation of information resources among MIS subjects. 展开更多
关键词 coopetition relationship M-commerce information service information resources possession stable equilibrium state SIMULATION Lotka-Volterra model
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Coopetition between B2C E-commerce Companies:Price Competition and Logistics Service Cooperation 被引量:2
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作者 Weixiang Huang Wenhui Zhou Feng Luo 《Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering》 SCIE EI CSCD 2020年第6期730-752,共23页
This paper studies the impact of logistics cooperation in two competing companies,one of which is equipped with a self-run logistics system while the other is not.The latter outsources logistics services to a third-pa... This paper studies the impact of logistics cooperation in two competing companies,one of which is equipped with a self-run logistics system while the other is not.The latter outsources logistics services to a third-party logistics company before logistics cooperation,or to its competitor after logistics cooperation with the client's service quality being in proportion to and no greater than the service provider's service quality.We find that when the service provider is a price taker,logistics cooperation is beneficial to both firms only when the service quality after logistics cooperation is moderate.Interestingly,under some circumstances,the client's profit increases even when its service quality decreases after logistics cooperation because logistics cooperation eases the price competition.We also find that all-win situations in which logistics cooperation increases the firms7 profit,consumer surplus and social welfare can be achieved.Finally,when the service price can be chosen by the service provider,we propose a negotiation process in which agreement on logistics cooperation can be reached;when the firm can invest in service quality,logistics cooperation may lower the equilibrium investment level. 展开更多
关键词 E-COMMERCE B2C coopetition logistics cooperation hotelling model
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Coopetition Between TTA and OTA Based on Multinomial Logit Choice Model
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作者 Hui-Li Yan Hao Xiong 《Journal of the Operations Research Society of China》 EI CSCD 2021年第4期741-756,共16页
This paper proposes a framework to analyse the impact of online travel agency(OTA)when it steps into an original market of a traditional travel agency(TTA).Based on the multinomial logit choice model,the demand model ... This paper proposes a framework to analyse the impact of online travel agency(OTA)when it steps into an original market of a traditional travel agency(TTA).Based on the multinomial logit choice model,the demand model and the profit model are presented.Then,the demand squeeze,the total demand increase and the cooperation range of wholesale price are analysed.From the analysis,the results indicate that:(1)OTA can increase the demand of the whole market while it squeezes the demand of TTA;(2)The demand squeeze,total demand increase and the range of cooperation wholesale price are all positive with the perceived value from OTA and negative with the perceived value from TTA.(3)The more immature the market is the more necessary for TTA to cooperate with OTA.In addition,numerical example and sensitivity analysis of perceived value and price are presented to illustrate the demand squeeze,demand increase and cooperation range of wholesale price. 展开更多
关键词 coopetition Online travel agency Multinomial logit choice model
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Who Benefits from Altruism in Supply Chain Management? 被引量:28
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作者 Zehui Ge Qiying Hu 《American Journal of Operations Research》 2012年第1期59-72,共14页
The significant effect of social preference on strategic behavior has been convinced by recent research. Along this stream of research, we study firms’ altruistic incentives in supply chains since the selfish rationa... The significant effect of social preference on strategic behavior has been convinced by recent research. Along this stream of research, we study firms’ altruistic incentives in supply chains since the selfish rationality can’t deal with economic behaviors. We show that the performance of the supply chain in consideration of altruism is between those of scenarios under decentralization and under integration. We further shows that a manufacturer, as a leader, should find an egoistic retailer, while a retailer, as a follower, should find a manufacturer with altruistic liability, to form a good chain. 展开更多
关键词 Supply Chain Management coopetition Altruistic PREFERENCE Advertising/Sales EFFORT Pricing
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竞合主义视角下的东北亚安全局势思考 被引量:1
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作者 储昭根 《学术前沿》 CSSCI 北大核心 2018年第9期4-17,共14页
朝鲜核问题是当前整个东北亚安全格局的核心。围绕朝鲜核问题的竞合,是东北亚战后秩序重组的竞合,同时也是大国间政治及战略的竞合。真正解决朝核问题,必须考虑到半岛内部的力量对比、安全结构及人心向背。面对扑朔迷离、复杂多变的半... 朝鲜核问题是当前整个东北亚安全格局的核心。围绕朝鲜核问题的竞合,是东北亚战后秩序重组的竞合,同时也是大国间政治及战略的竞合。真正解决朝核问题,必须考虑到半岛内部的力量对比、安全结构及人心向背。面对扑朔迷离、复杂多变的半岛形势,我们需要准确定位中国的国家利益,理清半岛"玩家"彼此竞合关系。在此基础上,我们才能看清半岛及整个东北亚局势的走向,找到半岛战争的制约因素及维护中国国家利益的着力点,从而实现中国国家利益及安全的最大化,并保障半岛的和平、发展与稳定。 展开更多
关键词 朝鲜核问题 东北亚 安全研究 竞合主义
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竞合主义:重构无政府状态下的范式与安全 被引量:7
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作者 储昭根 《浙江社会科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2020年第11期23-33,156,共12页
“无政府状态”是三大国际关系理论研究的逻辑起点。本文运用演绎法,从新现实主义和新自由主义两大经典国际关系理论分别提出无政府状态与复合相互依存的基本假定出发,推导出国际关系三大主流理论之外新的、第四种解读——当今世界“无... “无政府状态”是三大国际关系理论研究的逻辑起点。本文运用演绎法,从新现实主义和新自由主义两大经典国际关系理论分别提出无政府状态与复合相互依存的基本假定出发,推导出国际关系三大主流理论之外新的、第四种解读——当今世界“无政府状态”已演化为一种全新的“竞合状态”,即竞争代替了冲突,合作代替了对抗,竞争与合作相互作用及共存的新状态。进而,以“竞合状态”为立论基础,在综合、博采不同理论精华基础上,提出了竞合主义,从而实现对三大主流理论的推进。 展开更多
关键词 竞合主义 无政府状态 复合相互依存 竞争 合作
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竞合:超越传统安全化理论的新分析框架 被引量:6
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作者 储昭根 《学术前沿》 CSSCI 北大核心 2020年第11期66-77,89,共13页
鉴于系统理论研究夸大了体系对单元的冲击,忽略后者对体系的影响,而单元层次理论建构一直面临内容无所不包、过于具体化、复杂化、主观随意性大等多重困难。首先,通过从外交政策分析转向安全问题研究,让国家回归为理性行为体及解决单元... 鉴于系统理论研究夸大了体系对单元的冲击,忽略后者对体系的影响,而单元层次理论建构一直面临内容无所不包、过于具体化、复杂化、主观随意性大等多重困难。首先,通过从外交政策分析转向安全问题研究,让国家回归为理性行为体及解决单元是否具有稳定偏好的问题。其次,通过系统与单元的安全互动——安全化过程中的双层竞合,解决哥本哈根学派安全化理论中体系作用缺失问题。最后,通过再定义安全,找出单元内部竞合过程中稳定的变量,避免对外政策分析学者失败的"窠臼",并由此推导出安全的强度与烈度、领导人注意力、资源及资金分配、政治共识及社会认同这五个可观察、可检验与可重复的变量,弥补国际关系研究中有关"行动过程"的缺口,实现对哥本哈根学派安全化理论的超越。 展开更多
关键词 安全化 双层竞合 哥本哈根学派 跨层次理论整合 竞合主义
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Bipartite Consensus of Linear Multi-Agent Systems by Distributed Event-Triggered Control 被引量:3
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作者 YANG Ruitian PENG Li +1 位作者 YANG Yongqing ZHU Fengzeng 《Journal of Systems Science & Complexity》 SCIE EI CSCD 2021年第3期955-974,共20页
For multi-agent systems with competitive and collaborative relationships,signed graph can more intuitively express the characteristics of their interactive networks.In this paper,the bipartite consensus is investigate... For multi-agent systems with competitive and collaborative relationships,signed graph can more intuitively express the characteristics of their interactive networks.In this paper,the bipartite consensus is investigated for multi-agent systems with structurally balanced signed graph.In order to reduce actuation burden in dynamical network environment,the event-triggering strategy is applied to bipartite consensus protocol for the multi-agent systems.The triggered condition for each agent is designed by using its own information and transmitted information of its neighbors at sampling instant and make the number of triggers of the whole systems be reduced.Based on the distributed eventtriggered control,some sufficient conditions are derived to guarantee the leaderless and leader-following bipartite consensus.Finally,some numerical examples are shown to demonstrate the effectiveness of the theoretical results. 展开更多
关键词 Bipartite consensus coopetition networks event-triggered control structurally balanced
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