The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between investor protection, ownership structure and corporate valuation. La Porta showed that there existed a simple linear relationship between corporate ...The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between investor protection, ownership structure and corporate valuation. La Porta showed that there existed a simple linear relationship between corporate valuation and the holding percentage of controlling shareholders. But recent empirical evidence does not support it. A nonlinear relationship is proved between ownership structure and corporate valuaton by relaxing the assumption of La Porta＇s model in this paper. There exists a positive relation between investor protection and corporate valuation. Our empirical research shows that this relation is significantly positive indeed.展开更多
China’s restructuring of state-owned enterpsies has been a major component of the country’s reform and opening, and a driver of its impressive economic growth of the last two decades. An examination of this restruct...China’s restructuring of state-owned enterpsies has been a major component of the country’s reform and opening, and a driver of its impressive economic growth of the last two decades. An examination of this restructuring is important not only as a contribution to the general economic development literature, but also for China to best understand how its development has played out so far, and thus how it might best be continued.展开更多
Since the beginning of the 1990s, Japanese banks have become saddled with huge amounts of non-performing loans and a significant number of them have failed. We investigate the cause of this banking crisis that has jeo...Since the beginning of the 1990s, Japanese banks have become saddled with huge amounts of non-performing loans and a significant number of them have failed. We investigate the cause of this banking crisis that has jeopardized the stability of the financial and economic system. Following Hanazaki （2001）, we argue that the deficiency of effective corporate governance of banks in Japan has caused inefficient management. Our focus here is the role of large shareholders who happen to be banks and insurers. We argue that these large shareholders appear to collude or conspire with management instead of being tough monitors. Consequently, the management became entrenched. Our empirical results show that during the 1980s these ＂entrenched banks＂ extended more lending. Even after the collapse of the bubble in the 1990s, they did not dramatically undertake restructuring to cope with the accumulated bad loans.展开更多
文摘The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between investor protection, ownership structure and corporate valuation. La Porta showed that there existed a simple linear relationship between corporate valuation and the holding percentage of controlling shareholders. But recent empirical evidence does not support it. A nonlinear relationship is proved between ownership structure and corporate valuaton by relaxing the assumption of La Porta＇s model in this paper. There exists a positive relation between investor protection and corporate valuation. Our empirical research shows that this relation is significantly positive indeed.
文摘China’s restructuring of state-owned enterpsies has been a major component of the country’s reform and opening, and a driver of its impressive economic growth of the last two decades. An examination of this restructuring is important not only as a contribution to the general economic development literature, but also for China to best understand how its development has played out so far, and thus how it might best be continued.
文摘Since the beginning of the 1990s, Japanese banks have become saddled with huge amounts of non-performing loans and a significant number of them have failed. We investigate the cause of this banking crisis that has jeopardized the stability of the financial and economic system. Following Hanazaki （2001）, we argue that the deficiency of effective corporate governance of banks in Japan has caused inefficient management. Our focus here is the role of large shareholders who happen to be banks and insurers. We argue that these large shareholders appear to collude or conspire with management instead of being tough monitors. Consequently, the management became entrenched. Our empirical results show that during the 1980s these ＂entrenched banks＂ extended more lending. Even after the collapse of the bubble in the 1990s, they did not dramatically undertake restructuring to cope with the accumulated bad loans.
